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Executive Summary 
 
Fiduciary obligation, under both corporate law and the common law, requires directors and 
officers to identify and address climate-related financial and other risks. In fulfilling their 
obligations to act in the best interests of the company, directors and officers must directly engage 
with developments in knowledge regarding physical and transition risks related to climate change 
and how these risks may impact their corporation. Depending on the firm’s economic activities, 
the risk may be minor or highly significant, but directors and officers have an obligation to make 
the inquiries, to devise strategies to address risks, and to have an ongoing monitoring to ensure 
the strategies continue to be responsive to the risk. Directors’ fiduciary duty requires that they 
have overseen and monitored the actions of the individuals charged with mitigation and 
adaptation; and have mechanisms in place to respond rapidly to changes in the company’s risk 
profile. In addition to fiduciary obligations, this study examines the statutory duty of care under 
corporate law, which requires directors and officers to exercise the care, diligence and skills that a 
reasonably prudent person would exercise in the circumstances. This duty requires directors and 
officers to supervise and manage the transition that will address the specific risks, as well as the 
new opportunities, posed by climate change. 
 
The study also examines pension plan trustees and other investment fiduciaries in respect of their 
fiduciary obligations related to climate change. Pension fund trustees have a fiduciary obligation 
to pension beneficiaries to act prudently in their best interests in making investment decisions 
regarding fund portfolios.  In fulfilling their obligations to beneficiaries, pension trustees and their 
investment managers have an obligation to identify and address climate-related financial 
risk.  Trustees can take climate change into account as a legitimate investment issue over the short 
or long term or both. If trustees fail to act to address material climate change risk, they may be 
personally liable for breach of their fiduciary obligation.  Inaction is no longer acceptable, given all 
the evidence that climate change risk is material across the entire economy. Trustees can also take 
climate change into account because they have duties as public fiduciaries additional to their 
financial duty to beneficiaries. Fiduciaries have a duty to act even where the potential costs and 
benefits of climate change cannot be fully quantified immediately. Fiduciary obligation also 
requires considering the benefits of investment in green adaption and mitigation technologies and 
other products and services that are likely to have upside financial potential for return on 
investment.   
 
 To date, there is no jurisprudence in Canada that expressly clarifies fiduciary obligation regarding 
climate risk, but existing Supreme Court of Canada judgments make clear that the obligations of 
fiduciaries are contextual and broad enough to recognize such a duty. The Supreme Court has held 
that in considering what is in the best interests of the corporation, directors may look to the 
interests of shareholders, employees, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment, 
as well as prevailing socio-economic conditions to inform their decisions. The statutory obligation 
that directors act honestly and in good faith, and act diligently in supervising and managing the 
corporation’s affairs, necessarily means that they must engage with the issues of physical and 
transition climate change risks. In assessing violations of fiduciary obligations regarding climate-
related financial risk, the courts will look to see that the directors made a reasonable decision, not 
a perfect decision. Provided that the decisions and the action taken to monitor, mitigate and/or 
adapt with respect to climate risk is within a range of reasonableness, the courts are unlikely to 
find personal liability. Yet while courts are reluctant to second-guess the application of business 
expertise to the considerations involved in corporate decision making, they have made clear that 
they will determine whether an appropriate degree of prudence and diligence was brought to bear 
in reaching what is claimed to be a reasonable business decision at the time it was made. 
 
While the existing statutory and common law obligations of all these fiduciaries  are sufficient to 
ground a fiduciary obligation to address climate-related financial risk, Canadian governments could 
adopt legislation similar that enacted in France to require corporations, financial institutions, and 
institutional investors, including mutual funds and pension funds, to disclose annually the financial 
risks related to the effects of climate change and the company’s measures to reduce them, 
including how they are implementing a low-carbon strategy in every component of their activities, 
and how their corporate and investment decision-making is contributing to the energy and 
ecological transition to limit global warming. Relevant for this study are the requirements that 
institutional investors publish commitments on responsible investment regarding climate change 
risk, including explanations of how these commitments align with their fiduciary duties.  
 
Moving forward, fiduciaries should embed mitigation and adaptation strategies in their corporate 
decisions and investment portfolio management, and report to shareholders, pension 
beneficiaries and other stakeholders on how these commitments have been implemented and the 
resultant outcomes. Companies should provide robust, credible and detailed accounts of their 
management of climate risk. They should ensure that trustees, boards and executives have the 
resources and knowledge to hold investment managers and advisers to account on climate-related 
issues. The study also canvasses other avenues for holding directors accountable for failing to 
address climate-related financial risk, including corporate law oppression remedies, personal and 
derivative actions. It examines environmental liability in Canada for lessons that can be drawn for 
climate-related litigation risk. The study offers a starting list of due diligence that fiduciaries could 
undertake now to engage in proactive governance regarding climate-related financial risk.  
 
The law as currently framed is a driver for positive action on climate change. While the focus of 
the study is Canada, it draws on international developments and its key findings have broad 
application internationally.   
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Fiduciary Obligations in Business and Investment: Implications of Climate Change 
 
Janis Sarra* 
 
 
I.   Introduction  
 
The allocation of capital in business and investment have an impact on and are impacted by climate 
change. This study examines the scope of duties of directors, officers, pension fund managers, 
trustees and other fiduciaries in respect of climate change risk.  While the focus is on Canadian 
statutory and common law, the reasoning has broad application internationally, and is also 
informed by recent international developments. The study concludes that a comprehensive 
understanding of fiduciary obligation can facilitate, rather than constrain, the ability of directors, 
officers and other fiduciaries to address the complex challenges of climate-related financial risk. It 
provides an answer to concerns that consideration of climate change somehow places social 
benefits before enterprise wealth maximization and maximization of the financial performance of 
a fund’s investments. Fiduciary obligations require fiduciaries to make decisions based on a horizon 
longer than the financial quarter or year and limited to profit/return on investment for such limited 
period. Fiduciaries have a duty to identify and address the potential costs and benefits of climate 
change risk, even where those costs and benefits cannot be fully quantified immediately.   
 
Climate change represents a significant risk in financial and other markets; it could substantially 
affect the valuation of many publicly listed companies and place some investment portfolios at 
risk.1 Anthropogenic climate change - climate change due to the activities of humans - presents 
the greatest challenge of this century.  As 195 countries agreed in December 2015 in the first fully-
global climate change agreement, “COP 21”,2 there is urgent need to reduce annual emissions of 
greenhouse gases (GHG)3 by 2020 if we are to have any hope of holding the increase in the global 
average temperature to below 2°C above preindustrial levels and pursue efforts to limit it to 1.5°C 
                                                          
* My sincere thank you to the Ivey Foundation for providing financial support for this research.  Many thanks to 
participants at climate finance roundtable discussions in Toronto, Calgary and Vancouver, who provided helpful 
comments on the first draft of this research study. Thanks also to MaryGrace Johnstone for research assistance. 
1 World Economic Forum, The Global Risks Report 2017, online: WEF <http://reports.weforum.org/global-risks-2017/>. 
2 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) Conference of the Parties (“COP 21”), Paris 
Agreement, 12 December 2015, at 1, 
unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf; Adoption of the Paris 
Agreement, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/L.9, 11 December 2015 at para 137; 
unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09.pdf. More than 174 countries have since ratified the agreement, 
including Canada, http://unfccc.int/2860.php. On 5 October 2016, the threshold for entry into force of the Paris 
Agreement was achieved. The Paris Agreement entered into force on 4 November 2016.  
3 Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC), “Canadian Environmental  Sustainability Indicators Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions”, 2017,  https://www.ec.gc.ca/indicateurs-indicators/default.asp?lang=en&n=F60DB708-1. “Greenhouse 
gases trap heat in the Earth's atmosphere, just as the glass of a greenhouse keeps warm air inside. Human activity 
increases the amount of GHGs in the atmosphere, contributing to a warming of the Earth's surface. This is called the 
enhanced greenhouse effect. Over the past 200 years in particular, humans have released GHGs into the atmosphere 
primarily from burning fossil fuels. As a result, more heat is being trapped and the temperature of the planet is 
increasing. Sea levels are rising as Arctic ice melts, and there are changes to the climate, such as more severe storms 
and heat waves. All of this impacts the environment, the economy and human health”, at 5 (“ECCC Indicators”). 
  
 
2 
in order to survive as a planet.4 Scientists have known about the serious risks to our planet from 
anthropogenic climate change for more than 30 years.5 More than 800 scientists internationally 
have recognized a strong scientific case for urgent and long-term action on climate change, calling 
for fossil fuels to be phased out by 2100 and for immediate, substantial and sustained reductions 
in greenhouse gas emissions.6 In meeting the COP 21 goals, two-thirds of the world’s fossil fuel 
reserves will not be used and are at risk of becoming stranded assets, placing trillions of dollars of 
shareholder value at risk.7 Canada’s economy faces significant risk in this respect. Canada is only 
at a nascent stage of addressing climate change,8 and this moment in time presents an important 
opportunity to shift the trajectory of our efforts to address climate change risk.   
 
This study explores one important aspect of the transition to a low carbon economy, the fiduciary 
obligations of directors, officers, pension fund managers, trustees and other fiduciaries to identify 
and address climate change financial risk in their business operations and investment portfolios. It 
suggests that corporate and pension laws, as currently framed, already create a fiduciary obligation 
in respect of climate change. In fulfilling their duty to act in the best interests of companies, 
directors and officers have an obligation to identify and address climate-related financial risk. 
Pension and other investment fiduciaries, in fulfilling their obligations to beneficiaries, have an 
obligation to identify and address climate-related financial risk. There are both statutory provisions 
and a highly developed jurisprudence on fiduciary obligations in the business context in Canada.  
The study examines why they are sufficient to ground a fiduciary obligation to address climate-
related financial risk.  It examines whether it will take an appellate court judgment to generate 
widespread adoption of this idea.  It also explores whether legislators could act now to clarify the 
scope of the duty, to help provide a roadmap for directors, encouraging them to take meaningful 
action to transition towards a low-carbon economy. 
 
While the legislation governing corporate directors and officers, and that governing pension funds 
and other institutional investors, have different parameters, one point of intersection is the scope 
of fiduciary obligation, and more specifically, that obligation in respect of climate-related risk.  A 
comprehensive analysis of fiduciary obligation and climate-related financial risk is therefore best 
accomplished through the lens of multiple stakeholders implicated in financial markets. Hence, a 
research study considering the duties of all these fiduciaries. 
 
Part II of this report provides a description of the current state of fiduciary obligation in Canada.  
Part III examines the fiduciary obligation of Canadian directors and officers, suggesting that as 
framed, the current obligation to act in the best interests of the company includes the obligation 
                                                          
4 Ibid. 
5 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”), “Climate Change 2014. Impacts, Adaptation and 
Vulnerability”, at 9, https://www.ipcc.ch/. 
6 IPCC, 2014 Synthesis Report, http://www.ipcc.ch/news_and_events/docs/ar5/ar5_syr_headlines_en.pdf.  
7 Carbon Tracker Initiative, Unburnable Carbon, 2014, http://www.carbontracker.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/09/Unburnable-Carbon-Full-rev2-1.pdf; Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership, 
“Unhedgeable risk How climate change sentiment impacts investment”, 2015, 
https://www.cisl.cam.ac.uk/publications/publication-pdfs/unhedgeable-risk.pdf. 
8 Canadian governments and businesses are ahead of others in terms of thinking through the implications of climate 
change risk, but overall, the country lags other efforts internationally: Howard Covington and Raj Thamotheram, “The 
Case for Forceful Stewardship”, Part 1, 10 January 2015 working paper, SSRN-id2551478. 
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to identify and address climate-related risk.  This part also discusses the statutory duty of care and 
corporate law oppression remedies as further avenues for holding directors accountable for failing 
to address climate adaptation and mitigation. Part IV examines investment practices and fiduciary 
obligation in respect of climate-related financial risk, including the obligations of pension fund 
managers and trustees. While the jurisprudence on financial fiduciaries is not as developed as 
obligations under corporate law, part IV engages in careful analysis of both statutory and common 
law that does exist. It identifies a governance role for institutional investors and pension fiduciaries 
in respect of tacking the challenges posed by climate change. Part V suggests that while the duty 
currently exists, legislators in Canada could create greater certainty by clarifying the scope of 
current statutory language.  Part VI concludes. 
 
The methodology for the study includes consideration of the statutory language governing 
fiduciaries under corporate, securities, pension and trust law; the common law jurisprudence in 
Canada and elsewhere; and international developments in climate-related financial risk and policy 
and strategies to address it.  Consultations were held with industry and financial stakeholder 
groups in Toronto, Calgary and Vancouver, and a draft of the study was circulated for comments. 
 
 
II.  Fiduciary Obligation in Canada – the Current State of the Law 
 
Generally, a fiduciary relationship is “a relationship in which one person is under a duty to act for 
the benefit of another person on matters within the scope of the relationship.”9 A fiduciary 
obligation “arises in a relationship in which the fiduciary has a discretion or power to exercise, the 
fiduciary can unilaterally exercise this discretion or power, and the beneficiary is vulnerable to, or 
at the mercy of, the fiduciary.”10 The precise scope of a fiduciary’s duties depends on the nature 
of the fiduciary’s relationship with one or more beneficiaries.11  A trustee, for instance, is in a 
fiduciary relationship with the beneficiaries of the trust. The trustee is expected to be loyal to the 
beneficiaries in carrying out the trust obligations in the best interests of the beneficiaries.12 
Another long-accepted fiduciary relationship is that of an agent to the agent’s principal. An agent 
is expected to act with care and in the best interests of the principal.  
 
In terms of individuals and firms who manage other people’s money, their fiduciary obligation 
requires them to act in the interests of beneficiaries, rather than serving their own interests, 
                                                          
9 See the definition of “fiduciary relationship” in Black’s Law Dictionary, 10th ed (St Paul, Minn: Thomson Reuters, 
2009). Similarly, The Dictionary of Canadian Law, 4th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2011) says that a “fiduciary duty” is “1. 
One that arises in the context of a trust. 2. Certain relationships give rise to this type of duty: trustee and beneficiary, 
guardian and ward, principal and agent. 3. A duty by which the law seeks to protect vulnerable persons in transactions 
with others.” For a discussion see R Yalden, J Sarra, M Gillen, M Khimji, C Liao, P Patten, M Condon, G Campo, B Bryan 
and M Deturbide, Business Organizations: Practice, Theory and Emerging Challenges (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 
2017) [“Yalden et al”]. 
10 Lac Minerals Ltd v International Corona Resources Ltd, [1989] 2 SCR 574 [“Lac Minerals”]. Dictionary of Canadian 
Law, ibid. 
11 Guerin v The Queen, [1984] 2 SCR 335 at 384. 
12 Yalden et al, supra note 9. 
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including a duty of loyalty and a duty of prudence.13 The duty of loyalty requires fiduciaries to act 
in good faith in the interests of their beneficiaries, impartially balance the conflicting interests of 
different beneficiaries, avoid conflicts of interest, and a duty not to act for the benefit of 
themselves or a third party. The prudential obligation requires fiduciaries to act with the care, 
diligence and skill in the administration and investment of the pension fund that a person of 
ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with the property of another person.14 Prior to 
modern corporations statutes, directors were found to be in a fiduciary relationship with the 
corporation and, therefore, required to exercise care in making management decisions with 
respect to the corporation.15  
 
The Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) has held that there are certain common threads running 
through fiduciary duties that arise from relationships marked by discretionary power and trust, 
such as loyalty and “the avoidance of a conflict of duty and interest, and a duty not to profit at the 
expense of the beneficiary”.16 This part examines fiduciary obligation through the lens of the 
obligations of corporate directors and officers. However, the approach of the SCC in these 
judgments offers valuable insights for pension trustees and other fiduciaries as well.  
 
 
1. Director and Officer Fiduciary Obligations 
 
Corporate legislation in Canada has codified fiduciary duty provisions,17 which operate in tandem 
with common law obligations. Corporate law specifies that directors and officers of corporations 
incorporated under such statutes have a duty to act in the best interests of the corporation.18  
 
                                                          
13 Ronald B Davis, Democratizing Pension Funds, Corporate Governance and Accountability (Vancouver: UBC Press, 
2008) at 54 [“Davis”].  
14 See for example, the Ontario Pension Benefits Act, RSO 1990, c P 8 [OPBA], as amended, s 22(1). 
15 Lac Minerals, supra, note 10. 
16 Ibid. 
17 See the Canada Business Corporations Act, RSC 1985, c C-44, as amended [CBCA], s 122(1). For corresponding 
provisions in general statutes of incorporation of the provinces and territories, see the Alberta Business Corporations 
Act, RSA 2000, c B-9 [ABCA], s 122(1); the British Columbia Business Corporations Act, SBC 2002, c 57 [BCBCA], s 142(1); 
the Manitoba Corporations Act, CCSM c C225 [MCA], s 117(1); the New Brunswick Business Corporations Act, SNB 
1981, c B-9.1 [NBBCA], s 79(1); the Newfoundland and Labrador Corporations Act, RSNL 1990, c C-36 [NLCA], s 203(1); 
the Northwest Territories Business Corporations Act, SNWT 1996, c 19 [NTBCA], s 123(1); the Nunavut Business 
Corporations Act, SNWT (Nu) 1996, c 19 [NuBCA], s 123(1); the Ontario Business Corporations Act, RSO 1990, c B.16 
[OBCA], s 134(1); the Québec Business Corporations Act, CQLR c S-31.1 [QBCA], s 119; the Saskatchewan Business 
Corporations Act, RSS 1978, c B-10 [SBCA], s 117(1); the Yukon Business Corporations Act, RSY 2002, c 20 [YBCA], s 
124(1). The Nova Scotia Companies Act, RSNS 1989, c 81 and the Prince Edward Island Companies Act, RSPEI 1988, c C-
14 do not have a corresponding provision. 
18 Section 122(1) of the CBCA, ibid, provides: 
Every director and officer of a corporation in exercising their powers and discharging their duties shall 
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation; and 
(b) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in comparable 
circumstances. 
For corresponding provisions in general statutes of incorporation of the provinces and territories, see ABCA, ibid, s 
122(1); BCBCA, ibid, s 142(1); MCA, ibid, s 117(1); NBBCA, ibid, s 79(1); NLCA, ibid, s 203(1); NTBCA, ibid, s 123(1); 
NuBCA, ibid, s 123(1); OBCA, ibid, s 134(1); QBCA, ibid, s 119; SBCA, ibid, s 117(1); YBCA, ibid, s 124(1). 
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The primary role of directors is to manage, or supervise the management of, the business and 
affairs of a corporation.19  The directors may appoint officers, specify their duties and delegate 
powers to manage the corporation’s business and affairs.20 The Canada Business Corporations Act 
(CBCA) and its sister corporations statutes in the provinces and territories establish duties to be 
discharged by directors and officers in managing, or supervising the management of, the 
corporation. Two components of the codified duties of directors and officers are the duty of loyalty 
and the duty of care. The corporate statutory duty of loyalty requires that the directors and officers 
of a corporation “act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the 
corporation.”21 The statutory duty of care requires that the directors and officers “exercise the 
care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in comparable 
circumstances.”22 The SCC has held that it is the first of these duties that is the “statutory fiduciary 
duty”.23 These duties are discussed in turn. 
 
 
2. The Statutory Fiduciary Duty under Corporate Law 
 
The SCC has held that the statutory fiduciary duty requires directors and officers to act honestly 
and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation.24 It has held that considerable 
power over the deployment and management of financial, human and material resources is vested 
in the directors and officers of corporations. In deciding to invest in, lend to or otherwise deal with 
a corporation, shareholders and creditors transfer control over their assets to the corporation, and 
hence to the directors and officers, in the expectation that the directors and officers will use the 
corporation’s resources to make reasonable business decisions that are to the corporation’s 
advantage.25 Directors and officers must respect the trust and confidence that have been reposed 
in them to manage the assets of the corporation in pursuit of the realization of the objects of the 
corporation.26 They must serve the corporation selflessly, honestly and loyally.27 
 
In considering the specific substance of the fiduciary duty based on the relationship of directors to 
corporations, the SCC held that the phrase the “best interests of the corporation” should be read 
not simply as the “best interests of the shareholders”; that from an economic perspective, the 
“best interests of the corporation” means the maximization of the value of the corporation, but 
that various other factors may be relevant in determining what directors should consider in 
                                                          
19 Section 102(1), CBCA, ibid. 
20 Section 121, CBCA, ibid. Subject to any unanimous shareholder agreement and several other provisions of the 
statute. 
21 CBCA, ibid, s 122(1)(a); ABCA, supra note 17, s 122(1)(a); BCBCA, supra note 17, s 142(1)(a); MCA, supra note 17, s 
117(1)(a); NBBCA, supra note 17, s 79(1)(a); NLCA, supra note 17, s 203(1)(a); NTBCA, supra note 17, s 123(1)(a); 
NuBCA, supra note 17, s 123(1)(a); OBCA, supra note 17, s 134(1)(a); QBCA, supra note 17, s 119; SBCA, supra note 17, 
s 117(1)(a); YBCA, s 124(1)(a). 
22 Peoples Department Stores Inc (Trustee of) v Wise, 2004 SCC 68, [2004] 3 SCR 461 [“Peoples Department Stores”]. 
23  Ibid at paras 34-35, citing s 122(1), CBCA, supra note 17. 
24 Ibid at para 32. 
25 Ibid at para 34. 
26 Ibid at para 35. They must avoid conflicts of interest with the corporation. They must avoid abusing their position to 
gain personal benefit. They must maintain the confidentiality of information they acquire by virtue of their position. 
27 Ibid at para 35. 
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soundly managing with a view to the best interests of the corporation.28 The SCC held that: “We 
accept as an accurate statement of law that in determining whether they are acting with a view to 
the best interests of the corporation it may be legitimate, given all the circumstances of a given 
case, for the board of directors to consider, inter alia, the interests of shareholders, employees, 
suppliers, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment.”29   
 
The SCC held that the various shifts in interests that naturally occur as a corporation’s fortunes rise 
and fall do not, however, affect the content of the fiduciary duty - at all times, directors and officers 
owe their fiduciary obligation to the corporation.30 The Court further held that “In using their skills 
for the benefit of the corporation when it is in troubled waters financially, the directors must be 
careful to attempt to act in its best interests by creating a “better” corporation, and not to favour 
the interests of any one group of stakeholders.”31 
 
In BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders, the SCC reiterated its holding in Peoples Department Stores 
that “In considering what is in the best interests of the corporation, directors may look to the 
interests of, inter alia, shareholders, employees, creditors, consumers, governments and the 
environment to inform their decisions.32 The SCC held that:  
 
The fiduciary duty of the directors to the corporation is a broad, contextual concept. It is 
not confined to short-term profit or share value. Where the corporation is an ongoing 
concern, it looks to the long-term interests of the corporation. The content of this duty 
varies with the situation at hand. At a minimum, it requires the directors to ensure that 
the corporation meets its statutory obligations. But, depending on the context, there may 
also be other requirements. In any event, the fiduciary duty owed by directors is 
mandatory; directors must look to what is in the best interests of the corporation.33  
 
The SCC further held that, in executing its duty of loyalty to the corporation, the board of directors 
was required to reflect on the interests of the corporation both as an economic actor and as a 
“good corporate citizen”.34  
 
 
3. The Duty of Care under Corporate Law 
 
The second obligation, the duty of care, imposes a legal obligation on directors and officers to be 
diligent in supervising and managing the corporation’s affairs.35 That directors must satisfy a duty 
of care is a long-standing principle of the common law, although the duty of care has been 
                                                          
28 Ibid at para 42. 
29 Ibid at para 42. 
30 Ibid at para 43. 
31 Ibid at para 47. The SCC held that if the stakeholders cannot avail themselves of the statutory fiduciary duty (the 
duty of loyalty), to sue the directors for failing to take care of their interests, they have other means at their disposal. 
32 BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69 at para 39, [2008] 3 SCR 560 [“BCE”], citing Peoples Department 
Stores, supra note 22.  
33 Ibid at para 38. 
34 Ibid at para 66. 
35 Peoples Department Stores, supra note 22 at para 32. 
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reinforced by statute to become “more demanding”.36 The SCC held that unlike the statutory 
fiduciary obligation, the statement of the duty of care in s 122(1)(b) of the CBCA does not 
specifically refer to an identifiable party as the beneficiary of the duty.37 Instead, it provides that 
“[e]very director and officer of a corporation in exercising their powers and discharging their duties 
shall . . . exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in 
comparable circumstances.” Thus, the identity of the beneficiary of the duty of care is much more 
open-ended.38 The SCC held that the statutory duty of care requires more of directors and officers 
than the traditional common law duty of care. The standard by which to assess their conduct is 
objective; thus, the factual aspects of the circumstances surrounding the actions of the director or 
officer are important to assessing whether directors met their duty of care.39   
 
The SCC held that “the contextual approach dictated by s.122(1)(b) of the CBCA not only 
emphasizes the primary facts, but also permits prevailing socio-economic conditions to be taken 
into consideration.”40 Many decisions made in the course of business, although ultimately 
unsuccessful, are reasonable and defensible at the time they are made, and when challenged, the 
courts will look to see that the directors made a reasonable decision not a perfect decision. 
Provided the decision taken is within a range of reasonableness, the court ought not to substitute 
its opinion for that of the board, even though subsequent events may have cast doubt on the 
board’s determination.41  In order for a plaintiff to succeed in challenging a business decision, he 
or she has to establish that the directors acted (i) in breach of the duty of care and (ii) in a way that 
caused injury to the plaintiff; and directors and officers will not be held to be in breach of the duty 
of care if they act prudently and on a reasonably informed basis.42 The decisions they make must 
be reasonable business decisions in light of all the circumstances about which the directors or 
officers knew or ought to have known.43  
 
In most circumstances, the court’s analysis of whether directors and officers have met their duty 
of care involves an inquiry into the process undertaken by the directors or board of directors in 
making the decision and the procedures they have in place to identify and address problems, not 
an inquiry into the substance of the decision where the complaint is not directly related to a 
specified statutory violation.44 
                                                          
36 Ibid at para 59. 
37 Ibid at para 57. 
38 Ibid. The SCC held that this result is clearly consistent with the civil law interpretation of the word “another”; thus, if 
breach of the standard of care, causation and damages are established, creditors can resort to article 1457 to have 
their rights vindicated.  
39 Ibid. As opposed to the subjective motivation of the director or officer, which the SCC held is the central focus of the 
statutory fiduciary duty of s. 122(1)(a) of the CBCA, supra note 17. 
40 Ibid at para 64. It held that the establishment of good corporate governance rules should be a shield that protects 
directors from allegations that they have breached their duty of care.  
41 Ibid at para 64. 
42 Ibid at para 67. 
43 Ibid at para 67. 
44 Even where a director does not take a position at a board meeting, he or she can be held accountable for a decision 
of the board. For example, CBCA, supra note 17, s 123(1) provides that a director who is present at a meeting of 
directors or a committee of directors, is deemed to have consented to any resolution passed or action taken at the 
meeting unless the director’s dissent has been entered in the minutes of the meeting, the director requests that a 
dissent be entered in the minutes, the director sends a written dissent to the secretary of the meeting before the 
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 The SCC has held that courts should be reluctant to second-guess the application of business 
expertise to the considerations that are involved in corporate decision making.45 However, the SCC 
also held that courts “are capable, on the facts of any case, of determining whether an appropriate 
degree of prudence and diligence was brought to bear in reaching what is claimed to be a 
reasonable business decision at the time it was made”.46  The SCC has clearly signaled that the 
courts have the capacity and the responsibility to consider factors such as prudence and diligence 
when assessing corporate decision-making.  
 
Important for the Canadian context is the interplay of the Civil Code of Québec (Civil Code) and 
corporations law, since directors’ and officers’ obligations fall under both common law and civil 
law in Québec. The SCC in Peoples Department Stores held that the Civil Code is used as suppletive 
law, in that directors have been held liable to creditors in respect of either contractual or 
extracontractual obligations.47 The SCC held that three elements of article 1457 Civil Code are 
relevant to the integration of the director’s duty of care into the principles of extra-contractual 
liability: who has the duty (“every person”), to whom is the duty owed (“another”) and what breach 
will trigger liability (“rules of conduct”). Directors and officers come within the expression “every 
person” and “another” can include the creditors. The reach of article 1457 Civil Code is broad, and 
it has been given an open and inclusive meaning. Thus, in Québec, directors and officers can be 
found to have violated a duty of care under both corporate law and the Civil Code.   
 
The scope of directors’ obligations was affirmed by the SCC in BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders, 
noting that, “under the business judgment rule, deference should be accorded to business 
decisions taken in good faith and in the performance of the functions they were elected to 
perform.”48  
 
In Canada, therefore, the law is clear that directors owe their duty of loyalty to the corporation. 
The SCC has also confirmed that, in considering what is in the best interests of the corporation, 
directors can consider the interests of multiple stakeholders.49 The trend of Canadian 
                                                          
meeting is adjourned, or the director sends a dissent by registered mail or delivers it to the registered office of the 
corporation immediately after the meeting is adjourned. This provision addresses the contours of the fiduciary 
obligation when directors fail to dissent or disagree with a decision of the board. See also: ABCA, supra note 17, s 
123(2); BCBCA, supra note 17, s 154(6); MCA, supra note 17, s 118(2); NBBCA, supra note 17, s 80(2); NLCA, supra note 
17, s 204(2); NTBCA, supra note 17, s 124(2); NuBCA, supra note 17, s 124(2); OBCA, supra note 17, s 139(2); QBCA, 
supra note 17, s 139; SBCA, supra note 17, s 118(2); YBCA, supra note 17, s 125(2). 
45 Peoples Department Stores, supra note 22 at para 67. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid at para 54. The SCC held that contractual liability arises where the director personally guarantees a contractual 
obligation of the company. Liability also arises where the director personally acts in a manner that triggers his or her 
extra-contractual liability. Article 1457 Civil Code of Québec, c CCQ-1991 (CCQ): “Every person has a duty to abide by 
the rules of conduct which lie upon him, according to the circumstances, usage or law, so as not to cause injury to 
another. Where he is endowed with reason and fails in this duty, he is responsible for any injury he causes to another 
person by such fault and is liable to reparation for the injury, whether it be bodily, moral or material in nature. He is 
also liable, in certain cases, to reparation for injury caused to another by the act or fault of another person or by the 
act of things in his custody.” Ibid at para 55. 
48 BCE, supra note 32 at para 99. 
49 Yalden et al, supra note 9 at 51. 
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jurisprudence in respect of directors’ fiduciary obligations makes clear that the duty can include 
obligations in respect of climate change risk. 
 
 
III. Why Director and Officer Fiduciary Obligation Requires Attention to Climate Change Risk 
Reduction 
 
Most Canadian directors and officers have only recently turned their attention to climate change 
risk.  Canada, as a federal system, has very uneven levels of commitment to addressing climate 
change.  Some corporations, investment funds and governments are exhibiting leadership, others 
are not. 
 
Thus, there is a lag in addressing these issues, in comparison to other jurisdictions. The reasons are 
complex, but two primary reasons are the temporal nature of climate change and the reliance of 
the Canadian economy on fossil fuel production and use. With Canada’s vast natural resources, it 
is difficult for Canadians to comprehend that decisions made today will continue a trajectory 
towards severe harm to the climate in the longer term.50 Coupled with pressure on directors and 
officers, particularly of publicly-traded companies, to realize short-term profits, there is a 
disconnect between the responsibilities of companies to address climate change and market 
pressure to realize return on investment over very short periods.51 Absent pressure by 
shareholders and other stakeholders to hold directors and officers accountable, changes in 
businesses’ behaviour will be slower than is required to meet the COP 21 urgent challenges.52   
 
While the harmful effects of fossil fuels and GHG emissions are now well-documented, Canadian 
fiduciaries face the challenge that Canada’s fossil fuel sector generates 7.7% of Canada’s GDP,53 
and thus they are heavily invested in a sector that has only a limited future.54  In 2010, Canada 
exported $85 billion in value of crude oil, refined petroleum products and natural gas.55 Oil 
production in Canada increased by over 50% in the past decade.56 The United States (“US”) Energy 
Information Association estimates that energy consumption is rising globally for all fuels, except 
                                                          
50 Janis Sarra and Sally Aitken, “A Greener Future”, in P Tortell, M Young and P Nemetz, eds, Reflections of Canada 
(Vancouver, UBC, 2017) at 24-32 [“Sarra and Aitken”]. 
51 Exacerbated by requirement to disclose quarterly returns. 
52 This point is discussed in part IV below. 
53 Natural Resources Canada, “Energy Factbook 2016-2017”, 
https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/sites/www.nrcan.gc.ca/files/energy/pdf/EnergyFactBook_2016_17_En.pdf, at 5 (“Energy 
Factbook 2016-2017”);  Mark Carney, “Resolving the climate paradox”, Arthur Burns Memorial Lecture, Berlin, 22 
September 2016, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2016/speech923.pdf, at 9. See 
also Natural Resources Canada, “National Economic Performance”, http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/publications/statistics-
facts/1239 (“Natural Resources Canada”). 
54 “Energy Factbook 2016-2017” supra note 53 at 5: Oil and Gas generates 3.9% of employment, 700,000 jobs. 
55 Natural Resources Canada, supra note 53. 99% of Canadian crude oil exports are to the US, and Canada is the largest 
foreign supplier of crude oil to the US, accounting for 43% of total US crude oil imports and for 20% of US refinery 
crude oil intake; “Energy Factbook 2016-2017” supra note 53 at 31.  
56 Lawrence McKeown, Corben Bristow and Anthony Caouette, “Canada’s shifting sands: Oil production, distribution 
and implications, 2005 to 2014”, Environment, Energy and Transportation Statistics Division, Statistics Canada (12 July 
2016), http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/16-002-x/2016002/article/14629-eng.pdf, at 1.  
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coal.57 Production growth continues in numerous countries, including Canada.58 Canada’s 
predicted 1.26 million b/d increase in production by 2040 mainly comes from oil sands 
production.59 Nicholas Stern observes that delays in taking immediate action to mitigate climate 
change will amount to a decline of 5 to 10% of worldwide GDP, but the reduction in GDP will only 
be 1 to 2% if action is taken now; thus, any delay now poses a substantial financial risk.60 
 
Consumption is also an important part of the challenge.61  In 2015, Canada's total GHG emissions 
were 722 megatonnes (Mt) of carbon dioxide equivalent (“CO2 eq”). The oil and gas sector was the 
largest GHG emitter in Canada, accounting for 26% of total GHG emissions, followed closely by the 
transportation sector, which emitted 24% of total emissions.62  The other Canadian economic 
sectors: buildings, electricity, heavy industry, agriculture, and waste, each accounted for between 
7% and 12% of total GHG emissions in Canada.63  Emissions of GHG from the oil and gas sector 
have increased 76% since 1990, mostly attributable to the increased production of crude oil and 
the expansion of the oil sands industry.64 The oil sands alone account for 9.3% of Canada’s total 
GHG emissions.65   
 
                                                          
57 US Energy Information Association, International Energy Outlook 2017, 14 September 2017, www.eia.gov/ieo  (“EIA 
International Energy Outlook”). It predicts that most of the growth in world liquid fuels consumption from 2015 to 
2040 will come from non-OECD countries, where strong economic and population growth increase the demand for 
liquid fuel; and that more than 80% of the total increase in liquid fuels consumption will be in non-OECD Asia, as China 
and India experience rapid industrial growth and increased demand for transportation. In OECD countries, it predicts 
that the demand for liquid fuels will grow slowly or decline between 2015 and 2040, at 35-36. The US Energy 
Administration, “Short Term Energy Outlook”, 11 October 2017, 
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/report/global_oil.cfm, suggests that the short time outlook for Canada is stable 
production, not a large growth. 
58 The EIA International Energy Outlook 2017, ibid at 40, reports that world liquid fuels production are expected to rise 
by 16.1 million b/d from 2015 to 2040, with more than half of the increase coming from a 10.3 million b/d increase in 
crude oil and lease condensate, including production from tight and non-tight resources, and extra-heavy crude oils 
and processed bitumen from oil sands from OPEC member countries; and that production of other liquids (natural gas 
plant liquids, gas-to-liquids, coal-to-liquids, oil shale, refinery gain, and biofuels) will increase by 4.2 million b/d (25%) 
from 2015 to 2040.  
59 Ibid at 44. 
60 Nicholas Stern, Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (IPCC: 2014), <http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar5/syr/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf>.  
61 Government of Canada, Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change, 9 December 2016, 
https://www.canada.ca/en/services/environment/weather/climatechange/pan-canadian-framework.html.  80% of 
Canada’s GHG emissions are caused by the production and use of energy. 
62 Emissions from passenger and freight travel amounted to 96% of these emissions, ECCC Indicators, supra note 3 at 
9. There have been improvements in the fuel efficiency of both passenger cars and light trucks over the last few 
decades, but they were not sufficient to offset the increases in emissions due to the change in composition of the 
vehicle fleet. 
63 Ibid at 8. 
64 Ibid at 9. “GHG emissions from conventional oil production have increased by 26%, while emissions from oil sands 
production have increased more than fourfold. About half of the increase in emissions from oil sands production over 
this period came from the growth of in situ production. A temporary decrease in GHG emissions between 2008 and 
2011 is mostly attributable to the world economic downturn that resulted in a lower global demand for petroleum 
products.” 61% of Canada’s oil production in 2015 was in the oil sands, with an estimated $271 billion of capital 
investment to date, including $22.5 billion in 2015, Energy Factbook 2016-2017, supra note 53 at 34. 
65 Energy Factbook 2016-2017, ibid at 35. 
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However, overall, Environment and Climate Change Canada reports that the level of emissions per 
unit of gross domestic product (GDP) was 33% lower in 2015 than in 1990.66 These improvements 
are attributable to a number of factors such as more efficient industrial processes, a shift to a more 
service-based economy and a decrease in the emissions associated with energy generation, such 
as realized through fuel switching.67 As one industry leader noted, given heavy reliance on oil and 
natural gas, at least Canada is producing under some of the highest environmental standards in 
the world and is actively developing cleaner technologies. 
 
The impact of climate change on Canadian cities is not yet as visible as it is in the far north, away 
from population centres, such that it is not obvious that Canada has a higher rate of warming than 
most other regions of the world and the risks are great.68 Moreover, since Canada’s economy is 
heavily dependent on the very resources that generate some of the most egregious GHG 
emissions,  our capital markets are directly implicated in both the risk-generating activity and the 
potential to mitigate the risks. The influence of the GHG producing industry in Canada’s capital 
markets is exacerbated by the temporal mismatch between the climate change risks and the 
temporal horizons of investors. While some investors are interested in the long-term sustainability 
of firms, there are significant investors that press for short-term returns that maximize value to 
them but create risks to the firm overall.    
 
There has also historically been a perception that alternative business pathways are not as 
profitable. However, as renewable energy and other technologies become more profitable, for 
example, renewable energy sources currently provide 19% of Canada’s total primary energy 
supply, directors and officers may recognize that adaptation can align with the corporation’s long-
term success. 
 
There are mismatched timelines between capital markets’ need for profit, directors’ and officers’ 
obligations to act in the best interests of the company, and Canada’s need for long-term 
sustainability of its economy.69 Bank of England Governor Mark Carney has called climate risk a 
“tragedy of the horizon”, in that the most serious consequences of today’s emissions will 
eventuate beyond the time-frame of current business and regulatory cycles.70 He has observed 
that: “the catastrophic impacts of climate change will be felt beyond the traditional horizons of 
most actors – imposing a cost on future generations that the current generation has no direct 
incentive to fix.”71 The Bank identified three types of financial risk: “physical risks” that arise from 
increased frequency and severity of climate-related and weather-related events that damage 
                                                          
66 ECCC, supra note 3 at 6: “Over that period, GHG per unit of gross domestic product decreased from 0.62 
megatonnes (Mt) of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2 eq) per $billion gross domestic product in 1990 to 0.41 Mt CO2 eq 
per $billion gross domestic product in 2015. The amount of GHGs emitted per person in Canada decreased to 20.1 
tonnes CO2 eq in 2015, compared with 22.1 tonnes CO2 eq in 1990.” 
67 Ibid. 
68 Government of Canada, Impacts of Climate Change, 27 November 2015, 
http://climatechange.gc.ca/default.asp?lang=En&n=036D9756-1  
69 Janis Sarra, “The Anthropocene at the Time of Trump” (forthcoming, UBC Law Review, 2018) [“Sarra, 
Anthropocene”].  
70 Mark Carney, “Breaking the Tragedy of the Horizon- climate change and financial stability”, Bank of England (29 
September 2015), http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/2015/844.aspx# at 3 [“Carney”]. 
71 Ibid. 
  
 
12 
property and disrupt trade; “transition risks” resulting from adjustment towards a lower-carbon 
economy; and “liability risks” from parties seeking compensation for suffering loss from the effects 
of climate change from those individuals and entities they hold responsible.72 Changes in policy, 
technology and physical risks could prompt reassessment of the value of a large range of assets, 
which may affect financial stability.  
 
Building on the Bank of England’s insights, the Financial Stability Board (“FSB”) Task Force on 
Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (“TCFD”) has reported that climate-related risks fall into two 
major categories: (1) risks related to the transition to a lower-carbon economy and (2) risks related 
to the physical impacts of climate change.73 It suggests that transitioning to a lower-carbon 
economy may entail extensive policy, legal, technology, and market changes to address mitigation 
and adaptation requirements related to climate change; and such risks pose varying levels of 
financial and reputational risk to organizations.74 Policy aimed at constraining actions that 
contribute to the adverse effects of climate change, or aimed at promoting adaptation to climate 
change, include: implementing carbon-pricing mechanisms to reduce GHG emissions, shifting 
energy use toward lower emission sources, adopting energy-efficiency solutions, and promoting 
more sustainable land-use practices.75 The TCFD observes that litigation risk is on the rise, with an 
increase in climate-related litigation claims being brought before the courts by shareholders, public 
interest organizations, institutional investors and others. These lawsuits are often filed due to the 
failure of organizations to mitigate impacts of climate change, failure to adapt to climate change, 
and the insufficiency of disclosure around material financial risks.76 It observes that as the value of 
loss and damage arising from climate change grows, litigation risk will also likely increase. 
 
Technology risk is also part of transition risk, as technological innovations that support the 
transition to a lower-carbon, energy-efficient economic system can have a significant impact on 
organizations. The TCFD points to emerging technologies such as renewable energy, energy 
efficiency, and carbon capture and storage, all of which will affect the competitiveness of certain 
corporations, their production and distribution costs, and demand for their products and 
services.77 Part of the risk is that new technology will displace old systems and disrupt some parts 
of the existing economic system. The timing of technological development and deployment is a 
key uncertainty in assessing technology risk. Market risk is also a factor, in terms of shifts in supply 
and demand for certain commodities, products and services, as climate-related risks and 
opportunities are increasingly taken into account.78 The final transition risk is reputational risk, in 
                                                          
72 Ibid. An example of this latter risk is ExxonMobil, which is under investigation in the US for misleading the public on 
climate change research; Bradley Olson and Aruna Diswantha, “SEC Probes Exxon Over Accounting for Climate 
Change”, The Wall Street Journal (20 September 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-investigating-exxon-on-
valuing-of-assets-accounting-practices-1474393593. 
73 Financial Stability Board, Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, Final Report, Recommendations of the 
Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/publications/final-recommendations-
report/ at 5 (“TCFD Final Report”).  
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid, citing Peter Seley, “Emerging Trends in Climate Change Litigation,” Law 360, 7 March 2016.  
77 Ibid at 6. 
78 Ibid. 
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terms of changing customer or community perceptions of a corporation’s contribution to, or 
detraction from, the transition to a lower-carbon economy.79  
 
The second major risk identified by TCFD is physical risk resulting from climate change, which can 
be event driven (acute) or longer-term shifts (chronic) in climate patterns.80 Physical risks may have 
financial implications for organizations, such as direct damage to assets and indirect impacts from 
supply chain disruption, changes in availability of sourcing and quality of water and other inputs, 
extreme temperature changes affecting organizations’ premises, operations, supply chain, 
transport needs, and employee safety.81   
 
It is easy to see how each of these risks may manifest themselves in Canadian corporations.  In 
terms of physical risks, Canada’s arctic is one place where these manifestations of climate change 
are most pronounced, with the far north already experiencing “polar amplification”.82 If the 
weather and climate effects continue to spread, there will be additional costs from flooding, 
drought, fires, and loss of supply sources.   
 
The transition risks are already becoming clear. Alberta has recently seen a large growth in orphan 
wells (1391 as of March 2017), due to low commodity prices, environmental factors and an 
unprecedented number of corporate failures in the oil and gas sector.83 There has been an 80% 
increase in these stranded assets.84 One can project similar impacts if the Paris COP21 agreement 
targets begin to be reached. Such risks accrue directly to corporations, but also to particular 
sectors, such as the oil and gas sector. The risks and attendant costs can also accrue to 
governments and to taxpayers as a whole, where there is no one else to pay for remediation of 
these stranded assets.  
 
Liability risk is also possible from parties seeking compensation for suffering loss from the effects 
of climate change from those directors and officers they hold responsible, although to date, the 
type of litigation brought in the US and other countries has not yet materialized in Canada.  For 
example, in the US, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP has commenced a class action on behalf 
of purchasers of Exxon Mobil Corporation ("Exxon") common stock during the period between 19 
                                                          
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid at 6. It reports that acute physical risks refer to those risks that are event-driven, including increased severity of 
extreme weather events, such as cyclones, hurricanes, or floods; and chronic physical risks refer to longer-term shifts 
in climate patterns (e.g., sustained higher temperatures) that may cause sea level rise or chronic heat waves.   
82 Sarra and Aitken, supra note 50; “Polar amplification” describes greater climate change near the north pole, Arctic 
warming is already highly significant and substantial. 
83 Unprecedented at least in the past 30 years. 
84 In the upstream oil and gas industry, an orphan is a well, pipeline, facility or associated site that has been 
investigated and confirmed as not having any legally responsible and/or financially able party to deal with its 
abandonment and reclamation responsibilities. Orphan Well Association, Annual Report 2016-2017, 
http://www.orphanwell.ca/OWA%202016-17%20Ann%20Rpt%20Final.pdf at 13. See also: 
http://www.orphanwell.ca/pg_faq.html. One commentator has observed that the number of orphan wells is more 
attributable to a judgment in which federal insolvency legislation “trumped” provincial legislation remedying orphan 
wells. While that judgment has serious implications for how such wells are dealt with, and the extent to which tax 
dollars will be required to remediate these stranded assets, the judgment itself is unlikely to have caused an uptick in 
the number of stranded assets. 
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February 2016 and 27 October 2016.85 The complaint alleges that Exxon and its directors and 
officers violated the US Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in making materially false and misleading 
public statements. It alleges that they failed to disclose that Exxon's own internally generated 
reports concerning climate change recognized the risks associated with global warming and 
climate change, the inability of the company to extract existing hydrocarbon reserves and 
therefore, a material portion of Exxon's reserves were stranded and should have been written 
down; and that Exxon had employed an inaccurate price of carbon in evaluating the value of its 
future oil and gas prospects, materially overstating the value of its reserves.86 In September 2016, 
the market learned that federal regulators were actively scrutinizing Exxon's reserve accounting 
related to climate change and its refusal to write down any of its oil and gas reserves in the face of 
declining global oil prices.87  On these disclosures, the price of Exxon common stock fell than 13% 
from the stock's class period high, erasing billions of dollars of market capitalization.88 
 
Even where there are not lawsuits, Williams and Conley suggest that extra-legal pressure 
generated from highly publicized problems with stakeholders create risks to companies' 
reputations and therefore to the value of their brands.89 Such pressure may be stronger 
mechanisms of enforcement of environmental risk than the risks of actual liability in a court 
proceeding.  
 
Carney cautioned that “too rapid a movement towards a low-carbon economy could materially 
damage financial stability”.90  In that respect, directors and officers should be taking immediate 
action to identify risks, but materiality, remoteness and downside risk of transitioning should also 
be careful considerations. Fiduciary obligation also requires considering the benefits of investment 
in green adaption and mitigation technologies and other products and services that are likely to 
have upside financial potential.  
   
The statutory obligation that directors act honestly and in good faith, and act diligently in 
supervising and managing the corporation’s affairs, necessarily means that they must engage with 
the issues of physical and transition climate change risks.  Depending on the firm’s economic 
activities, the risk may be minor or highly significant, but directors and officers have an obligation 
to make the inquiries, to devise strategies to address risks, and to have an ongoing monitoring and 
adjusting plan to ensure the strategy continues to be responsive to the risk.  The SCC has expressly 
                                                          
85 Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, “Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP Files Class Action Suit Against Exxon Mobil 
Corporation”, 7 November 2016, http://www.rgrdlaw.com/cases/exxon/; Ramirez v Exxon Mobil Corporation, et al, No 
16-cv-3111, Northern District of Texas, http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/robbins-geller-rudman--dowd-llp-
files-class-action-suit-against-exxon-mobil-corporation-300358768.html. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Through a series of partial disclosures issued by different news sources between mid-August 2016 and late 
September 2016. Ibid. 
88 It fell to USD 82.54 per share on September 20, 2016. Ibid. 
89 Cynthia Williams and John Conley, “Is There an Emerging Fiduciary Duty to Consider Human Rights?” (2005) 74 U Cin 
L Rev 75 at 77. See also Pratima Bansal, “Evolving Sustainably: A Longitudinal Study of Corporate Sustainable 
Development”, (2005) 26 Strategic Mgmt J 197.  
90 Carney, supra note 70 at 2. He observes: “A wholesale reassessment of prospects, as climate-related risks are re-
evaluated, could destabilize markets, spark a pro-cyclical crystallization of losses and lead to a persistent tightening of 
financial conditions.” 
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approved the ability of directors to take account of the interests of diverse stakeholders.91 
Directors’ decisions must be reasonable business decisions in light of all the circumstances about 
which they knew or ought to have known.92 Directors are given broad authority to address climate 
change risk, and provided that decisions taken are within a range of reasonableness, the courts 
will defer to their business judgment.93  
 
Addressing climate risk is the responsibility of directors and officers in determining the best 
interests of the corporation. In addition to this fiduciary obligation, the duty of care requires 
directors and officers to exercise the care, diligence and skills that a reasonably prudent person 
would exercise in the circumstances; and arguably, this duty requires directors and officers to 
identify and develop a strategy to supervise and manage the transition that will address the specific 
risks posed by climate change.   
 
The crucial question of what are the best interests of the corporation in respect of climate change 
risk requires directors and officers to directly engage with developments in knowledge regarding 
physical and transition risks and how that information may impact their corporation. As discussed 
above, fiduciaries can consider the interests of numerous types of stakeholders and the 
environment when determining how to act in the corporation’s best interest in respect of climate 
change. Directors and officers who engage in good governance practices already take account of 
socio-economic conditions and the diverse and sometimes conflicting interests of all the 
stakeholders with an interest in the company. Ronald Davis has observed that:  
 
While shareholder wealth maximization as a goal of corporate activity has an appealing 
simplicity to it, the simplicity is deceiving. Conceptually it contains a level of indeterminacy that 
continues to raise issues of the proper exercise of corporate power, the balance between 
interests of investors with differing time horizons, and the appropriate concern to be shown 
to stakeholders other than shareholders by corporate management…. the range of options on 
corporate management’s desk rarely involves the following decision pairs - profit, only if 
socially irresponsible versus no profit, only if socially responsible. Providing one takes into 
account all consequences that can reasonably be expected to occur over the foreseeable 
future, having only these choices before one is rare. These rare choices will be provided only 
if one is focused solely on the immediate cost and benefit, to the exclusion of all other costs 
and benefits.” 94  
 
As also discussed above, the SCC has recognized that directors and officers need to look to the 
long-term interests of the corporation. As long as the decision was a reasonable one at the time, 
courts will defer to directors’ decisions.  That means that where directors and officers are duly 
diligent in trying to identify climate-related financial and other risks, and take action to mitigate 
                                                          
91 Peoples Department Stores, supra note 22 at para 34. The Court further held that in determining whether directors 
are acting with a view to the best interests of the corporation, it may be legitimate, given all the circumstances of a 
given case, for the board of directors to consider the interests of shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors, 
consumers, governments, and the environment, at para 42. 
92 Ibid at para 67. 
93 Ibid at paras 64 and 65.  
94 Davis, supra note 13 at 175. 
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and adapt, they will not face personal liability risk. Acting prudently and on a reasonably informed 
basis is what is required.  At the same time, failure to consider climate change risk does leave 
directors and officers open to actions against the corporation and in some cases, the directors and 
officers personally. 
 
 
1. The Fiduciary Obligation Involves Corporate Citizenship 
 
In Canada, the scope of fiduciary obligation in the business context goes beyond mere survival of 
the corporate entity. The SCC in BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders held that directors and officers 
must treat affected stakeholders in a fair manner, commensurate with the corporation’s duties as 
a responsible corporate citizen.95  The SCC held that directors should resolve conflicts among 
stakeholders or between them and the corporation “in accordance with their fiduciary duty to act 
in the best interests of the corporation, viewed as a good corporate citizen”.96 Thus, a director’s 
fiduciary duty implicates considerations of what “good” corporate citizenship requires in the 
context of climate change. Climate change risk poses a challenge made complex by the growing 
degree of interdependence and interconnectedness that have come to define our world, where 
domestic and sectoral regulation no longer provide adequate instruments to deal with public 
stewardship challenges.97 Directors’ responses to these challenges should accord with their duty 
to conform to good corporate citizenship.   
 
As noted in the introduction, the COP 21 agreement recognizes that deep reductions in global 
emissions through both climate adaption and remediation are required and urgent.98  Both the 
risks posed by climate change and recent governmental commitment to its remediation create 
reasonable expectations by citizens that legal and other processes will advance these public policy 
objectives.99 Reasonable expectations have been used to achieve objectives that are remarkably 
consistent, requiring the fair treatment of others and upholding the integrity of legal or regulatory 
regimes by closing the gaps and loopholes that allow avoiding the obligations associated with these 
regimes.100  A focus on systemic risks acknowledges interdependencies and requires that decision-
makers act with reference to others in society and to the principles that inform “reasonable 
expectations”.  These principles – fair treatment of others as well as upholding the integrity of legal 
regimes – are concerned with the protection or enhancement of the public good.101  These 
expectations can also inform a judgment as to what constitutes “good” corporate citizenship in the 
context of climate change when evaluating whether directors have fulfilled their fiduciary duty.  
John Rawls envisioned society as a fair system of social cooperation over time that reflects a notion 
                                                          
95 BCE, supra note 32 at paras 80, 81. 
96 Ibid at paras 81, 111. 
97 Edward Waitzer and Douglas Sarro, “Fiduciary Society Unleased: The Road Ahead for the Financial Sector” (2014). 
Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper Series. 10. http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/olsrps/10 [“Waitzer and 
Sarro”].  
98 Janis Sarra and Edward Waitzer, “Climate Change – A Case Study/Tipping Point for Rebalancing Interests in 
Insolvency Law?”, in Janis P Sarra and Barbara E Romaine, eds, Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2016 (Toronto: 
Carswell, 2017).   
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
101 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1966). 
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of reciprocity or mutuality, passed inter-generationally, guided by publicly recognized rules and 
agreed upon standards.102 He observed that if individuals had to determine distribution of goods 
or treatment of others ignorant of where they would fall within that distribution, they would strive 
for a more equitable distribution for everyone.103  Viewing climate change in this way, the SCC’s 
direction that fiduciaries are to act to as good corporate citizens has relevance for the allocation 
of both the benefits and costs of addressing climate change financial risk equitably across society. 
 
Directors and officers should understand that their fiduciary duty requires that they have 
undertaken efforts to identify any relevant risks to their business from climate change and climate 
change policies; that they have put appropriate strategies in place to manage these risks; that they 
have overseen and monitored the actions of the individuals charged with managing these risks; 
and have mechanisms in place to respond rapidly to changes in the company’s risk profile. 
Considering whether climate change poses a risk to the business requires directors to take account 
of the business sector, sources of energy, direct carbon emissions, benefits and risks of investing 
to support a lower carbon infrastructure, best environmental practices in terms of regulatory 
compliance, and integration of asset climate risk and resiliency in the firm’s investment decision 
making.  
 
Given the broad mandate of directors and officers under their statutory fiduciary obligation and 
their duty of care, specific decisions made to address climate change are unlikely to give rise to 
personal liability. It is the failure to act that is likely to attract liability, given the reasonable 
expectations of stakeholders, either through derivative actions on behalf of the company or 
personal actions against directors and officers. Courts will examine directors’ decisions balancing 
competing interests, but once a decision is found to be reasonable, it will be upheld. Measuring 
fulfillment of directors’ duties against reasonable expectations serves not only as an accountability 
check, but it may also provide evidence that directors have met their statutory and common law 
obligations, and thus provide a defence against shareholder and other claims of breach of those 
obligations. 
 
Under Canadian corporate statutes, the “oppression remedy” is a powerful potential tool for 
specified stakeholders to press for climate action. 
 
 
2. The Oppression Remedy 
 
The oppression remedy under Canadian corporate law focuses on harm to the legal and equitable 
interests of stakeholders when directors act oppressively or unfairly prejudicially.104 If directors act 
in a manner that is oppressive or unfair prejudicial, an extraordinarily broad set of remedies is 
available to complainants bringing such claims to the courts.   
 
However, there are limits to who can bring a complaint and from what harm they can seek relief.  
Oppression remedies offer another potential mechanism for the courts to assess the reasonable 
                                                          
102 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness, A Restatement, ed by E Kelly (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2001). 
103 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1971, revised 1999). 
104 Wilson v Alharayeri, 2017 SCC 39 [“Wilson”]. See also BCE, supra note 32 at para 45 (SCC).  
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expectations of certain stakeholders in respect of directors’ decisions or lack thereof regarding 
climate change risk.  The oppression remedy under corporate law statutes creates an equitable 
remedy that “seeks to ensure fairness – what is just and equitable”.105   
 
In establishing that directors have breached their obligation such that the oppression remedy 
should be available, the complainant must first “identify the expectations that he or she claims 
have been violated by the conduct at issue and establish that the expectations were reasonably 
held”.106 Second, the complainant must show that these reasonable expectations were violated by 
corporate conduct that was oppressive, or unfairly prejudicial to, or that unfairly disregarded the 
interests of “any security holder, creditor, director or officer”.107 The scope of the remedy is broad, 
but it must be tailored to remedy only the oppressive conduct. Remedies include orders restraining 
conduct, replacing directors, setting aside transactions, and compensating aggrieved persons.108 
The oppression remedy seeks to apply a measure of corrective justice, but it should go no further 
than necessary to correct the injustice or unfairness.109 
 
In BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders, debentureholders sought relief under the oppression remedy 
provisions of the CBCA on the ground that the increased debt contemplated by the purchase 
agreement under a plan of arrangement and “going-private” transaction under corporations 
legislation would reduce the value of their bonds.110 The SCC held that the oppression remedy 
                                                          
105 BCE, ibid at para 81; Wilson, ibid at para 23. 
106 BCE, ibid at para 70; Wilson, ibid at para 24. 
107 Wilson, ibid at para 24. 
108 Section 241(3), CBCA, supra note 17, in full reads as follows:  
(3) In connection with an application under this section, the court may make any interim or final order it thinks fit 
including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing,  
(a) an order restraining the conduct complained of;  
(b) an order appointing a receiver or receiver-manager;  
(c) an order to regulate a corporation’s affairs by amending the articles or by-laws or creating or amending a 
unanimous shareholder agreement;  
(d) an order directing an issue or exchange of securities;  
(e) an order appointing directors in place of or in addition to all or any of the directors then in office;  
(f) an order directing a corporation, subject to subsection (6), or any other person, to purchase securities of a security 
holder;  
(g) an order directing a corporation, subject to subsection (6), or any other person, to pay a security holder any part of 
the monies that the security holder paid for securities;  
(h) an order varying or setting aside a transaction or contract to which a corporation is a party and compensating the 
corporation or any other party to the transaction or contract;  
(i) an order requiring a corporation, within a time specified by the court, to produce to the court or an interested 
person financial statements in the form required by section 155 or an accounting in such other form as the court may 
determine;  
(j) an order compensating an aggrieved person;  
(k) an order directing rectification of the registers or other records of a corporation under section 243;  
(l) an order liquidating and dissolving the corporation;  
(m) an order directing an investigation under Part XIX to be made; and  
(n) an order requiring the trial of any issue.  
109 Wilson, supra note 104 at para 27. See also Naneff v Con-Crete Holdings Ltd (1995), 23 OR (3d) 481 (CA).  
110 BCE, supra note 32 at para 1. The case involved an appeal from BCE and Bell Canada of a decision from the Québec 
Court of Appeal that overturned the trial judge's approval of a plan of arrangement that contemplated the purchase of 
the shares of BCE Inc by a consortium of purchasers by way of a leveraged buyout. These appeals arose out of an offer 
to purchase all shares of BCE Inc, a large telecommunications corporation, by a group headed by the Ontario Teachers 
  
 
19 
focuses on harm to the legal and equitable interests of stakeholders affected by oppressive acts of 
a corporation or its directors; and the remedy is available to a wide range of stakeholders — 
security holders, creditors, directors and officers.111 The SCC in BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders 
held that, although directors must consider the best interests of the corporation, it may be 
appropriate, although not mandatory, to consider the impact of corporate decisions on 
shareholders or particular groups of stakeholders, citing its judgment in Peoples Department 
Stores.112 The SCC held that oppression is an equitable remedy; it seeks to ensure fairness and what 
is just and equitable, giving the court broad, equitable jurisdiction to enforce not just what is legal, 
but what is fair.113 Thus, a court considering claims for oppression should look at business realities, 
not merely narrow legalities. The SCC also held that oppression is fact-specific; and that what is 
just and equitable is judged by the reasonable expectations of the stakeholders in the context and 
in regard to the relationships at play; thus, conduct that may be oppressive in one situation may 
not be in another.114 The reasonable expectations of these stakeholders are the cornerstones of 
the oppression remedy. The SCC held: 
 
As denoted by “reasonable”, the concept of reasonable expectations is objective and 
contextual. The actual expectation of a particular stakeholder is not conclusive. In the context 
of whether it would be “just and equitable” to grant a remedy, the question is whether the 
expectation is reasonable having regard to the facts of the specific case, the relationships at 
issue, and the entire context, including the fact that there may be conflicting claims and 
expectations. Particular circumstances give rise to particular expectations. … 
 
Determining whether a particular expectation is reasonable is complicated by the fact that 
the interests and expectations of different stakeholders may conflict. The oppression remedy 
recognizes that a corporation is an entity that encompasses and affects various individuals 
and groups, some of whose interests may conflict with others. Directors or other corporate 
actors may make corporate decisions or seek to resolve conflicts in a way that abusively or 
unfairly maximizes a particular group's interest at the expense of other stakeholders. The 
corporation and shareholders are entitled to maximize profit and share value, to be sure, but 
not by treating individual stakeholders unfairly. Fair treatment - the central theme running 
through the oppression jurisprudence - is most fundamentally what stakeholders are entitled 
to “reasonably expect”.115 
 
The Court held that not every failure to meet a reasonable expectation will give rise to the equitable 
considerations that ground actions for oppression; the court must be satisfied that the conduct 
falls within the concepts of oppression, unfair prejudice or unfair disregard of the claimant's 
                                                          
Pension Plan Board, financed in part by the assumption by Bell Canada, a wholly owned subsidiary of BCE, of a $30 
billion debt. The plan of arrangement was approved by 97.93% of BCE’s shareholders. The debentureholders alleged 
that the arrangement was not “fair and reasonable” and opposed court approval of the arrangement under s. 192 of 
the CBCA, supra note 17. The crux of their complaints was that, on the completion of the arrangement, the short-term 
trading value of the debentures would decline by an average of 20% and could lose investment grade status.  
111 Ibid at para 45. 
112 Ibid at para 37. 
113 Ibid at para 58. 
114 Ibid at para 59. 
115 Ibid at paras 62-64. 
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interest, within the meaning of the statutory provisions.116 The concepts do not represent 
watertight compartments, and often overlap and intermingle.117 Under the unfair prejudice and 
unfair disregard branches of the oppression remedy, the focus is on the effect on the injured 
complainant of the conduct.118 This approach has been interpreted as conduct that unfairly 
disregards the complainant’s interests, conduct that unjustly or without cause fails to pay attention 
to, or ignores or treats as of no importance the interests of security holders, creditors, directors or 
officers.119 In this aspect of the oppression remedy, there need not be any bad faith or an intention 
to harm the complainant.120 The remedy is available to protect a complainant’s legal rights, as well 
as reasonable expectations arising out of the course of dealing between the parties or corporate 
law itself.121 
 
The court is to conduct two related inquiries in a claim for oppression. First, does the evidence 
support the reasonable expectation asserted by the claimant in the specific facts of the case? The 
claimant must identify the expectations that have been violated by the conduct at issue and 
establish that his or her expectations were reasonably held. Second, does the evidence establish 
that the reasonable expectation was violated by conduct falling within the terms “oppression”, 
“unfair prejudice” or “unfair disregard” of a relevant interest?122  While the Supreme Court noted 
that it is impossible to catalogue exhaustively situations where a reasonable expectation may arise 
due to their fact-specific nature, some generalizations can be made. Actual unlawfulness is not 
required to invoke the oppression remedy, as the remedy is focused on concepts of fairness and 
equity rather than on legal rights. In determining whether there is a reasonable expectation or 
interest to be considered, the court looks beyond legality to what is fair, given all of the interests 
at play; and thus, not all conduct that is harmful to a stakeholder will give rise to a remedy for 
oppression.123 The Court held that factors to be considered in determining whether a reasonable 
expectation exists include: general commercial practice; the nature of the corporation; the 
                                                          
116 Ibid at para 89. The Court observed that: “Viewed in this way, the reasonable expectations analysis that is the 
theoretical foundation of the oppression remedy, and the particular types of conduct described in s 241 [of the CBCA], 
may be seen as complementary, rather than representing alternative approaches to the oppression remedy, as has 
sometimes been supposed. Together, they offer a complete picture of conduct that is unjust and inequitable.” The 
Court continued at para 90: “As in any action in equity, wrongful conduct, causation and compensable injury must be 
established in a claim for oppression”. 
117 Ibid at para 91. 
118 Nystad v Harcrest Apartments Ltd, [1986] BCJ No 3145 at para 24 (BCSC) [“Nystad”]; Piller Sausages & Delicatessens 
Ltd v Cobb International Corp, [2003] OJ No 2647, 35 BLR (3d) 193 (Ont SCJ), aff’d [2003] OJ No 5128, 40 BLR (3d) 88 
(Ont CA) [“Piller Sausages”]. 
119 Piller Sausages, ibid; Harbert Distressed Investment Master Fund, Ltd v Calpine Canada Energy Finance II ULC, [2005] 
NSJ No 317 (NSSC); Nystad, ibid at para 24 (BCSC); Olympia & York Developments Ltd (Trustee of) v Olympia & York 
Realty Corp, [2001] OJ No 3394 at paras 30-31 (Ont SCJ [Commercial List]), additional reasons at 2001 CarswellOnt 
4739 (Ont SCJ [Commercial List]), aff’d [2003] OJ No 5242, 68 OR (3d) 544 (Ont CA). 
120 Downtown Eatery (1993) Ltd v Ontario, [2001] OJ No 1879, 200 DLR (4th) 289 (Ont CA), leave to appeal refused, 
[2001] SCCA No 397 (SCC) [“Downtown Eatery”]. See also Ferguson v Imax Systems Corp, [1983] OJ No 3156, 150 DLR 
(3d) 718 at 727 (Ont CA), leave to appeal refused (1983), 2 OAC 158 (note), 52 NR 317 (note) (SCC) [“Ferguson”]; Brant 
Investments Ltd v KeepRite Inc, [1991] OJ No 683, 3 OR (3d) 289 (Ont CA). 
121 UPM-Kymmene Corp v UPM-Kymmene Miramichi Inc, [2002] OJ No 2412, 214 DLR (4th) 496 (Ont SCJ), additional 
reasons at 2002 CarswellOnt 3579 (Ont SCJ [Commercial List]), aff’d [2004] OJ No 636 (Ont CA) [“UPM-Kymmene 
Corp”]. 
122 BCE, supra note 32 at para 68. 
123 Ibid at para 71. 
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relationship between the parties; past practice; steps the claimant could have taken to protect 
itself; representations and agreements; and the fair resolution of conflicting interests between 
corporate stakeholders.124 
 
The SCC held that commercial practice plays a significant role in forming the reasonable 
expectations of the parties; and that a departure from normal business practices that has the effect 
of undermining or frustrating the complainant’s exercise of legal rights will generally, although not 
inevitably, give rise to a remedy.125 Courts may accord more latitude to the directors of a small, 
closely held corporation to deviate from strict formalities than to the directors of a larger public 
company.126 The Court observed that reasonable expectations may emerge from the personal 
relationships between the claimant and other corporate actors.127 However, the SCC also noted 
that practices and expectations can change over time, and where valid commercial reasons exist 
for the change and the change does not undermine the complainant’s rights, there can be no 
reasonable expectation that directors will resist a departure from past practice.128 Given that 
knowledge about climate-related financial risk and policy commitments to a low carbon economy 
have developed substantially in recent years, directors and officers are clearly able to depart from 
their past practice of ignoring climate change risk; they should develop new strategies to address 
the risk in the company’s best interests. Reasonable expectations may be affected by 
representations made to stakeholders or to the public in promotional material, prospectuses, 
offering circulars, and other communications.129 
 
The SCC held that where conflicts among corporate stakeholders involve the interests of the 
corporation, “it falls to the directors of the corporation to resolve them in accordance with their 
fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the corporation, viewed as a good corporate citizen.”130 
It observed: 
 
…the duty of the directors to act in the best interests of the corporation comprehends 
a duty to treat individual stakeholders affected by corporate actions equitably and fairly. 
                                                          
124 Ibid at para 72. 
125 Ibid at para 73, citing Adecco Canada Inc v J Ward Broome Ltd, [2001] OJ No 454, 12 BLR (3d) 275 (Ont SCJ); SCI 
Systems Inc v Gornitzki Thompson & Little Co, [1997] OJ No 2115, 147 DLR (4th) 300 (Ont Gen Div), var’d [1998] OJ No 
2299, 110 OAC 160 (Ont Div Ct); Downtown Eatery, supra note 120. 
126 BCE, supra note 32 at para 74.  
127 Ibid at para 75. The Court held that “Relationships between shareholders based on ties of family or friendship may 
be governed by different standards than relationships between arm's length shareholders in a widely held 
corporation” As noted in Ferguson, supra note 120, “when dealing with a close corporation, the court may consider 
the relationship between the shareholders and not simply legal rights as such”. 
128 Ibid at paras 76 and 77, citing Alberta Treasury Branches v SevenWay Capital Corp, [1999] AJ No 1312, 50 BLR (2d) 
294 (Alta QB), aff’d [2000] AJ No 801, 8 BLR (3d) 1, 2000 ABCA 194 (Alta CA). In determining whether a stakeholder 
expectation is reasonable, the court may consider whether the claimant could have taken steps to protect itself against 
the prejudice it claims to have suffered, ibid at para 79, citing Main v Delcan Group Inc, [1999] OJ No 1961 (Ont SCJ); 
and Lyall v 147250 Canada Ltd [1993] BCJ No 874, 106 DLR (4th) 304 (BCCA). 
129 BCE, ibid at para 80, citing Tsui v International Capital Corp, [1993] SJ No 83, [1993] 4 WWR 613 (Sask QB), aff’d 
[1993] SJ No 293, 113 Sask R 3 (Sask CA); Deutsche Bank Canada v Oxford Properties Group Inc, [1998] OJ No 4375, 40 
BLR (2d) 302 (Ont Gen Div); Themadel Foundation v Third Canadian Investment Trust Ltd, [1995] OJ No 888, 23 OR (3d) 
7 (Ont Gen Div), var’d [1998] OJ No 647, 38 OR (3d) 749 (Ont CA). 
130 BCE, supra note 32 at para 81.  
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There are no absolute rules. In each case, the question is whether, in all the 
circumstances, the directors acted in the best interests of the corporation, having 
regard to all relevant considerations, including, but not confined to, the need to treat 
affected stakeholders in a fair manner, commensurate with the corporation’s duties as 
a responsible corporate citizen.131 
 
There is a further inquiry where the remedy sought is an order of personal liability of the directors. 
On 13 July 2017, in Wilson v Alharayeri, the Supreme Court of Canada unanimously reaffirmed that 
a corporation’s directors may be personally liable in an oppression action under Canadian 
corporate law, clarifying the criteria for imposing personal liability.132 The first of the two-prong 
test for personal liability requires that “the director or officer must be implicated in the oppressive 
conduct”; the “oppressive conduct must be attributable to the individual director because of his 
or her action or inaction”.133 Second, the imposition of personal liability “must be fit in all of the 
circumstances”.134  
 
The SCC in Wilson v. Alharayeri held that at least four general principles should guide courts in 
fashioning a fit remedy under the CBCA oppression remedy provision.135 First, the oppression 
remedy request must, in itself, be a fair way of dealing with the situation.136 Fairness is central to 
the inquiry. The Court held that it may be fair to hold a director personally liable where a remedy 
against the corporation would unduly prejudice other security holders. While personal benefit and 
bad faith are hallmarks of conduct attracting personal liability, as are other indicia, they do not 
constitute necessary conditions to imposing personal liability, and they should not overwhelm the 
analysis.137 The SCC held that these factors merely represent indicia of fairness. The SCC held that 
the fairness principle is ultimately not amenable to formulaic exposition and must be assessed in 
light of all the circumstances of a particular case. The second principle is that any order should go 
no further than necessary to rectify the oppression.138 Third, any order may serve only to vindicate 
the reasonable expectations of security holders, creditors, directors or officers in their capacity as 
corporate stakeholders.139 Fourth, a court should consider the general corporate law context in 
                                                          
131 Ibid at para 82. Citing Maple Leaf Foods Inc Schneider Corp, [1998] OJ No 4142 [“Maple Leaf Foods”], the Court held 
at para 83 that: Directors may find themselves in a situation where it is impossible to please all stakeholders. The 
“fact that alternative transactions were rejected by the directors is irrelevant unless it can be shown that a 
particular alternative was definitely available and clearly more beneficial to the company than the chosen 
transaction.” 
132 Wilson, supra note 104. The appeal was from a Québec Court of Appeal judgment, 2015 QCCA 1350, appeal 
dismissed. The SCC confirmed that the two-pronged test articulated Budd v Gentra Inc (1998), 43 BLR (2d) 23 (CA) 
continues to be valid, clarifying the parameters of the tests.   
133 Wilson, ibid at para 31. 
134 Ibid at para 31. 
135 Section 241, CBCA, supra note 17.  All the provincial corporate law statutes also have oppression remedy provisions. 
136 Wilson, supra note 104. The SCC held that It may be fair to hold a director personally liable where he or she has 
derived a personal benefit in the form of either an immediate financial advantage or increased control of the 
corporation, breached a personal duty or misused corporate power, or where a remedy against the corporation would 
unduly prejudice other security holders. The SCC held that these factors merely represent indicia of fairness. 
137 Ibid at paras 41 and 51. The SCC held, at para 50, that the list of factors is not closed. 
138 Ibid para 53. 
139 Ibid at para 54. 
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exercising its remedial discretion.140 Director liability cannot be a surrogate for other forms of 
statutory or common law relief, particularly where such relief may be more fitting in the 
circumstances.141  
 
The SCC held that conduct may run afoul of s. 241 CBCA even when it is driven by lesser states of 
mental culpability, as a range of conduct can give rise to liability: 
 
“Oppression” carries the sense of conduct that is coercive and abusive, and 
suggests bad faith. “Unfair prejudice” may admit of a less culpable state of mind, 
that nevertheless has unfair consequences. Finally, “unfair disregard” of interests 
extends the remedy to ignoring an interest as being of no importance, contrary to 
the stakeholders’ reasonable expectations … 142 
 
The oppression remedy is concerned with the effects of oppressive conduct, not the intent of the 
oppressor.143 
 
Applying these standards to conduct in respect of climate change risk, it is the latter two categories 
under the oppression remedy provisions that are likely to attract the attention of stakeholders 
seeking to hold directors and officers accountable for failure to address climate change risk. 
Directors could be held personally liable if they act in a manner that is unfairly prejudicial, based 
on adverse consequences to equity holders, and in some cases, other stakeholders. An example 
could be a decision to continue investing in fossil fuels when directors and officers ought 
reasonably to have known that the consequences of depressed market prices and policy changes 
means there will be firm failures and growing numbers of stranded assets. “Unfair prejudice” does 
not require a culpable state of mind; the court will assess whether the decision or failure to act 
had unfair consequences. The third threshold, “unfair disregard” of interests extends the remedy 
to where directors have ignored an interest as being of no importance, contrary to the 
                                                          
140 Ibid at para 55. 
141 Ibid. In this case, directors took action to address continuing financial difficulties by altering share structure and issuing 
a private placement of convertible secured notes.  The SCC held that the trial judge appropriately exercised the remedial 
powers provided in s 241(3) of the CBCA by holding W personally liable for the oppression. W and B, the only members 
of the audit committee, played the lead roles in Board discussions resulting in the non-conversion of A’s A and B Shares, 
and were therefore implicated in the oppressive conduct. In addition, W accrued a personal benefit as a result of the 
oppressive conduct: he increased his control over Wi2Wi through the conversion of his C Shares, which was not the case 
for the C Shares held by others, into common shares, which allowed him to participate in the private placement despite 
issues as to whether the test for conversion had been met. This conversion was done to the detriment of A, whose own 
stake in the company was diluted due to his inability to participate in the private placement. The SCC held that the 
remedy went no further than necessary to rectify A’s loss. The quantum of the order was fit, as it corresponded to the 
value of the common shares prior to the private placement. Finally, the remedy was appropriately fashioned to vindicate 
A’s reasonable expectations that (1) his A and B Shares would be converted if Wi2Wi met the applicable financial tests 
laid out in the corporation’s articles and (2) the Board would consider his rights in any transaction impacting the A and 
B shares.  
142 BCE, supra note 32 at para 67. See also Wilson, supra note 104 at para 41. 
143 Wilson, ibid at para 42, the Court quoting Gascon J (as he then was) in Segal v Blatt, 2007 QCCS 1488, at para 43 
(CanLII), aff’d 2008 QCCA 1094, at paras 16-17: “In oppression matters, it is the effect of the acts and omissions of 
directors and officers of a company, rather than their intentions, that determines whether the conduct complained of is 
unfairly prejudicial. The rights conferred by Section 241 CBCA turn on effect, not intent. What is important is the result. 
Effect is key.”  
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stakeholders’ reasonable expectations. Directors and officers are arguably at risk of personal 
liability if a complainant had a reasonable expectation that they would address climate change risk; 
and the directors and officers disregarded their interests. However, their due diligence in 
addressing climate risk, as discussed below under “defences”, will protect them from personal 
liability. 
 
If the best interests of the corporation are defined in terms of decisions that advance the potential 
long-term operational, financial and environmental sustainability of an enterprise, including 
climate adaption and mitigation measures, arguably both the public interest and the interests of a 
broader number of stakeholders could become factors in shifting current approaches.144 Assessed 
on the reasonable expectations of the complainant, the oppression remedy could be utilized to 
enforce directors’ obligations to make decisions that are aimed at financial sustainability and 
addressing climate or other systemic risks. In particular, judicial reasoning as to what “unfairly 
disregards” and is “unfairly prejudicial” under oppression remedy provisions could be informed by 
(and inform) “reasonable expectations” regarding the need to address such risks both to ensure 
corporate survival and exercise good corporate citizenship.145 Claimants seeking oppression 
remedies would have to establish the threshold of whether they come within the definition of 
complainant. Once recognized, the court has broad authority within the proceeding to craft a 
remedy to address the risk or the harm caused. On the other hand, claimants seeking to assert 
that climate mitigation strategies are oppressive because of the effect on immediate returns are 
liable to be thwarted by the “reasonable corporate citizen” view of the corporation’s best interests 
as the lens through which the reasonableness of expectations will be evaluated.  
 
In reality, climate-related litigation is likely to allege breaches of multiple duties. The SCC in BCE 
Inc v 1976 Debentureholders analyzed the relationship between the oppression remedy and 
directors’ duties under corporations statutes: 
 
The fact that the conduct of the directors is often at the centre of oppression actions 
might seem to suggest that directors are under a direct duty to individual stakeholders 
who may be affected by a corporate decision. Directors, acting in the best interests of 
the corporation, may be obliged to consider the impact of their decisions on corporate 
stakeholders, such as the debentureholders in these appeals. This is what we mean 
when we speak of a director being required to act in the best interests of the 
corporation viewed as a good corporate citizen. However, the directors owe a fiduciary 
duty to the corporation, and only to the corporation. People sometimes speak in terms 
of directors owing a duty to both the corporation and to stakeholders. Usually this is 
harmless, since the reasonable expectations of the stakeholder in a particular outcome 
often coincides with what is in the best interests of the corporation. However, cases 
(such as these appeals) may arise where these interests do not coincide. In such cases, 
it is important to be clear that the directors owe their duty to the corporation, not to 
stakeholders, and that the reasonable expectation of stakeholders is simply that the 
directors act in the best interests of the corporation.146 
                                                          
144 Waitzer and Sarro, supra note 97. 
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146 BCE, supra note 32 at para 66, [2008] 3 SCR 560 (SCC). 
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i. Who Can Bring an Oppression Remedy Application? 
 
It is most likely that security holders would bring claims seeking an oppression remedy for allegations 
that the directors and officers failed to identify climate-related risk and develop mitigation and 
adaptation strategies. They have standing as of right and can more easily establish as reasonable 
their expectations that the directors and officers would address threats to the sustainability of the 
company and thus to their financial interests. The broad language of the remedy, including that the 
directors unfairly disregarded their interests, gives considerable scope for a potential claim.  
 
In respect of potential claims by stakeholders other than security holders, it would be difficult for 
non-governmental organizations (“NGO”) to bring a claim for an oppression remedy for two reasons.  
The first hurdle is that the claimant must qualify as a “complainant”, as that term is defined in 
corporations statutes. Second, the remedy itself only protects the the interests of any security holder, 
creditor, director or officer.147  The statutory language creates two classes of potential complainants: 
a defined class where the individual falls within one of the relationships with the corporation defined 
in the statute, and an undefined class of potential claimants who are, in the court’s opinion, “a proper 
person”. Individuals who are not security holders may apply for an oppression remedy by asking a 
court to exercise its discretion to recognize them as complainants.  
 
Although the criteria for standing to bring an oppression remedy application do not specify any limits 
on who may commence the application, the criteria for those individuals who may obtain a remedy 
for unfair prejudice or unfair disregard of their interests appear restricted to members of a defined 
class of claimants.148 While the court may determine anyone is a “proper person” to bring an 
oppression remedy claim, the remedy provided in the statute is limited to corporate actions that are 
oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly disregard the interests of a narrower set of 
stakeholders, “any security holder, creditor, director or officer”.149  
                                                          
147 The full provision is as follows: 
Section 241 of the CBCA, supra note 17, specifies: 241 (1) A complainant may apply to a court for an order under this 
section. 
 (2) If, on an application under subsection (1), the court is satisfied that in respect of a corporation or any of its 
affiliates 
(a) any act or omission of the corporation or any of its affiliates effects a result, 
(b) the business or affairs of the corporation or any of its affiliates are or have been carried on or conducted in a 
manner, or 
(c) the powers of the directors of the corporation or any of its affiliates are or have been exercised in a manner 
that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards the interests of any security holder, creditor, 
director or officer, the court may make an order to rectify the matters complained of. 
The term security is not defined in the Nova Scotia Companies Act, although it is defined in the CBCA, supra note 17, 
and other statutes. 
148 Janis Sarra, “The Oppression Remedy: The Peoples’ Choice”, Annual Review of Insolvency Law, 2005 (Toronto: 
Carswell, 2006) at 111-156. 
149 See the precise language in footnote 146. See also Clitheroe v Ontario Hydro Inc, [2002] OJ No 4383 (Ont SCJ), 
where the CEO of the corporation was terminated allegedly for just cause; and instead of commencing an action for 
damages for wrongful dismissal, she commenced a proceeding under the oppression remedy provisions of the Ontario 
Business Corporations Act. The Court struck out her oppression claim because it failed to allege a pattern of oppressive 
conduct. In Walters v Harris Partners Ltd, 2001 CarswellOnt 1424 (ON SC), the Court held that it must determine 
whether it the claim is “at its heart, an oppression claim with a wrongful dismissal component . . . or whether it is a 
wrongful dismissal claim that happens to have an oppression component to it”. An oppression remedy may be 
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The Ontario Divisional Court held that the oppression remedy is designed to address the imbalance 
of power on the part of those directors in control with the vulnerability on the part of those 
individuals who have a genuine stake in the affairs of the corporation, but no control over its 
conduct.150 The oppression remedy gives recognition to the fact that there are a number of classes 
of persons who have a legitimate stake in the manner in which the affairs of a business corporation 
are conducted. It prevents those individuals having power and control over the affairs of a business 
corporation from exercising that power with impunity.151 Adopting the reasoning in BCE Inc v 1976 
Debentureholders, the Court in 1413910 Ontario Inc (cob as Bulls Eye Steakhouse & Grill) v 
McLennan held that the concept of reasonable expectations is objective and contextual.152 The 
question is whether the expectation is reasonable having regard to the facts of the specific case, 
the relationships at issue, and the entire context, including the fact that there may be conflicting 
claims and expectations.153 
 
The current reasonable expectation test used by Canadian courts in determining whether an 
oppression remedy should be granted may serve an important gatekeeping function in terms of 
the type of actions that give rise to a remedy, hence protecting the diligent director from frivolous 
claims. The significance of case law that emphasizes that the reasonable expectation test is an 
objective standard is critically important, given the scientific consensus regarding climate change 
risk and Canada’s adoption of COP 21 reduction goals. 
 
 
3. Derivative Action 
 
The derivative action is aimed at enforcing a right of the corporation itself.154  Many Canadian 
corporate law statutes utilize the same definition of a proper complainant under derivative action 
provisions as that utilized under the oppression remedy provisions. The complainant seeks leave 
of the court to bring an action on behalf of the corporation against directors.  It is a remedy 
designed to hold directors accountable for conduct that harms the corporation itself.  A derivative 
action can be sought for alleged violations of the statutory fiduciary duty, the duty of care, or under 
oppression remedy provisions.  The remedy sought must be for the benefit of the corporation as 
                                                          
available in the former situation, but not in the latter. The court will consider whether the interests of the individual as 
an employee of the corporation were so closely intertwined with her interests as a shareholder, and whether the 
dismissal forms part of a pattern of conduct meant to exclude the individual from participation in the corporation. 
150 1413910 Ontario Inc (cob as Bulls Eye Steakhouse & Grill) v McLennan, [2009] OJ No 1828 Ont SCJ Div Ct).  In that 
case, the Court held that a creditor to whom the corporation owed an obligation affirmed by judgment but not yet 
quantified by an assessment of damages, was no less in a vulnerable position vis-à-vis the corporation and had no less 
of a legitimate stake or interest in the manner in which the affairs of the corporation were conducted than one to 
whom a liquidation sum was owed. The Divisional Court held that the trial judge was correct in concluding that the 
creditor had a reasonable expectation that funds would be available to it, thus the thwarting of that expectation 
constituted oppression. It concluded that the creditor became a creditor when it obtained a summary judgment in its 
favour and although it was not yet a judgment creditor in that it did not have a legal right to enforce execution of a 
judgment for a specific sum of money. 
151 Ibid at para 31. 
152 Ibid at para 37. 
153 Ibid. 
154 BCE, supra note 32 at para 45. 
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a whole. The party seeking status must meet statutorily imposed tests of acting in good faith and 
have made reasonable prior efforts to have the directors pursue an action on behalf of the 
corporation.155   
 
The derivative action is another possible avenue for shareholders and possibly others to seek a 
remedy against directors personally if they can meet the threshold criteria as a complainant and 
persuade the court to exercise its discretion to allow the claim to proceed. In addition to giving 
notice of the claim to the directors and providing a reasonable period for them to take up the 
claim, a complainant must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the court that the claim is being 
brought in good faith and that it has a reasonable prospect of success, in order to be granted leave 
to proceed with the claim.  
 
Creditors, who are not one of the defined classes of complainants, have been granted access to 
derivative actions only in very limited circumstances, such as where the creditor has a direct financial 
interest or a particular legitimate interest in the manner in which the affairs of the corporation are 
being managed.156 The courts have held that a creditor seeking to bring the derivative action must 
be in a position somewhat analogous to a minority shareholder, where it has no right to influence 
what it sees as abuses by management or conduct contrary to the corporation’s interests.157 If the 
court is satisfied of this interest and the creditor meets the other statutory criteria, the court may 
exercise its discretion to grant status.158 
 
With respect to potential derivative action claims regarding climate-related risk, directors and 
officers will be most vulnerable to claims from shareholders, as they have a direct financial interest 
in corporate officers managing these risks. A derivative action is aimed at benefiting the corporation 
itself and the entire body of shareholders and others with legitimate interests in how the corporation 
is being managed. However, one could anticipate an NGO located in a “one company town” or “one 
industry community” in which directors failed to consider climate change risk seeking to commence 
a derivative action. The NGO would have to establish a legitimate interest in the corporation’s future 
sustainability, such as, that its survival affects the economic security of the community.  One-industry 
steel and mining towns in Northern Ontario come to mind as an example. 
                                                          
155 For example, s 239, CBCA, supra note 17, specifies: Commencing derivative action 
239 (1) Subject to subsection (2), a complainant may apply to a court for leave to bring an action in the name and on 
behalf of a corporation or any of its subsidiaries, or intervene in an action to which any such body corporate is a party, 
for the purpose of prosecuting, defending or discontinuing the action on behalf of the body corporate. 
(2) No action may be brought and no intervention in an action may be made under subsection (1) unless the court is 
satisfied that (a) the complainant has given notice to the directors of the corporation or its subsidiary of the 
complainant’s intention to apply to the court under subsection (1) not less than fourteen days before bringing the 
application, or as otherwise ordered by the court, if the directors of the corporation or its subsidiary do not bring, 
diligently prosecute or defend or discontinue the action; (b) the complainant is acting in good faith; and 
(c) it appears to be in the interests of the corporation or its subsidiary that the action be brought, prosecuted, 
defended or discontinued. 
156 AE Realisations (1985) Ltd v Time Air Inc, [1994] SJ No 684 at para 23, 127 Sask R 105 (Sask QB), aff’d [1995] SJ No 
273, 131 Sask R 249 (Sask CA); Re Daon Development Corp, [1984] BCJ No 2945, 54 BCLR 235 at 243 (BCSC) [“Re 
Daon”]; Constitution Insurance Co of Canada v Kosmopoulos, [1987] SCJ No 2, [1987] 1 SCR 2 (SCC); Jacobs Farms Ltd v 
Jacobs, [1992] OJ No 813 at paras 29-31 (Ont Gen Div) [“Jacobs Farms”]. 
157 Re Daon, ibid; Jacobs Farms, ibid. 
158 Jacobs Farms, ibid. 
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One benefit for potential complainants is that the court can order that the corporation fund the 
litigation where the complainant makes the case that it should fund the derivate action to hold 
directors personally liable.159 It can also be a hurdle for getting approval of a derivative action.  Where 
the court authorizes the derivative action and orders the company to finance the litigation, the 
claimant is often not risking its own resources in pursuing the claim against the directors personally. 
To this end, the rigorous tests in the statute and the high thresholds set by the court ensure that the 
resources of a corporation are not unnecessarily depleted by pursuit of the action, while still allowing 
potentially meritorious cases to proceed.  An NGO would have to persuade the court that it met this 
threshold in order to ground a derivative action. 
 
The court’s approach, therefore, appears to be efficiency and fairness enhancing in that directors 
have incentives not to engage in conduct contrary to the interests of the corporation, creditors 
cannot inappropriately use corporate resources to pursue litigation, and availability of the remedy 
may enhance governance decisions, since institutional shareholders are unlikely to tolerate conduct 
by directors that results in corporate resources financing litigation. 
 
 
4. Materiality 
 
Materiality underpins much of the transparency requirements of Canadian securities law, a 
determining factor as to whether information must be disclosed to investors.160 Materiality is also 
a tool with which to measure proper exercise of fiduciary obligations.  If the risks to the business 
are material, whether direct risk to the business through physical risks, transition costs or material 
financial risk in terms of market prices, financial performance, etc, directors and officers should 
have identified material risk to the best interests of the company. They should have devised a 
strategy to address the challenges, and monitored its implementation on a continuing basis, 
whether the company is privately held or publicly traded.  Non-financial material issues, which may 
be important to stakeholders, are also relevant, and directors and officers should be managing 
these issues effectively, even if they do not pose a significant threat to the viability of the business. 
They need to be able to establish for corporate stakeholders the ongoing steps they are taking.   
 
The probability/magnitude test is a method sometimes used by Canadian securities regulators to 
analyze when contingent events become sufficiently crystallized that they are required to be 
                                                          
159 For example, s 240 of the CBCA, supra note 17, specifies: 
240 In connection with an action brought or intervened in under section 239, the court may at any time make any 
order it thinks fit including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, 
(a) an order authorizing the complainant or any other person to control the conduct of the action; 
(b) an order giving directions for the conduct of the action; 
(c) an order directing that any amount adjudged payable by a defendant in the action shall be paid, in whole or in part, 
directly to former and present security holders of the corporation or its subsidiary instead of to the corporation or its 
subsidiary; and 
(d) an order requiring the corporation or its subsidiary to pay reasonable legal fees incurred by the complainant in 
connection with the action. 
160 Mary Condon, Anita Anand, Janis Sarra and Sarah Bradley, Securities Law in Canada, 3rd ed (Toronto: Emond 
Montgomery, 2017) at 282-312, 434-477 [“Condon et al”]. 
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disclosed as material changes.161 It requires an assessment of the probability that an event will 
occur, having regard to all the known or ascertainable facts. It also requires some assessment of 
the magnitude or significance of the change, in terms of whether the information would be viewed 
by reasonable investors as important information for making a decision to buy, sell, or continue to 
hold their securities.162 An important question is whether materiality of climate-related financial 
risk depends on the existing probability/magnitude assessment,163 or whether it needs to have a 
different understanding that recognizes the scale of risk, the longer timelines, and the impact of 
failing to act beyond an assessment of financial impact.  In some instances, material changes are 
contingent or uncertain, although directors and officers of the corporation may have some 
information regarding the possibility of such a change.  Disclosure relating to corporate governance 
is not subject to a materiality standard in Canada; climate-change disclosure should be treated 
similarly. 
 
The TCFD has recognized that most information included in financial filings is subject to a 
materiality assessment.164 However, it observes that because climate-related risk affects nearly all 
industries, many investors believe it requires special attention. For example, the TCFD reports that 
in assessing organizations’ financial and operating results, investors want insight into the 
governance and risk management context in which such results are achieved.165 It recommends 
that organizations provide climate-related financial disclosures in their mainstream public annual 
financial filings, noting that in most G20 jurisdictions, public companies have a legal obligation to 
disclose material information in their financial filings, including material climate-related 
information.166 The TCFD recommends that organizations should describe their processes for 
prioritizing climate-related risks, including how materiality determinations are made within their 
organizations.167 Essentially, the materiality requirement is that investors and other stakeholders 
should be able to see major trends and significant events related to climate change that affect or 
have the potential to affect the company’s financial condition and/or its ability to achieve its 
business plan or strategy. 
 
 
5. Is There Really Litigation Risk? 
 
A decade ago, the question would have been, can directors and officers consider climate-related 
risk in the exercise of their duties, given its long time horizon? Today, the question has 
fundamentally shifted. Can directors and officers ignore climate-related risk in the exercise of their 
fiduciary duties and their duty of care?  Arguably not.  
 
                                                          
161 YBM Magnex International Inc (2003), 26 OSCB 5285. 
162 Ibid. It is important to note that provincial securities laws have slightly different definitions of material fact and 
material change, something that Canadian securities regulators must harmonize through national instruments; Condon 
et al, supra note 160. 
163 Ibid. 
164 TCFD Final Report, supra note 73. 
165 Ibid. 
166 Ibid. 
167 Ibid at 21. 
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Litigation on climate-related risk is most likely to arise in the context of securities disclosure 
obligations.168 However, as corporations act through directors and officers, it is their actions that 
will determine the liability of the corporation. As Canadian courts determine the scope of the duty 
to disclose in relation to climate risk, they may look to how directors and officers have devised 
processes to identify material risk, and what programs, processes and strategies they have adopted 
to address the risks identified, even where securities law has not been amended to expressly 
require directors and officers to identify and disclose climate-related financial risk. 
 
In August 2017, lawyers at Environmental Justice Australia filed a lawsuit on behalf of two 
shareholders of Commonwealth Bank of Australia (“CBA”) alleging that the bank’s 2016 directors’ 
report did not adequately inform investors of climate change risks.169 The Notice of Filing alleges 
that CBA knew, or ought to have known, that its climate change business risks might have a 
material or major impact on the operations, financial position, and prospects for future financial 
years of CBA’s business and its customers; that CBA ought to have had business strategies to 
manage CBA’s climate change business risks; and that CBA’s members (shareholders) reasonably 
require a summary of CBA’s climate change business risks and of the business strategies, if any, 
employed to manage those risks.170 The shareholders argue that such a summary is necessary for 
shareholders to make an informed assessment of CBA’s operations, financial position, business 
strategies, and prospects for future financial years.171 They are seeking an injunction to stop the 
bank making the same omissions in future annual reports.  
 
The action in Australia comes on the heels of the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
observing that entities can no longer treat climate change as “non-financial” and that risks 
associated with climate change extend far beyond the ecological realm to economic transition risks 
that “are actionable now by Australian banks, insurers, asset owners and asset managers”.172 In 
addition, a legal opinion released by the Australian Centre for Policy Development and the Future 
Business Council states that “company directors who fail to properly consider and disclose 
foreseeable climate-related risks to their business could be held personally liable for breaching 
their statutory duty of due care and diligence”. 173  
 
These developments suggest that it is only a matter of time before some legal action is taken in 
Canada.  Directors and officers should therefore be proactive in addressing climate-related risk, 
rather than reactive to a lawsuit under corporations law, securities law, environmental law, or the 
                                                          
168 For a discussion, see Cynthia Williams and Jordan Routliff, “Disclosure of Information Concerning Climate Change: 
Liability Risks and Opportunities”, Commonwealth Climate and Law Initiative Working Paper, 14 October 2017, draft on 
file with author. 
169 The Guardian, “Commonwealth Bank shareholders sue over 'inadequate' disclosure of climate change risks”, 8 
August 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/aug/08/commonwealth-bank-shareholders-sue-
over-inadequate-disclosure-of-climate-change-risks.  
170 Notice of Filing, Guy Abrahams v Commonwealth Bank of Australia, Victoria Registry, federal Court of Australia, 8 
August 2017, 
http://envirojustice.org.au/sites/default/files/files/170807%20Concise%20Statement%20(as%20filed).pdf.  
171 Ibid. 
172 Geoff Summerhayes, Executive Board Member of Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, “Australia's New 
Horizon: Climate Change Challenges & Prudential Risk”, speech to the Insurance Council of Australia, 17 February 
2017. 
173 Ibid. 
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common law.  The previous discussion regarding the scope of fiduciary obligations and the duty of 
care has already canvassed some of the defences to actions that may be brought. The short answer 
is, if directors and officers are duly diligent in identifying whether there are climate-related risks 
and the scope of those risks, and if identified, in developing strategies to address the risk, they are 
unlikely to be held personally liable. Such diligence is also likely to help protect the corporation 
from losses due to climate-related civil actions. Thus, good governance would suggest directors 
and officers act now to meet their obligations. 
 
Another possible source of litigation are the consumer protection statutes in various provinces. 
While not a claim for breach of fiduciary obligation, they may be a tool to hold companies 
accountable for failing to adequately disclose risks associated with climate change. If a consumer 
product being sold by a corporation carries a risk of negative impact on the environment, class 
action litigation risk associated with such matters should prompt directors and officers to diligently 
investigate their company's compliance and marketing practices.  Recently, a Canadian class-action 
lawsuit against Volkswagen for its cheating emissions testing received Ontario court approval of a 
$2.1 billion settlement plan for the 105,000 purchasers and individuals that leased certain 
Volkswagen or Audi vehicles in Canada.174  Similarly, in 2017, Koskie Minsky LLP and Lenczner Slaght 
Royce Smith Griffin LLP commenced a class proceeding against Mercedes-Benz Canada Inc, 
Daimler AG, and other defendants, alleging that Mercedes BlueTEC vehicles are non-compliant 
with Canadian emissions laws, both in emitting significantly higher levels of pollutants than are 
permissible and emitting toxic chemicals at much higher levels when the temperature drops below 
10°C.175 In both cases, companies are alleged to have sold cars as being “clean and green”, when 
in fact their emissions fell far below legal standards.  Consumer protection legislation allows for 
class members to rescind their contracts and receive a full refund when a product was marketed 
by misrepresentation.176 Consumer misrepresentation class actions provide another tool to hold 
corporations accountable when the misrepresentations by their officers lead to negative 
environmental consequences and reduced utility of the product purchased by consumers.177 
  
Directors and officers have a duty to diligently investigate their company's business and marketing 
practices to avoid the litigation risk of such massive consumer fraud/misrepresentation cases. 
 
There are relatively few cases in Canada in which suits are brought against directors for failure to 
exercise a duty of care.178 In some measure, it is because Canada has a “cost follows results” regime 
that deters individual actions against directors; the plaintiff risks having to pay the legal costs for 
the defendant if it loses. However, one could anticipate a coalition of investors or a coalition of 
NGO funding an action for breach of the fiduciary obligation or duty of care, even where there are 
these potential cost consequences.   
                                                          
174 Aleksandra Sagan, “Volkswagen emissions lawsuit in Canada reaches $2.1B settlement” Toronto Star Newspaper, 27 
April 2017, https://www.thestar.com/business/2017/04/27/volkswagen-emissions-lawsuit-in-canada-reaches-21b-
settlement.html. 
175 Koskie Minsky LLP, “Mercedes BlueTEC Class Action”, 2017, https://kmlaw.ca/cases/mercedes-bluetec-class-action/. 
176 Furthermore, the legislation does not require any reliance on the misrepresentation, or causation in the traditional 
sense, meaning it is very easy to prosecute these claims on a class-wide basis, ibid. 
177 Ibid. 
178 Janis Sarra and Ronald Davis, Director and Officer Liability in Corporate Insolvency (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2015). 
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If a complainant pursues an action alleging a breach of fiduciary obligation owed to the corporation 
by the directors that had harmed the corporation in some way and thus indirectly harmed its 
interests, there would still be barriers to the pursuit of a derivative action. The courts generally 
serve a gatekeeping role in determining leave to commence a derivative action. They have 
generally been reluctant to order corporations to cover the costs of derivative actions until a 
judgment on the merits is obtained, creating a considerable cost barrier to their pursuit.179 
 
The SCC in Peoples Department Stores recognized, for the first time, a “business judgment rule” in 
Canada, which serves as a type of defence to particular decisions or conduct of directors and 
officers.180 The SCC observed: 
 
Many decisions made in the course of business, although ultimately unsuccessful, are 
reasonable and defensible at the time they are made. Business decisions must sometimes 
be made, with high stakes and under considerable time pressure, in circumstances in 
which detailed information is not available. It might be tempting for some to see 
unsuccessful business decisions as unreasonable or imprudent in light of information that 
becomes available ex post facto. Because of this risk of hindsight bias, Canadian courts 
have developed a rule of deference to business decisions called the “business judgment 
rule”, adopting the American name for the rule. 181 
 
The SCC subsequently held that the business judgment rule accords deference to a business 
decision, so long as it lies within a range of reasonable alternatives.182 It held that the deference 
reflects the reality that directors, who are mandated to manage the corporation's business and 
affairs, are often better suited to determine what is in the best interests of the corporation, 
including decisions on the appropriate balance among stakeholders' interests, as well as other 
directorial decisions.183  
 
With respect to climate-related financial risk, the court would look to see that the directors made 
a reasonable decision, not a perfect decision. Provided that the decision made, and the action 
taken to monitor, mitigate and/or adapt with respect to climate risk is within a range of 
reasonableness, the courts will not substitute their opinion for that of the directors, even though 
subsequent events may have cast doubt on the directors’ decision.  The SCC has held that courts 
should defer to business judgments when assessing whether there has been a breach of duty, 
although this deference is to duly diligent decisions rather than a presumption of sound business 
                                                          
179 Janis Sarra, Review of the Derivative Action Provisions of the Canada Business Corporations Act, Policy Implications 
and Options, Report for Corporations Canada, 30 April 2005. 
180 Peoples Department Stores judgment, supra note 22 at para 64. Prior to the Peoples Department Stores judgment, 
Canadian courts had deferred to business judgment in a number of cases, but were frequently careful to distinguish 
such deference from an actual “rule”. It was the first judgment in which the SCC found that it was a rule that serves as 
a defence to particular decisions or conduct. 
181 Peoples Department Stores, supra note 22 at para 64. 
182 BCE, supra note 32. 
183 Ibid. See also Maple Leaf Foods, supra note 131; Kerr v Danier Leather Inc, [2007] SCJ No 44, [2007] 3 SCR 331, 2007 
SCC 44 (SCC). 
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judgment as exists in the United States.184  
 
The Ontario Court of Appeal in UPM-Kymmene v UPM-Kymmene Miramichi Inc held that the 
business judgment rule “recognizes the autonomy and integrity of a corporation and the expertise 
of its directors”, since they are “in the advantageous position of investigating and considering first-
hand the circumstances that come before it and are in a far better position than a court to 
understand the affairs of the corporation and to guide its operation”.185 However, the court will 
not exercise deference unless directors are scrupulous in their deliberations and demonstrate 
diligence in arriving at decisions. Courts are entitled to consider the content of the directors’ 
decision and the extent of the information on which it was based, and to measure these 
considerations against the facts as they existed at the time the impugned decision was made.186 
Therefore, although corporate board decisions are not subject to microscopic scrutiny with the 
perfect vision of hindsight, they are subject to examination.187 
 
Hence, while statutory defences and the recognition of a judicial deference to business judgment 
offer directors and officers powerful defences against claims that they breached their statutory 
fiduciary duties or their duty of care, courts want to know they have been scrupulously diligent. 
While largely a process inquiry, judgments such as UPM-Kymmene v UPM-Kymmene Miramichi Inc 
emphasize that courts will consider the content of decisions and the extent of information on 
which they are based. While the courts will accord deference to reasonable decision-making and 
the business judgment of directors and officers, statutory terms such as due diligence offer 
considerable scope to the court for review in cases where corporations have caused considerable 
harm either to a third party or a minority entity. Rapidly developing technical and best practice 
information on climate-related financial risk allows directors and officers more information on 
scale of risk and best practice measures to address that risk. Directors will now need to 
demonstrate how they exercised their duties of loyalty and care in respect of climate-related risk 
that is reasonably foreseeable. 
 
 
6. Lessons from Existing Environmental Liability Cases 
 
Directors have been held personally liable for environmental harms in Canada. While there are not 
direct lessons for fiduciary obligation in the sense that environmental liability is expressly imposed 
by statute and a government agency enforces any breaches, the approach of the courts in 
considering personal liability and any available defences may offer some insights in respect of 
climate change and director and officer liability risk.  
 
While there appear to be no Canadian judgments expressly addressing climate change, 
corporations and their officers have long been held accountable for emissions exceeding statutory 
limits. Environmental liability under both statute and common law in Canada is an area in which 
                                                          
184 Ibid. 
185 UPM-Kymmene Corp, supra note 121 at para 152. 
186 Ibid. 
187 Ibid at para 153. 
  
 
34 
there has been a growth in the responsibility assigned to corporate directors and officers.188 There 
are more than 30 statutes in Canada that afford protection to the environment and most, if not 
all, impose liability on directors for breach of the statute.189 The purpose of environmental statutes 
is to prevent and remedy environmental contamination or harm. These statutes are generally 
referred to as “public welfare” legislation, aimed at preventing potentially adverse effects through 
the enforcement of minimum standards of care and conduct of corporations and their directors 
and officers.190  Directors and officers face potential personal liability under these statutes in 
addition to the corporation’s liability. The potential liability varies depending on the type and 
severity of the conduct giving rise to the environmental condition or damage. Directors and officers 
may face fines and/or terms of imprisonment, and even liability for clean-up costs.191  
 
Environmental protection statutes are aimed at holding corporate officers accountable for actions 
of the corporation that are harmful to the environment or that negatively affect the health of 
residents. Much of the legislation imposes personal liability on those persons who have charge, 
management or control of the corporation’s activities or property.192 Directors and officers may 
be considered to have charge, management or control of a corporation if they take an active role 
in the business or if they had a duty or opportunity to take preventive or corrective action but 
failed to do so.193 A directing or controlling mind can be attributed to more than one director or 
officer. “Control” lies not only in the ability to carry out activities, but also the ability or opportunity 
to restrain or prevent environmental harm.194 Most of the environmental statutes in Canada 
specify that if the corporation commits an offence, any director that authorizes, permits or 
acquiesces in the offence commits the same offence.   
 
The statutes impose a strict liability standard.195 Liability can be imposed on both those directors 
and officers with day-to-day responsibility and directors who have personal knowledge of the 
problem and fail to exercise due diligence to make the site safer.196 In addition to statutory 
reference to those individuals with “care, management and control”, environmental protection 
legislation, in most provinces and federally, expressly provides for liability of corporate directors 
and officers. The standard for establishing liability is generally that directors and officers will be 
liable if they directed, authorized, permitted, participated in or acquiesced in the commission of 
an offence by the corporation, in most cases specifying personal liability whether the corporation 
is prosecuted or convicted of the offence, or not.197 Ontario approaches the issue by imposing a 
                                                          
188 Sarra and Davis, supra note 178. 
189 Ibid. 
190 Ibid. 
191 Ibid. 
192 See, for example, Alberta Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act, s 232 [AEPEA]. 
193 P & L Tire Recycling Inc v Director, Ministry of Environment (1992), decision of the Ontario Environmental Appeal 
Board, EPA.001.90. 
194 R v Sault Ste Marie (City), [1978] SCJ No 59 at para 68, [1978] 2 SCR 1299 (SCC). See also Ontario (Ministry of the 
Environment and Energy) v 724597 Ontario Inc, [1995] OJ No 3713, 26 OR (3d) 423 (Ont Div Ct). 
195 R v Bata Industries Ltd, [1992] OJ No 236, 9 OR (3d) 329 (Ont Prov Div), remedy var’d on appeal, [1993] OJ No 1679, 
14 OR (3d) 354 (Ont Gen Div), var’d [1995] OJ No 2691, 25 OR (3d) 321 (Ont CA) [“Bata Industries”]. 
196 Ibid. 
197 See, for example, AEPEA, supra note 192; Northwest Territories Environmental Protection Act, RSNWT 1988, c E-7, s 
14.1(2); Saskatchewan Environmental Management and Protection Act, SS 2002, c E-10.21, s 74; Manitoba 
Environment Act, s 35 [MEA]; Nova Scotia Environment Act, SNS 1994-95, c 1, s 164. Section 179 of the Yukon 
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duty on directors and officers of a corporation to “take all reasonable care” to prevent the 
corporation from committing certain types of offences and providing that directors or officers who 
fail to carry out their duty are guilty of an offence.198  
 
Directors and officers, in most cases, have a defence of due diligence available in terms of potential 
personal liability. However, in Ontario, directors and officers must prove that they carried out their 
duty to take reasonable care to prevent the corporation from committing an offence.199 Directors 
are to take all reasonable care by establishing a proper system to prevent commission of the 
environmental offence and by taking reasonable steps to ensure the effective operation of the 
system. That includes a system that requires officers to report periodically to the board on the 
operation of the system and that ensures that officers are promptly addressing environmental 
concerns brought to their attention.200 The degree of reasonable care to be exercised depends on 
the circumstances of the case and the precise language of the environmental legislation.201 The 
British Columbia Court of Appeal has rejected a director’s contention that the Crown must prove 
an additional element - that the director had a wrongful intention in allowing the corporation to 
commit the offence.202   
 
                                                          
Environment Act specifies that liability is imposed on directors, officers and agents of the corporation where they 
“knowingly” directed, authorized, assented to, acquiesced in or participated in the commission of the offence, 
arguably importing a higher standard, that of “knowing” before liability will attach. The Prince Edward Island 
Environmental Protection Act, RSPEI 1988, c E-9, s 32 specifies that a director, officer or agent of a corporation who 
directed, authorized, assented to, acquiesced in or participated in the commission of an offence by the corporation is 
guilty of the offence.  
198 The Ontario Environmental Protection Act, RSO 1009, c E 19, as amended [OEPA], s 194 specifies: 
Duty of director or officer 
194. (1) Every director or officer of a corporation has a duty to take all reasonable care to prevent the corporation 
from, (a) discharging or causing or permitting the discharge of a contaminant, in contravention of, (i) this Act or the 
regulations, or (ii) an environmental compliance approval, certificate of property use, renewable energy approval, 
licence or permit under this Act; (b) failing to notify the Ministry of a discharge of a contaminant, in contravention of, 
(i) this Act or the regulations, or (ii) an environmental compliance approval, certificate of property use, renewable 
energy approval, licence or permit under this Act; (c) contravening section 27, 40, 41 or 47.3 in respect of hauled liquid 
industrial waste or hazardous waste as designated in the regulations relating to Part V; 
(d) contravening section 93 or 184; (e) failing to install, maintain, operate, replace or alter any equipment or other 
thing, in contravention of an environmental compliance approval, certificate of property use, renewable energy 
approval, licence or permit under this Act; or (f) contravening an order under this Act, other than an order under 
section 99.1, 100.1, 150 or 182.1.  
(1.1) Clause (1) (a) does not apply to a contravention of section 14 unless the contravention causes or is likely to cause 
an adverse effect. 2005, c. 12, s. 1 (65). 
(2)  Every person who has a duty under subsection (1) and who fails to carry out that duty is guilty of an offence.  
(2.1) If a director or officer of a corporation is charged with an offence under subsection (2) in connection with a 
specific contravention of the corporation, the director or officer has the onus, in the trial of the offence, of proving 
that he or she carried out the duty under subsection (1) in connection with that contravention. 2005, c 12, s 1 (66). 
(3)  A director or officer of a corporation is liable to conviction under this section whether or not the corporation has 
been prosecuted or convicted.  
199 Ibid.  
200 Bata Industries, supra note 195. 
201 Sarra and Davis, supra note 178. 
202 Offence under the British Columbia Waste Management Act, RSBC 1996, c 482 [BCWMA]; Alpha Manufacturing Inc 
v British Columbia, 2010 BCCA 436 (BCCA). 
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The courts will carefully scrutinize the language of environmental statutes in order to determine 
the elements of the offence that the Crown must establish. The legislation is strictly construed 
because of the potential for sanctions such as imprisonment. For example, in Ontario, in order to 
establish liability for environmental conditions or damage, the Crown must establish that the 
accused emitted, caused or permitted the emission of the contaminant into the natural 
environment; and that the contaminant caused or was likely to cause the impairment of the quality 
of the natural environment, causing injury or damage to plant, property or animal life, causing 
harm or discomfort to a person, adversely affecting the health or safety of a person, causing loss 
of enjoyment of normal use of property, or interfered with the normal course of business.203 
 
In R v Shell Canada Ltd, the Alberta Provincial Court held that the standard of reasonable care in 
assessing the defence of due diligence involves a proportionality test, assessing the risks involved, 
potential harm, potential benefit, and whether the level of sophistication of the system and its 
continual monitoring are reasonable given the activity sought to be regulated.204 The judgment is 
instructive for what is expected of directors and officers in their due diligence efforts. Scrutiny of 
their conduct frequently arises either when there has been an event that gives rise to an investigation 
and charges, or when the corporation is insolvent, and creditors or others are assessing the value 
remaining in corporate assets, given liability for environmental harms or hazards. The courts have 
asked the following questions in assessing the due diligence defence: 
  
• Did the directors establish a pollution prevention system? 
• Was there supervision or inspection? 
• Was there an improvement in business methods? 
• Did the directors exhort those individuals controlled or influenced?  
• Did each director ensure that the corporate officers had been instructed to set up 
a system, sufficient within the terms and practices of the particular industry, of 
ensuring compliance with environmental laws?  
• Did the directors ensure that the officers of the corporation reported back 
periodically to the board of directors on the operation of the system? 
• Did the directors ensure that the officers had been instructed to report any 
substantial non-compliance to the board of directors in a timely manner? 
• Is there a system of ongoing environmental audit? 
• Are there remedial and contingent plans for spills? 
• Are there training programs in place, sufficient authority to act, and other indices 
of a proactive environmental policy?205 
 
                                                          
203 This test set out by the SCC was in reference to provisions under ss 1 and 13 of the OEPA, supra note 198 (see also s 
187(8)); R v Canadian Pacific Ltd, [1995] SCJ No 62, [1995] 2 SCR 1031 at para 60 (SCC). The SCC has held that the 
polluting conduct is only prohibited if it has the potential to impair use of the natural environment in a way that is 
more than trivial: Canadian Pacific, ibid at para 64. 
204 R v Shell Canada Ltd, [1999] AJ No 1297 at paras 29-31 (Alta Prov Ct) [“Shell Canada”].  
205 Bata Industries, supra note 195. See also Shell Canada, ibid at paras 23-27, where the corporation was found to 
have failed to exercise due diligence. See also R v Pennecon Ltd, [1996] NJ No 9, 138 Nfld & PEIR 278 (Nfld TD); R v 
Commander Business Furniture Inc, [1994] OJ No 313 (Ont Gen Div). 
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Courts have held that directors are responsible for reviewing environmental compliance reports 
provided by corporate officers, but are justified in placing reasonable reliance on reports provided to 
them by corporate officers, consultants, counsel or other informed parties.206 Directors have an 
obligation to substantiate that the officers are promptly addressing environmental concerns brought 
to their attention by government agencies or other concerned parties, including shareholders. 
Directors should be aware of the standards of their industry and other industries that deal with 
similar environmental pollutants or risks. Directors also have an obligation to immediately and 
personally react when they have notice that the system has failed.207 “Reasonably foreseeable” is a 
factor to be considered in determining due diligence.208 
 
Numerous statutes also allow environmental authorities to issue “preventative” orders to reduce 
the risk of or prevent spills; “control” orders to reduce or control emissions and discharges; and 
“stop” orders to halt particular practices, such as discharges, if there is imminent danger to human 
beings.209 Under most of these statutes, directors, officers and persons who have charge, 
management or control can be held liable for non-compliance with the orders. Under Ontario 
legislation, directors owe a duty of care for preventing actual environmental contamination.210 
Directors and officers face similar liability under statutes aimed at special environmental concerns 
in specific industries.211 
 
The availability of a due diligence defence for directors and officers is discussed in the various 
judgments in the Bata Industries case. In R v Bata Industries Ltd., the trial judge held that the directors 
failed to take all reasonable care to prevent the corporation from causing or permitting an unlawful 
discharge of liquid material waste, contrary to the Ontario Water Resources Act.212 The corporation 
                                                          
206 See for example, Bata Industries, supra note 195. 
207 Ibid. 
208 R v Northwood Pulp & Timber Co, [1995] BCJ No 2380 (BCSC); R v Anachemia Solvents Ltd, [1994] OJ No 1201, 14 
CELR (NS) 110 (Ont Prov Div); Canadian Pacific, supra note 203. 
209 See, for example, Québec Environment Quality Act, c Q-2, ss 25, 31.43, 109.1, 114.1; AEPEA, supra note 192, ss 113-
114; MEA, supra note 197, s 24; Ontario Pesticides Act, RSO 1990, c P11, s 28. For example, the British Columbia 
Environmental Management Act [BCEMA] imposes liability on directors, officers and other persons in possession or 
control of polluting substances, allows the ministry to issue orders to take action to reduce risk of spills or escape, and 
specifies that if the corporation commits an offence under these provisions, a director, officer or agent who authorized 
or acquiesced is also deemed to have committed the offence, BC Environmental Management Act, SBC 2003, c 53 
[BCEMA], ss 45, 82, 85, 121. 
210 OEPA, supra note 198, ss 91-99, 147(1)(a), 194. 
211 See, for example, Alberta Oil Sands Conservation Act, RSA 2000, c O-7, s 24 for causing or inducing a permit holder 
to contravene its provisions; Alberta Gas Resources Preservation Act, RSA 2000, c G-4, s 19; British Columbia 
Environmental Assessment Act, SBC 2002, c 43, s 41. There is also liability under most legislation regulating the 
transportation of dangerous goods or for pesticide use: see, for example, Saskatchewan Dangerous Goods 
Transportation Act, SS 1984-85-86, c D-1.2, ss 18, 21; British Columbia Transport of Dangerous Goods Act, RSBC 1996, c 
458, ss 6, 19; Ontario Dangerous Goods Transportation Act, RSO 1990, c D1, ss 4, 7; Québec Pesticides Act, RSQ, c P-
9.3, ss 110, 119; Ontario Pesticides Act, RSO 1990, c P.11, ss 4, 42, 49. Most provinces also have statutes relating to the 
quality and management of practices regarding water, air and other natural resources: see, for example, Nova Scotia 
Water Resources Protection Act, SNS 2000, c 10; Alberta Water Act, RSA 2000, c W-3, ss 142, 143, 146; Saskatchewan 
Clean Air Act, SS 1986-87-88, c C-12.1, s 22(1); New Brunswick Clean Air Act, SNB 1997, c C-5.2. 
212 Bata Industries, supra note 195; Ontario Water Resources Act, RSO 1990, c O.40, ss 116(1)-(3). Section 116(1) 
specifies that every director or officer of a corporation that engages in activity that may result in the discharge of any 
material into any water or shore or bank or any place that may impair the quality of the water contrary to the Act has a 
duty to take all reasonable care to prevent the corporation from causing or permitting such unlawful discharge. 
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was convicted, the judge finding that the corporation did not establish proper systems to prevent 
the offence and the directors failed to take reasonable steps to ensure the effective operation of the 
system they had in place. The Court held that the onus is on the directors to establish due diligence.213 
The trial judge imposed a $60,000 fine on the corporation and imposed a probation order with an 
additional amount of $60,000 to fund a local toxic waste management program. The individual 
directors were fined $12,000 each and the corporation was ordered not to indemnify them in respect 
of their fines as a term of the probation order. The fines were subsequently reduced on appeal to 
$30,000 for the waste management program and to $6,000 each for the directors. In reducing the 
fines, the Ontario Court, General Division held that not enough consideration had been given to the 
defendants’ records as responsible citizens and to their remorse. The Court found that it was not a 
deliberate contravention of the legislation, but rather, a failure to take action within a reasonable 
period of time. Moreover, the corporation had undertaken complete remedial action with respect 
to the area damaged and had circulated instructions to all of its related companies worldwide alerting 
them to environmental issues.214 However, the Ontario Divisional Court upheld the non-
indemnification order.  
 
On further appeal, the Ontario Court of Appeal in the Bata Industries case struck out the non-
indemnification order on the basis that it contradicted the legislative scheme of the Ontario Business 
Corporations Act, which sets out a comprehensive code governing the indemnification of corporate 
officers and directors.215 The Court of Appeal held that the authority under the Ontario Provincial 
Offences Act to impose additional terms was aimed at deterrence and rehabilitation, allowing a court, 
in addition to imposing a fine or term of imprisonment as set out in the statute, to direct a defendant 
to comply with conditions in a probation order, in part to prevent similar conduct and to contribute 
to rehabilitation.216 Here, however, the indemnification order was improperly aimed at punishment. 
The Court also held that its time-limited nature did little to advance the general deterrence objectives 
because the corporation could merely wait out the period and then cover the fine.217 
 
A more recent case did not afford directors and officers access to indemnification when the Ontario 
Ministry of Environment (“MOE”) issued orders to pay the costs of remediation.  In Baker et al v 
Director, Ministry of the Environment (Northstar), former directors and officers of Northstar 
Aerospace Inc and its parent company, Northstar Aerospace (Canada) Inc, were held personally liable 
for contamination at the company’s former manufacturing and processing facility in Cambridge, 
Ontario.218 The environmental contamination arose from the migration of trichloroethylene from the 
                                                          
213 Ibid. The Court dismissed a challenge to the provisions of the statute imposing liability on directors and officers 
under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the Canada Act 
1982, 1982, c 11. The Court held that the legislation is not void for vagueness, the statute clearly targets specific 
environmental problems and the overall scheme is clear. Directors are or should be aware of the risks and standards 
set out in the statute and the courts have offered guidance on acceptable standards of conduct. 
214 Bata Industries, supra note 195. 
215 OBCA, supra note 17. See also indemnity provisions under corporations statutes: for example, ABCA, supra note 17. 
216 Ontario Provincial Offences Act, RSO 1990, c P 33, as amended, s 72. 
217 Bata Industries, supra note 195. The Court held that the lower courts should have considered these provisions in 
determining whether an indemnification order was appropriate, specifically, consideration of whether the directors 
acted honestly, in good faith and in the reasonable belief that their conduct was lawful. 
218 Baker et al v Director, Ministry of the Environment, Case Nos: 12-158 to 12-169, Environmental Review Tribunal, 15 
February 2013, written reasons, Baker et al v Director, Ministry of the Environment, 22 March 2013. Baker et al v 
Director, Ministry of the Environment, Case Nos.: 12-158/12-159/12-160/12-161/12-162/12-163/12-164/12-165/12-
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company’s site to nearby residential properties, which had resulted from the company’s aircraft parts 
manufacturing activities from 1981 to 2010.219  
 
In March 2012, the MOE issued a Director’s order that Northstar clean-up the contaminated ground 
water and in May 2012, another Director’s order required Northstar to provide more than $10 million 
of financial assurance to the MOE within a week. Northstar entered insolvency proceedings under 
the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) in June 2012 and obtained a stay of the MOE 
orders from the court. Northstar sold all its assets except the Cambridge property on 24 August 2012 
and became bankrupt on that date. After the sale proceeds were distributed to its creditors, it had 
no funds to conduct the remediation. The Ontario Minister of the Environment ordered the MOE to 
assume control of remediation of the site. The MOE then issued an order pursuant to the Ontario 
Environmental Protection Act (EPA) to Northstar’s former directors and officers as “persons who had 
management and control of the undertaking or property”.220 The order sought payment of over $15 
million for the remediation work. 
 
The Ontario Superior Court of Justice held that the directors of Northstar were not eligible to 
receive an indemnity from the priority charge created to indemnify Northstar directors in that 
corporation’s insolvency proceedings.221 The order against the directors was issued following 
Northstar’s commencement of CCAA proceedings and after it became clear that Northstar would 
have no funds available to pay the remediation costs. The court supervising the CCAA had issued 
an order that Northstar would indemnify the directors for any liability they would incur by acting 
in that capacity after the CCAA proceeding commenced, except for liability arising from gross 
negligence or willful misconduct, and ordered that directors would have the benefit of a charge of 
$1.750 million, in priority to the claims of other secured creditors, to pay any such indemnity 
claim.222  However, the Court held that the MOE Director’s order was not a  claim that qualified for 
the indemnity and directors’ charge because it was the result of events that occurred before the 
commencement of the CCAA proceeding and thus was not a liability incurred for acting as a 
director after the proceeding commenced.223 The Court noted that to allow such a claim against 
the directors’ charge would “wrongfully and inequitably” subordinate a secured creditor to the 
claims of an unsecured creditor.224 The Court held that if the MOE Director wished to pursue its 
environmental claims against the directors, it would have to do so without recourse to the 
directors’ charge and that the directors would have to defend these claims without the CCAA 
indemnity.  
 
                                                          
166/12-167/12-168/12-169, Environmental Review Tribunal, 2 December 2013, re Order No. 5866-8WKU92 issued by 
the Director, Ministry of the Environment, on 14 November 2012 under sections 17, 18, and 196 of the OEPA, supra 
note 198, ss 17, 18 & 196 [EPA]. 
219 Baker, ibid, written reasons 22 March 2013. 
220 OEPA, supra note 198; Baker, ibid. 
221 Re Northstar Aerospace Inc, 2013 ONSC 1780 [“Re Northstar”]. 
222 Ibid at paras 12, 13. 
223 Ibid at para 36. 
224 Ibid at para 34. 
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The former directors appealed the Director’s order requiring them to pay the costs of remediation 
to the Environmental Review Tribunal.225 The Ontario Environmental Review Tribunal refused a 
request by the directors for a stay pending a determination of the liability issues. It held: 
 
The Tribunal finds that there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that danger to human 
health and serious risk of impairment to the natural environment would result if the 
remediation work were to be interrupted. This is not a situation where an order is issued 
to require commencement of a remediation program that might be able to be delayed for 
a few months pending the resolution of an appeal.  Rather, the Order here was issued to 
confirm an ongoing remediation program for an extremely serious contamination problem 
affecting hundreds of nearby residents and regional water systems and to ensure that the 
program continues until all risk of harm due to the contamination is removed.226 
 
The former directors had been unsuccessful in previous motions seeking an injunction against the 
MOE to prevent them from issuing the order once the CCAA stay expired.227 The former directors 
also lost their motion for an order that the CCAA court assume jurisdiction over the merits of their 
appeal, rather than the Environmental Review Tribunal, arguing both paramountcy and 
administrative efficiency.228  The Court rejected these arguments because they relied on the 
existence of an on-going CCAA proceeding for their applicability. Here, CCAA proceedings were at 
an end and there was no plan of arrangement that might have contained a compromise of claims 
against directors in its provisions. The corporation was bankrupt, the MOE order was against its 
former directors and there was no operational conflict between federal legislation and provincial 
legislation that would require the application of paramountcy.229 The directors and officers 
subsequently reached a settlement with the MOE that involved, among other things, the payment 
of $4.75 million to the MOE in exchange for the withdrawal of the order.230   
 
The careful attention that the Court pays to the specific requirements under environmental 
protection legislation, including the obligations of directors and officers and the availability of 
defences, is quite different than advancing a more general fiduciary obligation for directors and 
officers to identify and address climate change risk.  There may, however, be an interplay between 
these various obligations, where the failure to address climate change intersects with emissions or 
other statutory violations. When corporations are financially healthy, they indemnify their 
directors, but where they are in financial distress and there is no value in the corporation’s assets 
to cover the claims, stakeholders may look to the directors and officers personally.  The Baker case 
illustrates that while the CCAA contains provisions permitting a compromise of claims against 
                                                          
225 Ibid at para 12. 
226 Baker et al v Director, Ministry of the Environment, supra note 218 at para 54. 
227 Re Northstar Inc, 2012 ONSC 6362. 
228 Re Northstar Inc, 2013 ONSC 2719. 
229 Ibid. The Court held that it was bound by the SCC decision in R v Consolidated Maybrun Mines, which held that the 
appeal provisions in the EPA were part of a complete code that excluded the jurisdiction of the courts until an appeal 
from the Environmental Review Tribunal decision on a matter of law was filed, and thus appeal of the MOE Director’s 
order was to be adjudicated by the Environmental Review Tribunal. R v Consolidated Maybrun Mines, [1998] 1 SCR 
706. 
230 S Anderson, “Update on Directors’ and Officers’ Environmental Liability: Lessons from Northstar Aerospace”, 22 
January 2014, http://www.mccarthy.ca/article_detail.aspx?id=6607.  
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directors as part of the larger compromise of claims against a corporation in a plan of arrangement, 
where the assets are sold and no plan of arrangement is used to distribute the proceeds, the courts 
may be reluctant to intervene in claims against the directors personally. 
 
The issue of environmental harm may also give rise to particular claims in tort with respect to third 
parties harmed by activities of the corporation, either through actual production processes or by 
accidental emissions or other environmental damage. Claims against directors and officers for torts 
related to the environment can be brought against directors or officers even where they are acting 
within the course of their duties; however, the facts giving rise to the claim in tort must be specifically 
pleaded.231 Where properly pleaded, officers can be held liable for tortious conduct even when acting 
in the course of their duties.232  
 
 
7. Due Diligence Defence for Climate Change Related Decisions 
 
The environmental law jurisprudence does assist in thinking about what a due diligence defence 
might look like when stakeholders bring personal or derivative actions in respect of climate-related 
financial risk. Questions that the courts might pose, could include:  
 
• Did the directors and officers undertake to identify potential transition risks and 
physical risks from climate change and climate change policies?  
 
• Did the directors and officers develop an ongoing process or program for monitoring 
and identifying new climate-related risks, and have mechanisms in place to respond 
rapidly to changes in the risk profile?  
 
• Did the directors and officers establish a program or put appropriate strategies in 
place to manage the climate-related risks identified, such as reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions, climate mitigation and adaptation?  
 
• Was there supervision or inspection of employees carrying out emissions related 
activities and mitigation or adaptation activities?  
 
• Did each director ensure that the corporate officers had been instructed to set up a 
system, sufficient within the terms and practices of the industry, of ensuring 
compliance with the climate risk identification, mitigation and adaptation program? 
 
• Did the directors ensure that the officers of the corporation reported back periodically 
to the board of directors on the operation of the system?  
 
                                                          
231 Swamy v Tham Demolition Ltd, [2000] BCJ No 1734 (BCSC); United Canadian Malt Ltd v Outboard Marine Corp of 
Canada, [2000] OJ No 1554, 48 OR (3d) 352 (Ont SCJ) [“United Canadian Malt”]. 
232 United Canadian Malt, ibid at paras 9-10, 48 OR (3d) 352 (Ont SCJ). See also ADGA Systems International Ltd v 
Valcom Ltd, [1999] OJ No 27, 43 OR (3d) 101 (Ont CA), leave to appeal to SCC dismissed [1999] SCCA No 124 (SCC). 
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• Did the directors ensure that the officers had been instructed to report any substantial 
non-compliance to the board of directors in a timely manner?  
 
• Is there a system of ongoing climate-related risk audit? 
 
• Are there remedial and contingency plans in place for acute events? 
 
• Are there training programs in place, sufficient authority to act, and other indicia of 
pro-active climate risk identification, mitigation and adaptation program? 
 
The best defence, of course, is proactive governance.  There is evidence that an increasing number 
of corporate directors and officers are identifying and addressing climate-related financial risk. For 
example, Teck Resources Ltd has identified as one of its four primary sustainability goals a focus 
on taking “urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts”.233 It expressly recognizes that 
its “activities consume energy and generate significant greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.” 234  Its 
four pillars of tackling climate change include: setting ambitious targets to reduce its carbon 
footprint, which it is working to achieve through innovation, improved efficiency and adoption of 
low-carbon technologies; positioning Teck for the low-carbon economy in terms of products; 
advocating for climate action, including effective carbon pricing; 235 and adapting to the physical 
impacts, increasing the resilience of its operations by incorporating forecasted climate scenarios 
into project design and mine closure planning.236 
 
A second example is TransAlta Corporation, a large publicly-traded corporation owning, operating 
and managing a diversified portfolio of 69 power generating facilities that use a variety of fuels, 
including coal, natural gas, hydro, and wind.237 It is converting coal plants to gas plants to 
significantly reduce GHG emissions before 2030.238 In addition to being the largest hydro producer 
in Alberta, it is now the largest wind energy producer in Canada.239 Its disclosures reveal that its 
goal, in line with a commitment to the UN Sustainable Development Goals, is to reduce its total 
                                                          
233 Teck Resources Ltd, “Sustainability Report 2016”, April 2017, http://www.teck.com/media/2016-Teck-Annual-
Report.pdf, http://www.teck.com/responsibility/featured-topics/taking-action-on-climate-change/.  
234 Teck Resources Ltd, “Taking Action on Climate Change”, http://www.teck.com/responsibility/featured-
topics/taking-action-on-climate-change/. As of April 2017, it has cut its GHG emissions by over 200,000 tonnes and its 
target is to reduce GHG emissions by 450,000 tonnes by 2030, “the equivalent of taking more than 40,000 cars off the 
road”. 
235 For example, Teck supported development of the SunMine—Western Canada’s largest solar power facility and the 
first owned and operated by a municipality. Ibid. 
236 Ibid. It reports: “we know that the metals and minerals we produce are essential to building the technologies and 
infrastructure necessary to reduce GHGs and adapt to the effects of climate change. For example, renewable energy 
systems can require up to 12 times more copper compared to traditional energy systems; and steel and the 
steelmaking coal required to make it is necessary for infrastructure that reduces emissions, such as rapid transit and 
wind turbines.” 
237 TransAlta, “Action on Climate Change”, 2017, http://www.transalta.com/sustainability/climate-change-action-and-
strategy/. 
238 Ibid. TransAlta is focused on wholesale electricity generation and energy marketing in deregulated electricity 
environments. See also, TransAlta, 29 November 2016, http://www.transalta.com/statement-on-coal-to-gas-
conversion/  
239 TransAlta, “Action on Climate Change”, supra note 237. 
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GHG emissions in 2021 to 30% below 2015 levels, and 60% below 2015 levels by 2030.240  It is 
working towards optimizing its plants to reduce energy consumption and thus GHG emissions. It 
seeks to generate offset and renewable energy credits from its renewable energy portfolio and 
emissions trading, and participates in carbon pricing structures in California, Alberta, Ontario, and 
Australia. It reports annually on climate change strategy, risk, opportunity and emissions database 
to the Climate Disclosure Project (“CDP”).241  
 
 
IV.  Investment Practice, Fiduciary Obligation and Climate Change Risk 
 
Internationally, institutional investors have increased their attention to climate risk 
management.242 In Canada, pension funds in particular have begun to engage with companies in 
their portfolios in respect of climate risk. Pension funds and other institutional investors will 
potentially lose significant value of their investments if they do not act as prudent investors by 
recognizing climate change financial risk. The financial services sector in Canada accounts for 
approximately 6% of Canada’s gross domestic product,243 and thus these institutional investors can 
be a significant force in the move towards a lower carbon economy.   
 
There are duties of both care and loyalty with respect to fiduciary obligation. Where institutional 
investors are fiduciaries, they could be held accountable for failing in their obligations if they do 
not address the issues discussed above regarding climate-related financial risk. As noted in part I, 
a fiduciary’s duties to beneficiaries are twofold: a duty to act prudently and a duty of loyalty.244 It 
is the prudential obligation that necessitates fiduciaries paying attention to climate change risk, 
for the same reasons that directors and officers of corporations must. However, as discussed in 
this part, the precise duties of pension fund trustees and other investment fiduciaries have their 
own unique considerations. 
 
 
1. The International Context 
 
The United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (“UNPRI”) reports that investors’ 
fiduciary duties of loyalty and prudence are not a barrier to implementing environmental and social 
investment practices, suggesting that the failure to consider long-term environmental and social 
goals is a failure of the investor’s fiduciary duty.245 The report identifies several challenges in terms 
of financially material, immaterial, and socio-economic and environmental issues that need to be 
considered by the fiduciary.246  
                                                          
240 Ibid. 
241 Formerly the Carbon Disclosure Project. TransAlta, “CDP Climate Change 2016”, http://www.transalta.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/12/CDP_Climate_Change_2016.pdf. 
242 See for example, TCFD Final Report, supra note 73. 
243 Principles for Responsible Investment, Fiduciary Duty in the 21st Century, 
https://www.unpri.org/download_report/6131, 8 September 2015 [“Fiduciary Duty in the 21st Century”] at 38. 
244 Hodgkinson v Simms, [1994] 3 SCR 377 at 419. 
245 Fiduciary Duty in the 21st Century, supra note 243. 
246 Ibid. An analysis of Canadian asset owners and investment manager’s reliance on fiduciary duties is presented, 
focused on how they interact with environmental and social governance principles. 
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These ideas have been discussed for more than a decade. A SHARE report in 2005 suggested that 
failure to consider climate change could constitute a breach of fiduciary duty “where it is 
determined that trustees ought to have had a reasonable expectation that such factors could 
influence materially the long-term performance of plan investments”.247 The UNEP Finance 
Initiative that same year concluded that integrating environmental, social and governance (“ESG”) 
considerations into investment analysis is “clearly permissible and is arguably required”.248  
 
A report issued by UNPRI in 2015, in collaboration with the UN Global Compact, UNEP Finance 
Initiative, and Inquiry: Design of a Sustainable Financial System, titled Fiduciary Duty in the 21st 
Century, analyzed investment practice and fiduciary obligation in eight countries, including 
Canada.249 While the report focused more generally on responsible investment and ESG issue 
integration in investment decision-making, it offered insights for thinking about climate change 
risk. Fiduciary Duty in the 21st Century notes that many asset owners have made commitments to 
responsible investment and have introduced codes requiring institutional investors to take account 
of ESG issues in their investment decision-making.250 It observes that failing to consider long-term 
investment value drivers is a failure of fiduciary duty.251 ESG considerations include climate change. 
 
The report gives an example of a decision not to invest in a high-carbon asset because of financial 
concerns. Asset owners may take account of climate risk issues where there is a clear focus on 
beneficiaries’ interests. A decision not to invest in coal mines because of risk of stranded assets 
can be a decision in the best interests of beneficiaries. Such a decision is likely to be consistent 
with fiduciary duties as long as the decision is based on credible assumptions and a robust decision-
making process, including clear decisions on investment objectives and reviewing outcomes 
achieved, and willingness to change if the data change or if it is clear that the decision is causing 
significant damage to the beneficiaries’ financial interests.252 
 
The Fiduciary Duty in the 21st Century report recommends that fiduciaries need to be able to show 
that they have identified and assessed the risks of climate change to companies and to their 
investment portfolios. It recommends that fiduciaries show that they have recognized relevant 
risks, even if they are sceptics on the issue of climate change; and have analyzed how climate 
change might affect investment returns over the short, medium and long-term. They should also 
have explicitly managed the risks, and not assumed that the risks are automatically managed by 
other risk management strategies. Fiduciaries must demonstrate that they have interrogated and 
                                                          
247 SHARE, “Fiduciary Duties, Investment Screening and Economically Targeted Investing: A Flexible Approach for 
Changing Times” (2005) http://www.share.ca/files/Fiduciary_Duties,_Investment_Screening_and_ETI.pdf at 9. See also 
Gil Yaron, ”Acting Like Owners: Proxy Voting, Corporate Engagement and the Fiduciary Responsibilities of Pension 
Trustees”, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=772184, Gil Yaron, "The Responsible Pension Trustee: 
Re-interpreting the Principles of Prudence and Loyalty in the Context of Socially Responsible Institutional Investing" in 
(2001) Estates, Trusts and Pensions Journal 305.  
248 UNEP Finance Initiative (UNEP FI), “A Legal Framework for the Integration of Environmental, Social, and Governance 
Issues into Institutional Investment” (London: Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, 2005). 
249 Fiduciary Duty in the 21st Century, supra note 243. 
250 Ibid at 9. 
251 Ibid at 9. 
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challenged the individuals or organizations, for example, investment managers and companies, to 
ensure that climate change risks are being effectively managed. They must have established 
processes that enable them to demonstrate the actions they have taken.253 Integrating climate 
considerations will allow investors to make better investment decisions and improve investment 
performance consistent with their fiduciary duties, in turn allocating capital towards well-governed 
companies and engaging to influence investee companies to allocate capital internally in ways that 
address climate change risks. In this way, they will place “investors in a better position to contribute 
to the goals of a greener economy and a more sustainable society.”254 
 
Investors can embed concern about climate change in their investment processes by analyzing 
risks and opportunities over the longer-term and by encouraging companies to adopt higher 
standards and better practices on these issues, all consistent with their fiduciary duties.255 
Investors could also engage with regulators to encourage the adoption of policy measures to 
correct market failures and to require companies and investors to internalize externalities, for 
example, through the adoption of carbon pricing,  as an integral part of their fiduciary duties.256 
Examples of this engagement exist in Canada and internationally.257 
 
For example, the British Columbia Investment Management Corporation (“bcIMC”) provides 
investment management services to British Columbia’s public sector, with $123.6 billion in assets 
under management.258  bcIMC invests patient capital for the long term, and it considers assessing 
climate-related investment risk to be integral to fulfilling its fiduciary duty.259 It reports: “in 
discharging our fiduciary obligation of working in our clients’ best financial interests to generate 
returns, bcIMC aims to manage the long-term risks and opportunities that ESG matters present”.260 
bcIMC monitors ESG factors, and where it considers appropriate, uses its influence as a 
                                                          
253 Ibid at 17. 
254 Ibid at 10. 
255 Ibid at 18. 
256 Ibid. 
257 See for example, bcIMC, submission to the federal Department of Finance statements on climate change, Canada, 
Review of the Federal Financial Sector Framework, October 2017, 
https://www.bcimc.com/newsroom/pdf/Submissions/2017/bcIMC%20response%20to%20Review%20of%20Federal%2
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can they tell investors about corporate lobbying? 5 September 2017, 
https://share.ca/documents/investor_briefs/Governance/2017/Lobbyist_Registry_Scorecard.pdf.  
258 British Columbia Investment Management Corporation (“bcIMC”), Responsible Investing Newsletter: Climate 
Change, April 2016 at 1, http://read.uberflip.com/i/664765-rin-april-2016. 
259 bcIMC, “Responsible Investing Fact Sheet”, 2017, http://www.bcimc.com/publications/pdf/2017RIFactsheet.pdf at 
1. See also bcIMC, “Engagement Factsheet”: http://www.bcimc.com/publications/pdf/ESGIntegration-Factsheet.pdf. It 
reports that its express “mandate requires that we maintain our fiduciary responsibility while considering ESG factors 
throughout the investment management process; it does not permit us to select or exclude investments based solely 
on environmental, social, governance or values-based considerations; bcIMC, “An Overview of bcIMC’s Approach to 
Responsible Investing”, 2015, http://read.uberflip.com/i/605664-responsible-investing-overview, at 3. bcIMC defines 
responsible investing as: “Considering environmental, social and governance factors when selecting and managing 
investments, allows bcIMC to manage long-term investment risk with the view of protecting and enhancing the 
financial value of our investments. Responsible investing also includes contributing to initiatives that enhance the 
stability and integrity of global capital markets, ibid at 6. 
260 bcIMC, “2016 ESG Engagement: Public Equities Priorities and Process”, at 6, http://read.uberflip.com/i/653745-
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shareholder to encourage companies to manage and report on risks and enhance governance and 
operational practices.261  bcIMC focuses on reporting and disclosure, emissions reduction, resource 
efficiency and regulatory preparation.  
 
Climate change is one of three areas of its focus in respect of long-term business challenges. bcIMC 
actively seeks to optimize the value of its public equities portfolio over the long term by integrating 
ESG factors, including climate change, into investment analysis and decision making.262 Its 
investment reporting expressly recognizes that climate change has a wide-scale economic impact, 
directly through flooding and other extreme weather events, and indirectly through regulatory 
measures to limit GHG emissions. It observes that virtually all sectors are likely to be affected by 
climate change.263 It engages in dialogue with companies in which it invests, to encourage them to 
disclose relevant data on climate risks, to encourage investment in research and new technologies 
to reduce carbon emissions, and to prepare for increased regulatory scrutiny regarding GHG 
emissions.264 bcIMC encourages companies to manage climate change risk and be transparent 
about their progress.265 In 2016, it engaged with 265 public companies.266 Such engagement 
minimizes portfolio risk for its clients, and increases long-term returns.267 
 
In 2016, bcIMC exercised its proxy votes at 2,183 shareholder meetings.268 bcIMC voted in favour 
of shareholder proposals at Rio Tinto and Suncor Energy, which called for additional disclosure 
relating to the companies’ exposure to climate change risks.269 The proposals received 99.2 % and 
98.2% support respectively, largely because the boards of both companies recommended 
support.270  In 2016, bcIMC co-filed its first climate-related shareholder proposal with other global 
investors representing 5% of the company’s outstanding shares. The proposal called on Anglo 
American Plc to report annually on the resiliency of its business model under different climate 
scenarios for 2035.271 The proposal, which was passed by shareholders, also asked for emissions 
management and low carbon research and development.272 
 
bcIMC actively engages with regulators and industry associations in encouraging policy change. 
bcIMC is signatory to the 2014 Global Investor Statement of Climate Change, which asks 
governments to bolster policies to influence investment flow towards a climate-resilient economy, 
adopt meaningful carbon pricing and promote low-carbon technologies.273  
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2. Canadian Pension Funds as Fiduciaries 
 
Canadian pension fund trustees have a fiduciary obligation to pension beneficiaries to act 
prudently in their best interests in making investment decisions regarding fund portfolios.274  
Pension plan trustees’ duties are assessed based on the express language in the pension plan, and 
the relevant pension and trust legislation.275 For example, for a defined benefit pension plan, the 
objective is to build a life income for the future retiree.  Pension plans have an obligation to make 
investment decisions that create sustainable pension funds, addressing intergenerational 
pressures such as the need to fund pensions in the short to medium term, and the need to look 
ahead to future generations of beneficiaries.276 
 
Pension funds, which safeguard the financial security of our aging population, will potentially lose 
significant value of their investments if Canada does not shift the existing fossil fuel trajectory of 
our economy very soon.277 That includes both decarbonizing efforts and technological 
improvement in fossil fuel extraction and production.  Pension fund fiduciaries must act in the best 
interests of pension fund beneficiaries in accordance with the terms of the trust.278 This fiduciary 
obligation is eminent in both statutory and common law, requiring positive actions on the part of 
the fiduciaries.  In determining asset allocation between short-term and long-term investments, 
the duty of care precludes short-term investments that prejudice long-term investments, as the 
fund must be sustained over the long-term, and thus, trustees must take account of systemic 
risks.279 Climate change is one such risk.  The duty of impartiality requires trustees and fund 
managers to balance intergenerational interests in their investment decisions, in that the time 
horizon for older workers is much different than for workers just entering the workforce.280  
 
This part examines two overarching points. Trustees can take climate change into account as a 
legitimate investment issue, which may be short or long term or both, because once climate 
change becomes material to the investment decision, it is part of trustees’ fiduciary obligation.  If 
trustees fail to act to address material climate change risk, they are liable for breach of their 
fiduciary obligation. Thus, inaction is no longer acceptable, given all the evidence that climate 
change risk is material across the entire economy.  Second, trustees can take climate change into 
account because they have duties as public fiduciaries additional to their financial duty to 
beneficiaries. These ideas are examined in turn.  
 
Public statements by several pension funds and their investment managers illustrate how they 
consider climate change to be a material financial risk.  An example is the Canada Pension Plan 
                                                          
274 Arguably, there are also foundations with an asset pool for which the same arguments can be made with respect to 
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Investment Board (“CPPIB”), an investment management organization that invests the funds of the 
Canada Pension Plan on behalf of its 20 million contributors and beneficiaries.281  CPPIB states that 
it has a responsibility to take climate change into account in ensuring it is making sound 
investments over the long term.282 As a long-term investor, CPPIB reports that it is investing for 
multiple generations of beneficiaries, today and well into the future. It is positioning its portfolio 
to perform well through the transition to a low-carbon economy. CPPIB states that “as a significant 
long-term investor we believe we can have a powerful influence on the companies in which we 
invest. We seek to create change from the inside by engaging with numerous Canadian and global 
companies that are high emitters of greenhouse gas emissions.”283  
 
CPPIB seeks enhanced disclosure from companies it invests in, and discusses strategies to help 
them manage and improve their GHG emissions and practices related to climate change. It has co-
filed climate change-related shareholder proposals.284 CPPIB has also developed a cross-
departmental Climate Change Working Group that actively reviews climate change risks and 
opportunities, and its strategy is both “bottom-up review of our investment due diligence as it 
relates to the consideration of climate change risks and opportunities” and a “top-down 
assessment of climate risk across our total portfolio”, including how climate change is positioned 
in CPPIB’s overall risk framework.285 CPPIB has endorsed the TCFD recommendations and is 
engaging with investee companies on the recommendations. CPPIB views its approach to climate 
change as consistent with its mandate to seek to achieve a maximum rate of return.286  
 
i. Pension Legislation and Fiduciary Obligation 
 
Pensions are provincially regulated in Canada, except for employees in the federal sector, which 
are federally regulated. The legislation varies slightly across the country, but in all cases, imposes 
a duty of loyalty and a prudential duty. For example, the Ontario Pension Benefits Act specifies “the 
administrator of a pension plan shall exercise the care, diligence and skill in the administration and 
investment of the pension fund that a person of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with 
the property of another person”.287 The administrator of a pension plan must, in its administration 
                                                          
281 Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (“CPPIB”), “Who We Are”, http://www.cppib.com/en/who-we-are/our-
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22 (1) The administrator of a pension plan shall exercise the care, diligence and skill in the administration and 
investment of the pension fund that a person of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with the property of 
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of the pension plan and in the administration and investment of the pension fund, use all relevant 
knowledge and skill that the administrator possesses or, by reason of the administrator’s 
profession, business or calling, ought to possess.288 An employee or agent of an administrator is 
subject to the same obligations.289  With respect to this obligation, care, diligence and skill would 
seem to indicate that climate change risk is a necessary consideration for all pension administrators 
in Canada, particularly since many pension funds are invested in fossil fuels and other energy assets 
at risk.   
 
A 2011 report by Mercer Inc estimated that as much as 10% of a fund’s portfolio risk exposure 
within the next 20 years will arise from climate change, technology, regulatory, and other 
impacts.290 Important risk factors include: the rate of development and opportunities for 
investment into low carbon technologies, the extent to which changes to the physical environment 
                                                          
(2) The administrator of a pension plan shall use in the administration of the pension plan and in the administration 
and investment of the pension fund all relevant knowledge and skill that the administrator possesses or, by reason of 
the administrator’s profession, business or calling, ought to possess.  
Member of pension committee, etc. 
(3) Subsection (2) applies with necessary modifications to a member of a pension committee or board of trustees that 
is the administrator of a pension plan and to a member of a board, agency or commission made responsible by an Act 
of the Legislature for the administration of a pension plan.   
Conflict of interest 
(4) An administrator or, if the administrator is a pension committee or a board of trustees, a member of the committee 
or board that is the administrator of a pension plan shall not knowingly permit the administrator’s interest to conflict 
with the administrator’s duties and powers in respect of the pension fund.   
Employment of agent 
(5) Where it is reasonable and prudent in the circumstances so to do, the administrator of a pension plan may employ 
one or more agents to carry out any act required to be done in the administration of the pension plan and in the 
administration and investment of the pension fund.   
Trustee of pension fund 
(6) No person other than a prescribed person shall be a trustee of a pension fund.   
Responsibility for agent 
(7) An administrator of a pension plan who employs an agent shall personally select the agent and be satisfied of the 
agent’s suitability to perform the act for which the agent is employed, and the administrator shall carry out such 
supervision of the agent as is prudent and reasonable.   
Employee or agent 
(8) An employee or agent of an administrator is also subject to the standards that apply to the administrator under 
subsections (1), (2) and (4).   
Benefits of administrator 
(9) The administrator of a pension plan is not entitled to any benefit from the pension plan other than pension 
benefits, ancillary benefits and a refund of contributions.  2010, c 24, s 7. 
Benefits of members of pension committee, etc. 
(10) Subsection (9) applies, with necessary modifications, to a member of a pension committee or board of trustees 
that is the administrator of a pension plan and to a member of a board, agency or commission made responsible by an 
Act for the administration of a pension plan.  2010, c 24, s 7. 
288 OPBA, supra, note 14, s 22(2). Section 22(3) states that: Subsection (2) applies with necessary modifications to a 
member of a pension committee or board of trustees that is the administrator of a pension plan and to a member of a 
board, agency or commission made responsible by an Act of the Legislature for the administration of a pension plan.   
289 Ibid at s 22(8). 
290 Mercer LLC, Carbon Trust and International Finance Corporation, "Climate Change Scenarios - Implications for 
Strategic Asset Allocation", February 2011,  
http://www.mmc.com/content/dam/mmcweb/Files/Climate_Change_Scenarios_Implications_for_Strategic_Asset_All
ocation.pdf at 7. 
  
 
50 
will affect investments and the implied cost of carbon. Published four years prior to the COP 21 
Paris Agreement, the report noted the unclear global climate policy environment.291 Four years 
later, Mercer updated its report, adding risk of resource availability and the impact on investments 
of chronic weather patterns, noting that climate change will unequivocally have an impact on 
investment returns such that it needs to be regarded as a new return variable.292 Mercer observed 
that the two most significant categories of risk introduced by climate change that pension fund 
trustees may take into account are the physical risk of destroyed assets or assets with diminished 
value and the regulatory risk of stranded assets or assets with diminished value. It reported that 
traditional diversification across asset classes is insufficient to mitigate the portfolio risks of climate 
change. Rather, diversification must take place across sources of risk, not just traditional asset 
classes, including increased allocation to climate positive assets as a potential hedge for risk.293 
With the more certain policy direction coming out of the COP21 agreement, Mercer’s 
recommendations have become prescient. 
 
The British Columbia Pension Benefits Standards Act (BC PBSA) sets out the fiduciary obligations of 
the pension administrator. 294 The administrator stands in a fiduciary capacity in relation to the 
                                                          
291 Ibid at 2. 
292 Mercer LLC, International Finance Corporation and UK Department for International Development, “Investing in a 
Time of Climate Change”, April 2015, 
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limits global warming to 2 degrees Celsius; “coordination”, whereby actions are aligned to hold warming to 3 degrees 
Celsius; and two types of “fragmentation”, first, where lack of action and coordination results in a 4 degree Celsius 
warming and the second, in which the same occurs but higher damages result, ibid at 10.  In assessing the effects of 
climate change under these scenarios, sectors most effected were coal, renewables.   
293 Ibid at 2. 
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September 30, 2015. 
35 (1) The administrator of a pension plan must ensure that the plan and the pension fund are administered in 
accordance with this Act, the regulations and the plan documents. 
(2) While acting in the capacity of administrator of a pension plan, the administrator stands in a fiduciary capacity in 
relation to (a) the members, and (b) others entitled to benefits. 
(3) Without limiting subsection (2), the administrator, while acting in the capacity of administrator of a pension plan, 
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(a) act honestly, in good faith and in the best interests of 
(i) the members, and (ii) others entitled to benefits, and  
(b) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a person of ordinary prudence would exercise when dealing with the 
property of another person. 
(4) The administrator of a pension plan, or, if the administrator is a board of trustees, a member of that board, must 
not, while acting in the capacity of administrator, knowingly allow his or her interests to conflict with the 
administrator's powers and duties in respect of the plan. 
(5) For the purpose of subsection (4), an administrator does not knowingly allow the interests of the administrator to 
conflict with the administrator's powers and duties in respect of the pension plan merely because the administrator is 
or may become entitled to a pension or other benefit under the plan. 
(6) In addition to any other responsibilities under this Act, the administrator of a pension plan must 
(a) ensure that the plan documents comply with this Act and the regulations, 
(b) if the plan is terminated, ensure that the plan is wound up in accordance with this Act and the regulations, 
(c) ensure that any agreement respecting the transfer of money or benefits between the plan and any other pension 
plan does not contain any provision, relating to a benefit, that a pension plan is prohibited by this Act from containing, 
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members and others entitled to benefits.295 The administrator must act honestly, in good faith and 
in the best interests of the members, and the care, diligence and skill that it must exercise mirrors 
that of the Ontario pension legislation.296 Gold and Scotchmer have observed that the BC PBSA’s 
reference to “another person” is intended to obligate pension fund fiduciaries not simply to 
exercise the degree of prudence that they exercise in conducting their own affairs, but to conduct 
themselves in a more objectively justifiable manner that reflects the fiduciary’s obligations to the 
beneficiaries of the pension plan.297 Pension fund fiduciaries are to be duly diligent in their decision 
making. Kaplan and Frazer suggest that the duty of care requires trustees to use all relevant 
knowledge and skill that the plan administrator possesses or, by reason of his or her profession, 
business or calling, ought to possess.298 
 
With respect to climate change risk, a relevant provision of the BC PBSA is section 60 on investment 
requirements. It specifies that pension plan assets must be invested in a manner that a reasonable 
and prudent person would adopt if investing the assets on behalf of a person to whom the investing 
person owed a fiduciary duty to make investments without undue risk of loss.299 Assets must be 
invested with a reasonable expectation of a return on the investments commensurate with the 
risk, having regard to the plan's liabilities.300 Given the long-term nature of a pension plan’s 
liabilities, the need to consider the effects of climate change on those risks seems to be necessary 
to comply with this provision. Yet even without similar statutory language, the long-term nature of 
pension plans requires the plan’s fiduciaries to consider the risks to comply with prudential and 
fiduciary obligations. 
 
In Ontario, the Pension Benefits Act has been amended to require pension funds to disclose 
information about whether environmental, social and governance factors are incorporated into 
the plan’s investment policies and procedures and, if so, how those factors are incorporated.301 It 
                                                          
(d) perform any other duties the administrator is obligated under the regulations to perform. 
(7) If an administrator employs an agent to exercise one or more of the powers or perform one or more of the duties 
of the administrator, the administrator must 
(a) be satisfied that the agent is qualified to exercise the powers or perform the duties for which the agent is 
employed, and 
(b) carry out reasonable and prudent supervision of the agent. 
295 BCPBSA, ibid, s 35(2). 
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(a) without undue risk of loss, and 
(b) with a reasonable expectation of a return on the investments commensurate with the risk, 
having regard to the plan's liabilities. 
300 Ibid. 
301 O Reg 235/14, s. 8. Pension Benefits Act, RRO 1990, Reg 909 (“Pension Benefits Act”). 
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is a “disclose and explain” approach.302 Pursuant to Regulation 909 under the Pension Benefits Act, 
the administrator of a pension plan is required to establish a statement of investment policies and 
procedures (“SIPP”).303  Effective January 2016, plan administrators are required to file their SIPP 
and any amendments with the Financial Services Commission of Ontario (“FSCO”).304 FSCO 
observes that reporting that ESG factors are incorporated into the plan's broader investment 
policies and procedures requires action by the administrator beyond a broad delegation. Some 
examples of the actions that administrators could take include: summarizing policies where the 
managers incorporate ESG factors into their investment policies; describing how the administrator 
incorporates ESG factors as part of the manager search, selection and review process; and 
describing how the administrator incorporates ESG in the choice of investment fund 
options.305  FSCO has observed that administrators have a fiduciary duty to supervise their 
investment managers, including ensuring that the managers are complying with the PBA and with 
the SIPP. This supervision requirement extends to the incorporation of ESG factors, where the SIPP 
contains them.306 
 
One report suggests that the amendments have been important in stimulating boards of trustees 
to explicitly discuss ESG issues and to seek advice on how responsible investment is consistent with 
their fiduciary obligation.307 One advance from the current Ontario requirements would be to 
                                                          
40 (1) A statement required under subsection 27 (1) of the Act shall contain, as recorded in the records of the 
administrator, at least, 
(v) a statement that the administrator of the pension plan must establish a statement of investment policies and 
procedures for the plan that contains, 
(ii) information about whether environmental, social and governance factors are incorporated into the plan’s 
investment policies and procedures and, if so, how those factors are incorporated; 
40.1 (1) A statement to a former member required under subsection 27 (2) of the Act shall contain, as recorded in the 
records of the administrator, at least, 
(s) a statement that the administrator of the pension plan must establish a statement of investment policies and 
procedures for the plan that contains, 
(ii) information about whether environmental, social and governance factors are incorporated into the plan’s 
investment policies and procedures and, if so, how those factors are incorporated; 
40.2 (1) A statement to a retired member required under subsection 27 (2) of the Act shall contain, as recorded in the 
records of the administrator, at least, 
(r) a statement that the administrator of the pension plan must establish a statement of investment policies and 
procedures for the plan that contains, 
(ii) information about whether environmental, social and governance factors are incorporated into the plan’s 
investment policies and procedures and, if so, how those factors are incorporated; 
78 (3) The statement of investment policies and procedures shall include information as to whether environmental, 
social and governance factors are incorporated into the plan’s investment policies and procedures and, if so, how 
those factors are incorporated. 
302 Section 78(1) of Regulation 909 under the Pension Benefits Act, ibid. The Statement of Investment Policies and 
Procedures (SIPP) must meet the requirements of the federal investment regulations (FIR), as modified in sections 47.8 
and 79 of the Regulation: Financial Services Commission for Ontario (FSCO), “Statement of Investment Policies and 
Procedures (SIPP)”, http://www.fsco.gov.on.ca/en/pensions/legislative/Pages/sipp.aspx#ESG (“SIPP”). 
303 Pension Benefits Act, supra note 301. 
304 Ibid. 
305 SIPP, supra note 302. 
306 Ibid. 
307 Fiduciary Duty in the 21st Century, supra note 243 at 15. See also FSCO, ibid, which reports that Ontario is saving 
approximately $4.4 billion annually in health, environmental and financial costs since it eliminated coal-fired energy 
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require pension plans across Canada to incorporate ESG factors, including climate change risk, into 
the plan’s investment policies and procedures.  Failure to do so would then give rise to liability for 
breach of fiduciary and prudential obligations. 
 
In Manitoba, the Pension Benefits Act expressly allows “non-financial” factors to be taken into 
account so long as investment policy and decision making remain consistent with prudence 
standards.308 The administrator of a pension plan must exercise the care, diligence and skill in the 
administration of the plan and the pension fund that a person of ordinary prudence would exercise 
in dealing with the property of another person.309 Pursuant to the Manitoba Pension Benefits Act, 
the administrator is to invest and manage the assets of the pension fund in a manner that a 
reasonable and prudent person would apply in investing and managing a portfolio of investments 
of a pension fund. Unless a pension plan otherwise provides, an administrator who uses a non-
financial criterion must have regard for the prudential and diligence standard.310 
 
 
                                                          
generation. Ontario Government Green Ontario Fund, “Climate Changes Everything”, 2017, 
https://www.ontario.ca/page/climate-change.  
308 Manitoba The Pension Benefits Act CCSM c P32, as amended. 
Care, diligence and skill  
28.1(2) The administrator of a pension plan shall exercise the care, diligence and skill in the administration of the plan 
and the pension fund that a person of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with the property of another 
person.  
Investing pension assets  
28.1(2.1) The administrator of a pension plan shall invest the assets of the pension fund, and manage those 
investments, in accordance with the regulations and in a manner that a reasonable and prudent person would apply in 
investing and managing a portfolio of investments of a pension fund.  
Non-financial considerations  
28.1(2.2) Unless a pension plan otherwise provides, an administrator who uses a non-financial criterion to formulate 
an investment policy or to make an investment decision does not thereby commit a breach of trust or contravene this 
Act if, in formulating the policy or making the decision, he or she has complied with subsections (2) and (2.1).  
Special knowledge and skill  
28.1(3) The administrator of a pension plan shall use in the administration of the plan and in the administration and 
investment of the pension fund all relevant knowledge and skill that the administrator possesses or, by reason of the 
administrator's profession, business or calling, ought to possess.  
Application of subsection (3)  
28.1(4) Subsection (3) applies with necessary modifications to a member of a board, agency or commission made 
responsible by an Act of the legislature for the administration of a pension plan.  
Conflict of interest  
28.1(5) An administrator of a pension plan shall not knowingly permit the administrator's interest to conflict with the 
administrator's duties and powers in respect of the plan and the pension fund…  
Employment of agent  
28.1(6) Where it is reasonable and prudent in the circumstances so to do, the administrator of a pension plan may 
employ or appoint one or more agents to carry out any act required to be done in the administration of the plan and in 
the administration and investment of the pension fund.  
Employee or agent  
28.1(8) An employee or agent of an administrator is also subject to the standards that apply to the administrator under 
subsections (2), (2.1), (3) and (5).  
309 Ibid, s 28.1(2.2).   
310 Manitoba The Pension Benefits Act, supra note 308, s 28.1(2.2).   
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ii. Trustee Legislation and Fiduciary Obligation 
 
Pension fiduciaries must also comply with trustee legislation, which is complementary to their 
obligations under pension standards legislation. The Ontario Trustee Act requires that “in investing 
trust property, a trustee must exercise the care, skill, diligence and judgment that a prudent 
investor would exercise in making investments.311 A trustee may invest trust property in any form 
of property in which a prudent investor might invest.312  A trustee must consider the following 
criteria in planning the investment of trust property, in addition to any others that are relevant to 
the circumstances: general economic conditions; the possible effect of inflation or deflation; the 
expected tax consequences of investment decisions or strategies; the role that each investment or 
course of action plays within the overall trust portfolio; the expected total return from income and 
the appreciation of capital; needs for liquidity, regularity of income and preservation or 
appreciation of capital; and an asset’s special relationship or special value, if any, to the purposes 
of the trust or to one or more of the beneficiaries.313  Trustees are to diversify the investment of 
trust property to an extent that is appropriate to the requirements of the trust and general 
economic and investment market conditions.314  
 
Other Canadian trustee statutes contain similar language, although not always as detailed as the 
Ontario legislation.315 There is protection from personal liability; specifically, a trustee is not liable 
for a loss to the trust arising from the investment of trust property if his or her conduct conformed 
to a plan or strategy for investment of the trust property, comprising reasonable assessments of 
risk and return, that a prudent investor would adopt under comparable circumstances.316  Trustees 
can delegate to agents.317  Manitoba’s trustee legislation has a section on trustee duties similar to 
                                                          
311 Trustee Act RSO 1990, c T 23, as amended, s 27(1) (“Ontario Trustee Act”). 
312 Ibid, s 27(2). 
313 Ibid, s 27(5). 
314 Ibid, s 27(6). 
315 See for example, Trustee Act, RSBC 1996, c 464, as amended [“BC Trustee Act”], s 15.2. 15.2. In investing trust 
property, a trustee must exercise the care, skill, diligence and judgment that a prudent investor would exercise in 
making investments. See also Manitoba The Trustee Act, CCSM c T160, s 68(2).  
316 Ontario Trustee Act, supra note 311, s 28; BC Trustee Act, ibid, s 15.3. 
317 Ontario Trustee Act, ibid, s 27.1. See also: BC Trustee Act, ibid, s 15.3. 
Delegation of authority with respect to investment 
15.5 (1) In this section, "agent" means any person to whom a trustee delegates investment responsibility. 
(2) A trustee may delegate to an agent the degree of authority with respect to the investment of trust property that a 
prudent investor might delegate in accordance with ordinary business practice. 
(3) A trustee who delegates authority under subsection (2) must determine the investment objectives for the trust and 
exercise prudence in 
(a) selecting an agent, 
(b) establishing the terms and limits of the authority delegated, 
(c) acquainting the agent with the investment objectives, and 
(d) monitoring the performance of the agent to ensure compliance with the terms of the delegation. 
(4) In performing a delegated function, an agent owes a duty to the trust to exercise reasonable care to comply with 
the terms of the delegation. 
(5) A trustee who complies with the requirements of subsection (3) is not liable to the beneficiaries or to the trust for 
the decisions or actions of the agents to whom the function was delegated. 
(6) This section does not authorize a trustee to delegate authority under circumstances in which the trust requires the 
trustee to act personally. 
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wording of the province’s pension benefits legislation that predates the pension provisions on 
prudence, judgment and care in administering the property of others.318 
 
The Shareholder Association for Research and Education (SHARE) suggests that trustee decision-
making should be aimed at protecting the long-term interests of investors, working people, 
communities and society, which in turn will help improve outcomes for pension plan members and 
other beneficiaries of trusts.319 This objective is perfectly aligned with the statutory obligations 
under both pension and trustee law. 
 
 
iii. A Deeper Understanding of Cowan v Scargill 
 
The 1984 English judgment Cowan v Scargill 320 is often cited in Canada as limiting the scope of 
conduct of pension fiduciaries.321 Yet a careful reading of the judgment reveals that it is entirely 
compatible with pension fiduciaries having an obligation to address climate-related financial risk 
in exercising their fiduciary duties. Given the significance of the judgment in Canada and other 
jurisdictions, it is worth examining in some detail. 
 
Cowan v Scargill was a case in which five union-appointed trustees on the committee of 
management of the Mineworkers’ Pension Scheme objected to funds being invested in energy 
sources in competition with coal, in overseas investments and in the acquisition of land 
overseas.322 The objections were based both on the beneficiaries’ best interests and on “matters 
of principle” determined at the union’s annual policy conference.323 The issue was whether the 
trustees were in breach of their fiduciary obligations in refusing approval of an investment plan 
unless it was amended to prohibit any increase in overseas investment and investment in energies 
in direct competition with coal, and provided for the withdrawal of existing overseas 
investments.324 The Court held that the starting point was that trustees are to exercise their powers 
in the best interests of present and future beneficiaries, holding the scales impartially between 
different classes of beneficiaries.325 They must obey the law, but subject to that, put the interests 
of their beneficiaries first.326 Megarry V C held that trustees must exercise their power to invest so 
                                                          
(7) Investment in an investment fund referred to in section 15.1 (1) or a common trust fund referred to in section 15.1 
(3) is not a delegation of authority with respect to the investment of trust property. 
318 Manitoba The Trustee Act, supra note 315, specifies: s 68(2) Subject to any express provision of the will or other 
instrument creating the trust, in investing money for the benefit of another person, a trustee shall exercise the 
judgment and care that a person of prudence, discretion and intelligence would exercise in administering the property 
of others. 
319 SHARE Annual Report, https://share.ca/?s=annual+report.  
320 Cowan v Scargill [1985] Ch 270, [1984] 3 WLR 501, [1984] 2 All ER 750, [1984] ICR 646, [1984] IRLR 260, 128 SJ 550 
[Cowan v Scargill, hereafter cited to Ch 270]. 
321 See, for example, Boe v Alexander, 1987 CanLII 2596 (BC CA); Bathgate v National Hockey League Pension Society, 
1994 CanLII 1427 (ON CA) 
322 Cowan v Scargill, supra note 320, at 276. The trustees were union-nominated trustees; the other five trustees were 
nominated by the National Coal Board. 
323 Ibid at 270. 
324 Ibid at 276-277, 279. 
325 Ibid at 286. 
326 Ibid at 287. 
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as to yield the best return for beneficiaries, judged in relation to risks, and, in judging potential 
return from yield of income and capital appreciation.327 He observed that if trustees decided not 
to make a particular investment for social or political reasons and the investment made was equally 
beneficial to the beneficiaries, it would be difficult to criticize the decision; but where it is less 
beneficial, trustees would normally be open to criticism.328 Trustees are not to refrain from making 
decisions that will benefit the beneficiaries because of the views they hold. 
 
Megarry V C said that trustees might even have to act dishonourably, although not illegally, if the 
interests of beneficiaries required it, the judge giving a contract law example where trustees may 
be bound to consider a better price or offer, essentially an “efficient breach” of an agreement.  
Perhaps the language of the judgment in its use of “acting dishonourably” and “gazumping” 
(thwarting) a counterparty was unfortunate, but the judge was simply referring to the efficient 
contract formation issue.329   
 
Megarry V C also made clear in his reasons that trustees do not need to make financial benefit 
their paramount concern, even if the only object of the trust is to provide financial benefits, as 
benefit has a wide meaning. He observed that beneficiaries might well consider that it is better to 
receive less money from investments where they are not morally or socially opposed to the 
investment.330 In such decisions, there is a heavy burden on trustees to determine that it is for the 
benefit of beneficiaries as a whole to receive less, and to act with a degree of prudence on the 
facts, and such was not the specific case before the court.331 Trustees are to act with care, 
prudence and reasonableness in providing the greatest financial benefits for present and future 
beneficiaries, including seeking advice on making investments and making decisions on that advice 
with prudence.332 Trustees also have a duty to consider the need for diversification of investments 
in the circumstances, including considering the size of the trust fund, and the degree of 
diversification that is practicable and desirable.333 The Court’s concerns on the facts were that: the 
trustees were advocating their position more for future beneficiaries than current ones; the 
trustees felt constrained to comply with union policy; and the prohibitions were too sweeping, 
when one could not predict the future potential benefits of discarding the disputed investments 
in the diversified portfolio.334  
 
Megarry V C  found that the defendant trustees had breached their duty to act with prudence and 
in the best interests of their beneficiaries when they hindered normal operation of the pension 
scheme by insisting on prohibitions that could not be justified as being in the interests of the 
beneficiaries.335 The Court declined to make specific orders as it hoped that by giving direction to 
                                                          
327 Ibid at 287. 
328 Ibid at 287. 
329 Ibid at 288. 
330 Ibid at 288. 
331 Ibid at 288. 
332 Ibid at 288-289. 
333 Ibid at 289. 
334 Ibid at 290, 293, 295. 
335 Ibid at 273. 
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the trustees on their duties, it would get the trust back on “its rails”, but remained seized in case 
an order was needed.336  
 
The detailed recitation of the court’s reasoning in Cowan v Scargill is necessary to understand the 
full judgment, in order to challenge the argument that trustees cannot make investment decisions 
based on social or political grounds and thus cannot address climate change. In fact, the judgment 
in its entirely suggests the opposite.  Given today’s mounting evidence of the financial, health and 
other risks of climate change, today, pension trustees and other fiduciaries could be found in 
breach of their fiduciary obligations if they do not take into account the risks.  Arguably, some of 
the current investments in fossil fuels are weighted in favour of current beneficiaries and not all 
beneficiaries because the huge financial risks only 15 years out must be considered. The judgment 
indicates that in fulfilling their fiduciary obligation, pension fiduciaries need to consider how their 
decisions impact on risk and return to the pension fund, and ultimately beneficiaries, in terms of 
the expected shifts to low carbon technologies, the risk of stranded assets, and diminished returns 
from companies failing or market prices plummeting. 
 
Unusually, Megarry V C wrote an article commenting on his own judgment several years later, 
observing that the case was limited in its precedential value, and noting that the defendant Scargill 
did not have a lawyer speak for him in the court room.337 He wrote that one could not say what 
would have emerged had the defendant's case been presented by a lawyer. He also wrote that 
“Another important factor is the narrow compass of the point that lay for decision. What was in 
issue was a matter not of preferences or policies but of exclusion.”338  It was the proposed absolute 
prohibition on certain types of investment, without any assessment of whether it was in the 
interests of the beneficiaries, that was rejected by the court. “The trustees cannot prefer their own 
interests – be they protectionist or otherwise, where those interests are not shared by the 
beneficiaries and are detrimental to those beneficiaries’ financial interests”.339 Megarry also 
observed that many of the investments regarding which there are social, political or other non-
financial objections are open to valid objections purely on investment grounds, such as fears for 
the political stability of the country concerned.340  He wrote that much may be achieved by trustees 
exercising their discretion on perfectly proper grounds without subjecting themselves to any 
absolute prohibitions or, indeed, any policy of preference.341  These observations are directly 
relevant to pension fiduciaries’ consideration of climate change risk. 
 
The UNEP Finance Initiative report on fiduciary responsibilities suggests that the Cowan v Scargill 
decision stands for the “uncontroversial position that trustees must act for the proper purpose of 
the trust, and not for extraneous purposes.”342 It observed that all factors relevant to risk and 
                                                          
336 Ibid at 297. 
337 Rt Hon Sir Robert Megarry, “Investing Pension Funds: The Mineworkers Case”, in Timothy G Youdan, ed, Equity, 
Fiduciaries and Trusts, (Toronto: Carswell, 1989) at 149-159. 
338 The defendants were declared to be in breach of their fiduciary duties in refusing to concur in the adoption of the 
1982 plan unless their proposals prohibiting investment overseas or in oil were adopted. Ibid at 156. 
339 Ibid at 157. 
340 Ibid. 
341 Ibid at 158. 
342 UNEP Finance Initiative (UNEP FI), “A Legal Framework for the Integration of Environmental, Social, and Governance 
Issues into Institutional Investment” (London: Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, 2005). 
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return should be considered by fiduciaries in investment decisions, and it may be a breach of 
fiduciary duties not to take into account ESG considerations that are relevant, and to give them 
appropriate weight, bearing in mind that some important economic analysts and leading financial 
institutions are satisfied that a strong link between good ESG performance and good financial 
performance exists.343 Climate change risk involves both material financial and non-financial risks, 
both relevant to fiduciaries. 
 
 
iv. Does the Fiduciary Obligation Differ for Defined Contribution Pension Plans? 
 
Although about 85% of assets under management in Canadian pension funds continue to be held 
by defined benefit pension plans, there has been a recent shift from defined benefit plans to 
defined contribution pension plans (“DCPP”).344 This shift raises another set of challenges for 
fiduciary obligation. Unlike defined benefit plans, in which fiduciary obligation is based on both 
statutory and trust obligations, defined contribution plans are contractually based. Nonetheless, 
pension legislation in Canada does impose fiduciary and prudential obligations on trustees of DCPP 
and their agents.  The challenge arises because of the myriad ways in which such funds are 
invested.  
 
For example, some DCPP offer beneficiaries a range of options of where to invest their money. If 
the employer chooses the options, they should be suitable to providing investment income for a 
pension. If the employee chooses the option, the employer’s obligation is to provide beneficiaries 
with sufficient information about the risks and benefits of each option so that the employee can 
make an informed choice.  The policy objective of such plans is to build a life income for the 
workforce, although time horizons differ for the beneficiary who is three years from retirement 
than for the employee who is 20 years from retirement.  If the DCPP includes an option that is not 
suitable to that objective, the administrator, and arguably the pension plan trustees, can be liable 
for a breach of fiduciary obligations.  In terms of climate change risk, the question is what is “not 
suitable”.  Here the courts will engage in an inquiry about what steps the fiduciaries took to apprise 
themselves of the risks to sustainability of the companies within each investment option, which 
includes risk of stranded assets, financial risks due to carbon transition, and other climate risks. 
While jurisprudence is sparse in Canada, these issues are being litigated in the US courts.345  
 
Three recent judgments are illustrative. The US Supreme Court decision in Fifth Third Bancorp v 
Dudenhoeffer centred on Bancorp’s defined-contribution retirement savings plan, where plan 
participants may direct their contributions into any of several investment options, including an 
“employee stock ownership plan” that invested primarily in the company’s own stock.346 When 
Bancorp’s stock fell, the plan participants sued. They claimed the plan fiduciaries should have 
known Bancorp’s stock price was too high and excessively risky. The fiduciaries defended on the 
                                                          
343 Ibid. 
344 Fiduciary Obligation 21st, supra note 243 at 38. 
345 Julius Melnitzer, “Litigation risk for defined-contribution plans on the rise”, 
 http://www.canadianlawyermag.com/5712/Litigation-risk-for-defined-contribution-plans-on-the-rise.html.  
346 Fifth Third Bancorp v Dudenhoeffer, Supreme Court of the United States, 573 U S (2014); the judgment was vacated, 
and the case was remanded to the Sixth Circuit Court for a reconsideration decision on the merits. 
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basis that fiduciaries of the employee stock-ownership plan were subject to a relaxed duty of 
prudence compared with pension plan fiduciaries generally. The Court disagreed, unanimously 
holding that the fiduciaries were subject to the same duty of prudence as pension fiduciaries 
generally, except they didn’t have an obligation to diversify assets.347   
 
In Pfeil v State Street Bank and Trust Co, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that control by plan 
participants over the allocation of pension assets across a range of investment options does not 
exempt fiduciaries from their duty to use prudence when designating and monitoring the menu of 
different investment options that are offered.348 In Harris v. Amgen Inc, the US Court of Appeals 
Ninth Circuit held that plaintiff beneficiaries had “sufficiently alleged” that defendants had violated 
the duty of loyalty and care they owe as fiduciaries under pension legislation by failing to provide 
material information to plan participants about investment in a common stock fund.349 The Court 
held that the task of selecting information to include in summary plan descriptions to plan 
participants is performed in their fiduciary capacities and is a fiduciary communication to plan 
participants. Whether the fiduciary states information in the summary itself or incorporates by 
reference another document containing that information is of no moment, it all falls within the 
ambit of fiduciary obligation.350   
 
These US judgments make clear that DCPP still give rise to fiduciary duties. Thus, the same 
reasoning as discussed above for defined benefit pension plans and fiduciary obligation arguably 
apply to DCPP and could ground complaints that the plan administrators failed to address climate-
related financial risk in developing the menu of investment options offered to members of the 
plan.    
 
DCPP can also, however, choose to invest through an insurance company, in which case, the 
counterparties to the contract are the DCPP and the insurance company.  The issue with respect 
to the investment strategy is what obligations arise from the contract and to whom.  Another issue 
is whether the beneficiaries can directly make a claim for breach of fiduciary obligation against the 
investment manager of the insurance company for failure to take account of climate change risk 
in their investment choices, because ultimately, they are the parties harmed by the risks.  The 
caselaw in this respect is still under development. 
 
One could argue that the pension fiduciary’s duty even includes trying to cause the investee 
corporation to further the non-financial interests of the beneficiaries, where doing so does not 
demonstrably harm their financial interests. In respect of addressing climate change risk, arguably, 
it will benefit both the financial and non-financial interests. 
 
 
                                                          
347 Ibid.  
348 Pfeil v State Street Bank and Trust Co 806 F.3d 377 (2015), US Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. 
349 In Harris v Amgen Inc, 770 F 3d 865 (2014), the US Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit applied Fifth Third Bancorp and 
refused to invoke a presumption of prudence or a duty to diversify in a case about two defined-contribution plans that 
included an option to invest in company stock. But the court did hold that the defendants had breached their duty of 
loyalty by failing to provide certain information to plan participants. 
350 Ibid. 
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v. Shifting Focus 
 
While Canadian statutory reform has yet to move in the direction of requiring all investment funds 
to identify and address climate-related financial risk, efforts by institutional investors elsewhere 
provide insights on how a shift could occur.  
 
For example, in 2016, ABP, the large Dutch pension fund, launched a program to invest sustainably. 
One objective is to reduce the carbon dioxide (“CO2”) footprint in its equity portfolio by 25% by 
2020 compared to the start of 2015.351  By the end of 2016, a reduction of 16% had been realized, 
largely from the disposal of most of the fossil branches of the energy companies RWE and E-on 
and from new “carbon budgets” that will gradually be reduced each year. ABP has committed to 
investing EUR 5 billion in renewable energy by 2020. In 2016, its investments in renewable energy 
rose by 25% to EUR 2.8 billion; and in 2016, the company achieved a total return of 9.5% on that 
investment.352  ABP has set itself the objective of doubling the investments that contribute to 
solving social challenges and environmental problems, from EUR 29 billion at the start of 2015 to 
EUR 58 billion by 2020.  At the end of 2016, these investments stood at EUR 41 billion.353 ABP 
pursues dialogue with companies about climate measures and good corporate governance. In 
2016, ABP held discussions with 245 companies and voted at more than 4,000 shareholder 
meetings, encouraging companies to become more sustainable.354  In 2016, ABP also developed a 
system so that equity investors can see the precise size of a portfolio’s CO2 footprint, to be 
implemented fully over the next three years.355  
 
Another example is the California Public Employee Retirement System (CalPERS) Board of 
Administration, which in May 2014 adopted a set of 11 “Pension Beliefs” that articulate the 
pension fund’s views on public pension design, funding and administration.356 Important for this 
discussion are the beliefs that “retirement system decisions must give precedence to the fiduciary 
duty owed to members but should also consider the interests of other stakeholders”; “funding 
policies should be applied in a fair, consistent manner, accommodate investment return 
fluctuations and support rate stability”; and “trustees, administrators and all other fiduciaries are 
accountable for their actions, and must transparently perform their duties to the highest ethical 
standards”. In 2013, CalPERS also adopted ten “Investment Beliefs” to provide a basis for strategic 
management of the investment portfolio, to inform organizational priorities, and to guide 
                                                          
351 ABP, Pensioenfonds voor overheid en onderwijs, “ABP on course with sustainable investments”, 8 May 2017, 
https://www.abp.nl/images/press-release-sustainable-and-responsible-investment-report%20-2016.pdf. The General 
Pension Fund for Public Employees (ABP) is the industry-wide pension fund for employers and employees of 
government and educational institutions in the Netherlands. ABP has 2.9 million participants and EUR 388 billion in 
available assets as at 31 March 2017. 
352 Ibid, including, ABP invested in solar panels in India and the US, and in wind power in the Netherlands. 
353 Ibid, relating primarily to investments in sustainable real estate and “green” bonds. New investments include 
mortgages for energy-efficient housing in the Netherlands.   
354 Ibid. 
355 Ibid. See also PGGM, a pension fund service provider in the Netherlands, managing pensions for different pension 
funds, the affiliated employers and their employees, managing pension assets worth EUR 206 billion in 2017, and 
committed to sustainable development in its investment and governance practice.  PGGM, “Who We Are”, 
https://www.pggm.nl/english/who-we-are/Pages/About-PGGM.aspx. 
356 CalPERS has $266 billion under management. CalPERS, “CalPERS Investment Beliefs” (2014), 
https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/forms-publications/calpers-beliefs.pdf.  
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decisions that often require balancing multiple, inter-related decision factors. 357  Of note is 
Investment Belief 9, which acknowledges the need for a broad set of investment and actuarial risk 
measures and clear processes for managing risk; specifying that as a long-term investor, CalPERS 
must consider risk factors such as climate change, that emerge slowly over long time periods, but 
could have a material impact on company or portfolio returns.358 
 
The SCC has held that fiduciary law protects vulnerable beneficiaries from abuses of power by 
those individuals who owe them a fiduciary duty of loyalty, but also reinforces the social 
institutions in which those fiduciaries operate.359 Pension trustees and other fiduciaries should not 
shirk responsibilities in terms of thinking about climate change risk in respect of their investment 
portfolios.  Where they do not possess the requisite knowledge and skill, they have an obligation 
to seek expert advice, and then engage in an informed decision process. 
 
Gold and Scotchmer observe that pension standards legislation in Canada maintains an investment 
focus on risk and return in a diversified portfolio that is constructed in beneficiaries’ best financial 
interests and with specific regard to the liability characteristics of the particular plan.360 In some 
                                                          
357 Ibid.  
Investment Belief 1 Liabilities must influence the asset structure 
Investment Belief 2 A long time investment horizon is a responsibility and an advantage, including “Favor investment 
strategies that create long-term, sustainable value and recognize the critical importance of a strong and durable 
economy in the attainment of funding objectives.” 
Investment Belief 3 CalPERS investment decisions may reflect wider stakeholder views, provided they are consistent 
with its fiduciary duty to members and beneficiaries. 
Investment Belief 4 Long-term value creation requires effective management of three forms of capital: financial, 
physical and human. 
Investment Belief 5 CalPERS must articulate its investment goals and performance measures and ensure clear 
accountability for their execution. 
Investment Belief 6 Strategic asset allocation is the dominant determinant of portfolio risk and return. 
Investment Belief 7 CalPERS will take risk only where we have a strong belief we will be rewarded for it. 
Investment Belief 8 Costs matter and need to be effectively managed. 
Investment Belief 9 Risk to CalPERS is multi-faceted and not fully captured through measures such as volatility or 
tracking error. Sub-beliefs: CalPERS shall develop a broad set of investment and actuarial risk measures and clear 
processes for managing risk; the path of returns matters, because highly volatile returns can have unexpected impacts 
on contribution rates and funding status; a s a long-term investor, CalPERS must consider risk factors, for example 
climate change and natural resource availability, that emerge slowly over long time periods, but could have a material 
impact on company or portfolio returns. 
Investment Belief 10 Strong processes and teamwork and deep resources are needed to achieve CalPERS goals and 
objectives. 
358 Ibid. Materiality – does the issue have the potential for an impact on portfolio risk or return? 
359 Hodgkinson v Simms, supra note 244 at 422. 
360 Gold and Scotchmer, supra note 297 at 9-10. They observe: “the PBSA’s admonition that a pension plan’s liability 
structure is the appropriate reference point for its investment policy is particularly important. Different plans do, of 
course, have different liability structures. Some are more mature than others, for example, and we know, based on 
recent mortality tables issued by the Canadian Institute of Actuaries, that mortality varies according to the type of work 
plan members perform during their working lives. Nevertheless, it is generally true that pension plan liabilities include 
liabilities for active employees who range in age from their twenties to their sixties and, as well, for retirees whose ages 
typically range from the mid-fifties to (in some cases) over 100. Young active members may not draw a pension for 40 
years, and, once they begin to draw their pension they may continue to do so for 30 or more years. Even the population 
of current retirees can generally be expected to remain on a pension payroll for more than 30 years. This means that 
pension liabilities are long term; considering investment strategy in the context of a plan’s liabilities means that an 
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jurisdictions, such as British Columbia, pension benefits standards reflect some of the underlying 
objectives and concerns of modern portfolio theory, which they suggest is strong direction to 
configure an investment portfolio with regard to the specific characteristics of the plan’s liabilities, 
and being concerned with asset/liability matching.361 They also observe that pension fiduciaries 
are challenged by the global scale of climate change.  
 
In summary, pension and other fiduciaries must address the full range of considerations relevant 
to both risk and return. Pension fund fiduciaries must make their investment strategy decisions 
based on a time frame commensurate with the pension plan’s liabilities.362  While there is always 
a risk of loss, trustees are to make decisions in a manner that avoids undue loss. Prudential 
obligations require the fiduciary to undertake a careful and thorough evaluation of climate change 
risk prior to making decisions, and to act on information generated by that process, including a 
rationale for their decisions. Materiality is important in assessing the likelihood of the risk 
materializing and the downside financial risk if it does.  Pension trustees and other fiduciaries must 
evaluate the market and regulatory risks that are likely to depress market prices or restrain fossil 
fuel production and consumption, adjusting their investment strategies appropriately.363 A pension 
fund trustee’s fiduciary duty is to provide oversight of those fiduciaries making investment 
decisions, with the objective of trying to ensure that there are funds to pay the promised pension 
benefits owing to members currently and in the future.  Pension fund trustees’ fiduciary duty 
requires them to take into account any risks, within their portfolios, of climate change, as well as 
investment opportunities. Non-financial risks are ultimately financial risks, so these factors must 
be taken into account.  
 
How can it be done? A number of initiatives address this question. The TCFD has developed 
voluntary, consistent climate-related financial risk disclosures for use by companies in providing 
information to investors, lenders, insurers, and other stakeholders. It also contains 
recommendations for improving investors’ ability to appropriately assess and price climate-related 
risk and opportunities. A work in progress, it considers the physical, liability and transition risks 
associated with climate change and what constitutes effective financial disclosures across 
industries. One of its goals is to “help companies understand what financial markets want from 
disclosure in order to measure and respond to climate change risks, and encourage firms to align 
their disclosures with investors’ needs.”364 The TCFD concluded that assessing climate change risk 
is complex, partly because there are no uniform risk assessment tools or disclosure standards, and 
                                                          
investment strategy must be cognizant of long duration liabilities, often for 70 years or more. For most open defined 
benefit plans, young employees are becoming new plan members as the employer’s labour force is renewed; 
accordingly, pension liabilities for most open plans may be expected to remain longer term indefinitely.” 
361 Ibid. 
362 Davis, supra note 13. 
363 Damian Carrington and Caelainn Barr, “Coal crash: how pension funds face huge risk from climate change” The 
Guardian, 15 June 2015, www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jun/15/coal-crash-how-pension-funds-face-huge-
risk-from-climate-change. UNEP FI, “Portfolio Carbon – Measuring, disclosing and managing the carbon intensity of 
investments and investment portfolios”, UNEP FI Investor Briefing, A document of the UNEP FI Climate Change Advisory 
Group and Investment Commission (July 2013),  
http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/UNEP_FI_Investor_Briefing_Portfolio_Carbon.pdf at 3. 
76 Ibid at 4-8. 
364 Financial Stability Board, Introduction to the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, https://www.fsb-
tcfd.org/about/#.  
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because the interaction of climate science, financial markets, and regulatory frameworks is 
complex in determining downside risks of particular strategies.365 However, there is global 
consensus in the scientific community that there is an urgent need for mitigation and adaptation, 
which can be guideposts for fiduciaries.  
   
In June 2017, the TCFD released three key documents that serve as building blocks to describe and 
support implementation of the Task Force’s recommendations: Final Report: Recommendations of 
the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures”; “Annex: Implementing the 
Recommendations of the TCFD”, which provides detail to help companies implement the 
recommendations and is a “living” document that will be refined as companies gain more 
experience preparing climate-related financial disclosures; and “Technical Supplement: The Use of 
Scenario Analysis in Disclosure of Climate-Related Risks and Opportunities”, which provides a 
further level of detail that can be helpful for companies in considering scenario analysis.366 Scenario 
analysis can be very helpful to fiduciaries in determining climate-related financial risk and 
strategies to respond. It can also assist in identifying upside investment opportunities in developing 
technologies for climate adaptation. 
 
 
3. Investors, Good Governance and Fiduciary Obligation 
 
Institutional investors, particularly pension funds, have an important role to play in facilitating an 
overall strategy towards long-term sustainability. To date, business enterprises have externalized 
the negative environmental effects of their economic activities because of pressure to exhibit 
increased short-term returns to capital market funders. Institutional investors have the economic 
power to help businesses shift trajectory. The Bank of Canada reports that the eight largest 
Canadian public pension funds are major investors domestically and globally, with net assets under 
management of more than $1 trillion. Thus, they can influence how quickly strategies to address 
climate change could be integrated into decision making. Globally, investors are increasingly 
moving to hold directors to account for their failure to address climate risk. 
 
Canada can learn from international developments. For example, in 2015, the French National 
Assembly enacted La Loi de transition énergetique pour la croissance verte (the Law for Energy 
Transition and Green Growth), aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions, capping fossil fuel 
production and increasing renewable energy usage.367 Article 173 of the Law strengthens 
                                                          
365 TCFD Final Report, supra note 73. 
366 Technical Supplement, The Use of Scenario Analysis in Disclosure of Climate-Related Risks and Opportunities 
(December 2016), https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/TCFD-Technical-Supplement-A4-14-Dec-
2016.pdf  
367 French National Assembly, Law for Energy Transition and Green Growth, 22 July 2015. On 18 November 2015, 
modifications were made to the Code de l’environnement - L222-1 in response to Article 173 of the Law for Energy 
Transition and Green Growth (“Transition énergétique”). The amendments address carbon budgets and national low-
carbon strategy, regulating the quantity of greenhouse gases of certain types of large-scale operation, converting 
energy consumed or waste processed into corresponding emission factors. Emissions are recorded annually, excluding 
international air and sea links, under France’s carbon budgets as set out by the European Commission and the UN 
Convention on Climate Change, UNFCCC, supra note 2. On 19 August 2016, modifications were made to the Code de 
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mandatory climate disclosure requirements for listed companies and financial institutions, and 
introduces the first mandatory requirements for institutional investors.  Listed companies must 
disclose annually the “financial risks related to the effects of climate change and the company’s 
measures to reduce them”, including how they are implementing a low-carbon strategy in every 
component of their activities, and disclosing “the consequences on climate change of the 
company’s activities and of the use of goods and services it produces”.  Institutional investors, 
including mutual funds and pension funds,368 must disclose how their investment decision-making 
takes social, environmental and governance criteria into consideration, and disclose how they are 
contributing to the energy and ecological transition to limit global warming.369 The law is an 
important step forward in addressing climate financial risk, both in the extensive reporting 
required and the obligation to disclose the manner in which climate change issues are being 
addressed. 
 
The new provision survived a constitutional challenge. The entities subject to Article 173 were 
required to publish their ESG criteria by June 2017 for the 2016 financial year.370 The Assemblée 
nationale published a report on implementation of the provision,371 including how Caisse des 
Dépôts has taken steps to reduce its carbon footprint by 20% per thousand invested over the 
period 2014-2020, valued at approximately €55 billion.372  The Climate Disclosure Standards Board 
observes that the French law has been important in requiring investors to report on how their 
policies and targets align with national energy and ecological targets; and that Article 173 includes 
a focus on integration, where companies must disclose information in their mainstream reports, 
creating a much stronger connection between climate and other corporate information.373 
 
                                                          
commerce - Art R225-105-1(M) in response to Articles 70 and 173 of the Transition énergétique. The Commercial Code 
now includes a section on Environment information:   
A. General policy on the environment, including that environmental assessment must be made where appropriate, 
employees trained to protect the environment, and steps be taken to prevent environmental risks and pollution;  
B. Pollution, including measures to reduce or repair damage;  
C. Economical waste management, including recycling, reuse, use of sustainable resources, and the minimization of 
energy consumption;  
D. Climate change, particularly significant emissions from the use or development of the company’s product;  
E. Protection of biodiversity.  
The amendment also added societal commitments to sustainable development, including a commitment to use 
resources sustainably and to adapt to the consequences of climate change, ibid. 
368 As well as investment companies with variable share capital, ibid. 
369 As well as how they exert the voting rights attached to the financial instruments resulting from those choices. 
“Environmental” includes the exposure to climate-related risks, including GHG emissions associated with assets 
owned, ibid. 
370 The French government has committed to publish a report for the 2016 and 2017 financial years before 31 
December 2018. (See Fédération Française de l’Assurance Report, at 12-13: https://www.ffa-
assurance.fr/content/article-173-decryptage-guide-sur-la-loi-de-transition-energetique-et-son-decret-application). 
371 Assemblée nationale, France, Rapport d’information sur l’application de la loi du 17 août 2015 relative à la 
transition énergétique pour la croissance verte” on 26 October 2016, http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/rap-
info/i4157.asp.. 
372 Ibid. 
373 Climate Disclosure Standards Board, “Mandatory climate change disclosure in the G20: where are we at?”, 3 July 
2017, https://www.cdsb.net/g20schemes; Climate Disclosure Standards Board, Corporate Climate Disclosure Schemes 
in G20 Countries after COP 21, 3 July 2017, https://www.cdsb.net/sites/default/files/climate-disclosure-standards-
board-climate-disclosure.pdf.    
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The Forum Pour L’Investissement Responsable has observed that France’s move to regulating 
based on the “comply or explain” principle is an innovative means to encourage investors and 
companies toward best practices aligned with the COP 21 Paris Agreement goals; and that Article 
173 will direct financing toward companies that have a low carbon footprint. “It recognizes the key 
role investors play in the energy transition, acknowledging the financial aspect of the fight against 
climate change.”374 It observes that the new regulations and metrics being developed will provide 
solutions to the challenge of translating climate issues into the language of finance, investors 
distinguishing between the negative impacts of climate change financial risks and the positive 
impacts of energy transition opportunities, growth momentum, and activities that contribute to 
the 2°C target.375 
 
The first reports under article 173 reveal some unevenness in the initial disclosure, some reporting 
reductions in carbon output by asset class,376 others reporting on green investments and emissions 
avoided,377 and some reporting only that these issues will be addressed going forward.378 One 
report outlines the climate change risks to which the fund is exposed through the financial assets 
that it holds, developing a strategy that will enable it to continually assess its carbon footprint in 
terms of both emissions and stock holdings, its physical risks, transition risks, its portfolio’s 
alignment with a 2°C scenario, as well as opportunities linked to ecological and energy transition.379  
It describes its methodology for meeting its climate trajectory and the limitations of that 
methodology.380  
 
It will likely take some time for the reports to develop some consistency in their disclosures 
pursuant to article 173. However, what is evident in all the reporting is that it has focused the 
attention of pension funds and other institutional investors on climate change and required them 
to embed disclosure of climate-related financial and transition risks directly in their reporting. It 
will be interesting to monitor over the next period the extent to which they comply with the second 
part of the article, disclosing how they are contributing to the energy and ecological transition to 
limit global warming.   
 
                                                          
374 The Forum Pour L’Investissement Responsible, Guide for understanding Article 173; http://www.frenchsif.org/isr-
esg/wp-content/uploads/Understanding_article173-French_SIF_Handbook.pdf).  
375 Ibid. The guide outlines three carbon indicator ‘scopes’. The first two relate to GHG emissions linked to an issuer’s 
energy consumption, measured in CO2 per square meter and CO2 per €m. The third scope relates to GHG emissions from 
the issuer’s activity. Avoided emissions and carbon efficiency/intensity may be measured based on these data, relative 
to a benchmark scenario. An investor may thereby measure the total GHG emissions of their portfolio.  
376 See for example, AXA 2017 Report, summary tables at 5-6, https://www-axa-com.cdn.axa-contento-
118412.eu/www-axa-com%2Ff570ad25-6178-47a0-afb9-
59a5b7d3d70a_changementclimatique_rapport_risqueinvestissement_vf_30.08.17-b.pdf.  
377 Caisse des Dépôts, Green Bond Issuance Report, http://www.caissedesdepots.fr/green-bond-issuance-report; 
http://www.caissedesdepots.fr/sites/default/files/medias/institutionnel/investissement_responsable/cdc_radd_2016_
ven_def.pdf. Humanis, Rapport ESG-Climat 2016 : reports reductions in carbon output and plans for green investments, 
2016 report: https://humanis.com/sites/default/files/doc5107-rapport-esg-climat2016.pdf 
378 See for example, ERAFP 2016 report: https://www.rafp.fr/sites/rafp_fr/files/file/charte_isr-2016.pdf.  
379 See for example, Fonds de reserve pour les retraites (“FRR”), “The FRR and Climate Change, Report under Article 
173 of the Energy transition Act for the year 2016”,  http://www.fondsdereserve.fr/documents/Report-2016-article-
173-lte.pdf and FRR 2016 press release: http://www.fondsdereserve.fr/documents/FRR_Carbon_Footprint.pdf. 
380 Ibid at 7. 
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Climate change presents both risks and opportunities across asset classes. There are clear benefits 
to investing in companies that prioritize energy efficiency and reduction of GHG emissions and that 
develop sustainable business models. Shareholder action on climate change can help to minimize 
risk and ensure that portfolio companies are working towards cost-effective and innovative climate 
solutions. 
 
There is growing consensus that companies should also expressly report on their strategies to 
address how they are meeting their climate risk mitigation responsibilities.381 For example, in 2016, 
SHARE engaged with 28 companies across a range of sectors on the importance of measuring, 
disclosing and reducing their climate risks.382 SHARE reports that in 2016, 18 of these companies 
reported to the CDP Climate Change survey;383 nine companies reduced their GHG emissions; five 
companies substantially expanded disclosure on key climate performance indicators; and two 
companies set new company-wide targets to reduce GHG emissions.384  A growing number of 
shareholder resolutions calling for enhanced disclosure regarding climate change risk and 
management.385 Through its proxy voting service, in 2016, SHARE executed votes in favour of 34 
shareholder proposals on climate change-related matters.386  
  
Transparency requirements draw fiduciaries’ attention to climate risk and serve as a normative 
influence on fiduciaries to take action. Institutional investors with three trillion dollars under 
management have launched the Carbon Asset Risk project, calling on the world’s top non-
renewable energy companies to assess the risks of climate change to their businesses.387 
Institutional investors globally are beginning to protect their portfolios from the risks of global 
warming and climate change.388   
                                                          
381 Covington and Thamotheram, supra note 8. See also Financial Stability Board Task Force on Climate-related 
Financial Disclosures, “Phase I Report of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures”, (March 2016); 
https://www.fsbtcfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Phase_I_Report_v15.pdf. 
382 SHARE Annual Report 2016 at 7, http://share.ca/documents/annual_reports/annual_activity_report_2016.pdf  
383 CDP Climate Change Survey, which requests information on climate risks and low carbon opportunities from the 
world’s largest companies on behalf of 827 institutional investor signatories with a combined US$100 trillion in assets, 
https://www.cdp.net/en/climate. CDP, “Out of the starting blocks, Tracking progress on corporate climate action”, 
2016. Only 49 of 200 companies surveyed in Canada answered the CDP Survey; 
https://www.cdp.net/en/research/global-reports/tracking-climate-progress-2016.  
384 SHARE Annual Report 2016, supra note 382 at 8, reporting that in 2016, Fortis Inc took a significant step by 
publishing its first environmental report, based on a shareholder proposal SHARE filed in 2015; Fortis is now measuring 
and disclosing key information for the first time, including the company’s GHG emissions, paving the way for more 
substantial changes.  
385 167 resolutions in 2015 in North America. Ceres, Letter to SEC, at 12, citing Investor Network on Climate Risk, 
Shareholders Spur Action on Climate Change: Company Commitments from 2014 & 2015 Proxy Seasons 3, 4 (Ceres) 
(2015), http://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/shareholdersspur-action-on-climate-change-company-commitments-
from-the-2014-2015-proxy-seasons. Press Release, Record Number of Climate and Corporate Political Spending 
Resolutions Dominate 2016, Shareholder Votes, Proxy Preview (8 March 2016), available at 
http://www.proxypreview.org/wpcontent/.  
386 Ibid at 8. 
387 Aaron Pickering, “Investors ask fossil fuel companies to assess how business plans fare in low carbon future”, Ceres, 
http://www.Ceres.org/press/press-releases/investors-ask-fossil-fuel-companies-to-assess-howbusiness-plans-fare-in-
low-carbon-future. TCFD Final Report, supra note 73. 
388 For example, the Fourth Swedish National Pension Fund, known as AP4, will invest $3.2bn in passive investment funds 
designed by MSCI, which will track low carbon benchmarks. The SKr299bn ($35bn) pension scheme intends to 
“decarbonise” its $14.7bn global equity portfolio by 2020. It will drastically cut exposure to companies that pollute with 
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Of course, many institutional investors are not fiduciaries in the same sense as pension plans, in 
terms of prudential obligations to act in the interests of multigenerational beneficiaries. However, 
they are concerned with effective management and the sustainability of their investment 
portfolios.  As noted above, the legislation in France and being considered in other jurisdictions is 
not confined to pension fiduciaries. Institutional investors such as mutual funds must also report 
on how their investment decision-making is directed at moving towards lower carbon emissions 
and increased sustainability.  
 
The Fiduciary Duty in the 21st Century report sets out a number of recommendations for 
institutional investors.  Relevant for this discussion on climate risk and fiduciary obligation are that 
institutional investors should: publish commitments to integration and responsible investment 
regarding climate change risk, including explanations of how these commitments align with 
fiduciary duties. Investors should implement these commitments effectively in their investment 
processes; monitor how investment managers are implementing these commitments; and report 
to beneficiaries on how these commitments have been implemented and the resultant outcomes. 
They should ensure that trustees, boards and executives have the resources and knowledge to 
hold investment managers and advisers to account on climate-related issues; and require 
companies to provide robust, credible and detailed accounts of their management of climate 
risk.389  Institutional investors should also engage policymakers on issues relevant to long-term 
performance, including strengthened corporate reporting in respect of climate change risk.390 
 
These recommendations, if implemented by institutional investors in Canada, would go a long way 
toward helping Canadian companies and asset funds make the transition to a lower carbon 
economy, therefore benefiting beneficiaries. 
 
The report recognizes that asset owners have significant freedom to decide how they wish to take 
account of ESG issues in their investment practices and processes; but they should pay close 
attention to decisions that lead to skews in portfolios and explicitly assess the implications of these 
skews for the overall risk profile of the fund.391  
  
                                                          
fossil fuels and increase allocations to those with low carbon emissions. PKA, Denmark’s fourth-largest pension fund, 
with €35.5bn in assets, asked 53 companies that generate between 25 and 50% of their revenues from coal to provide 
plans on how they will reduce their exposure to the fossil fuel, and has announced that it will pull money from businesses 
that lack plans or provide inadequate proposals “for the shift to a low-carbon future”. PKA also divested itself of 31 coal-
only companies in 2015. Chris Flood, “Sweden’s AP4 pension fund avoids fossil fuels in landmark move”, Financial Times, 
18 July 2016. 
389 Fiduciary Duty in the 21st Century, supra note 240 at 20. 
390 Ibid. 
391 Ibid. 
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i. Financial intermediaries 
 
Financial intermediaries, who manage money on behalf of others or give advice, have an obligation 
to include considerations of sustainability as part of their duty to their beneficiaries and clients.392 
A European Commission report observes that another challenge is the pursuit of financial returns 
in the presence of market failures, often leading fiduciaries to take action that avoids weaker short-
term returns or losses while ignoring the long-term consequences.393 It observes that “climate 
change and its related risks have become a crucial issue in fiduciaries’ decision-making process”, 
and the liability or litigation risk places an obligation on fiduciaries to consider climate-related risks 
as part of their fiduciary duty, stating that failure to do so could potentially lead to claims for 
damages by beneficiaries and clients of financial institutions who may not have acted in their best 
interests.394 It suggests extending the definition of the prudent person principle, namely that 
“fiduciaries should throughout their decision-making process consider the broad range of long-
term interests of their beneficiaries. In doing so, it should be made clear to financial actors that 
the long-term interests of beneficiaries include not despoiling the planet and exploiting their fellow 
human beings”.395  
 
Fiduciary Duty in the 21st Century contains a list of recommendations for intermediaries, such as 
legal advisors, actuaries, investment consultants, stock exchanges, brokers and data providers. The 
report points out that they should report to their fiduciary clients on how these commitments have 
been implemented and the implications for the research and advice provided. Intermediaries 
should advise fiduciaries that, as an integral part of their duties, they need to analyze and account 
for long-term value drivers, including climate change risk issues, in their investment practices and 
processes. Intermediaries should support research on the relationship between ESG issues and 
investment performance, and on the relationship between engagement and corporate 
performance. They should support efforts to change market views on ESG issues by making these 
issues an integral part of professional training, an integral part of codes of professional ethics; and 
raise market awareness of the investment case for ESG integration.396 These recommendations are 
very important. If pension fiduciaries are relying on these intermediaries for expert advice and the 
intermediaries fail to develop that knowledge and skill to give that advice, the current pattern of 
investor risk from climate change will be reinforced, rather than remedied.  Moreover, the failure 
of intermediaries to be informed of these developments and to give timely and relevant advice 
could lead to erosion of the due diligence defence if a court determines that it was not reasonable 
to rely on their advice. 
 
                                                          
392 Ibid at 23-25, reporting that in the EU, notions of fiduciary duty or related concepts are enshrined in Solvency II 
(insurance), IORP II (occupational pensions), MiFID (investment firms), UCITS (mutual funds) and AIFMD (alternative 
investment funds). 
393 European Commission DG ENV, Resource Efficiency and Fiduciary Duties of Investors, 2014, 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enveco/resource_efficiency/pdf/FiduciaryDuties.pdf. 
394 Fiduciary Duty in the 21st Century, supra note 243 at 25. 
395 Ibid at 25. 
396 Ibid at 21. 
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In 2016, one hundred PRI signatories representing USD 16 trillion of assets and six credit rating 
agencies signed the “Statement on ESG in Credit Ratings”.397 The goal over the next two years is to 
develop more systemic, practical and transparent incorporation of ESG into credit ratings and 
analysis, recognizing that ESG factors can affect borrowers’ cash flows and likelihood of default of 
debt obligations.398 Ripe for further research inquiry are the deficiencies and biases currently in 
credit rating systems given the system of payment for credit rating, and the need for intermediaries 
and others to correct them before ESG credit rating becomes more accurate and thus helpful to 
addressing climate-related financial risk. 
 
 
ii. Portfolio Investment and Fiduciary Obligation 
 
Waitzer and Sarro observe that there is now broad-based acceptance of the idea that most 
investment returns come from general exposure to the market (beta), rather than from seeking 
market benchmark outperformance strategies (alpha).399 Thus, systemic market factors are 
critically important to fiduciary responsibility in assessing the impact of investment decisions on 
intergenerational beneficiaries. In this respect, the definition of prudence in the duty of care has 
evolved as our understanding of investment risk has changed.400 Under modern portfolio theory, 
fiduciaries must weigh risk by looking at the portfolio as a whole, to ensure that it is appropriate 
for beneficiaries and designed to generate a suitable rate of return without creating an undue risk 
of loss.401 Asset classes of higher duration often yield the highest private and societal returns.402  
Decisions regarding investments must look beyond current market benchmarks and consider 
questions of future value, including systemic, governance and market  risks, as well as potential 
benefits to current and future generations.403 Fiduciaries charged with managing and advising 
investment vehicles that encompass multiple generations of beneficiaries, like pension plans, must 
therefore consider the intergenerational implications of their decisions or advice, importing the 
principle of intergenerational equity into the duty of loyalty.404 Thus the duty of loyalty requires 
fiduciaries to take proactive steps to invest and encourage investment for the long term, serving 
the best interests of their beneficiaries by charting a course whereby investment decisions take 
account of important social and economic challenges, including sustainable development.405 
 
Waitzer and Sarro also advocate that the fiduciary of the future needs to be an ethical fiduciary, 
recognizing its responsibility to preserve and build on the social and environmental infrastructure. 
                                                          
397 bcIMC Report, supra note 269. Principles for Responsible Investment signatories, 
http://www.rbcgam.com/corporate-governance-and-responsible-investment/pdf/pri_statement-on-esg-in-credit-
ratings_2016.pdf.  
398 Ibid. 
399 Waitzer and Sarro, supra note 97 at 1093. 
400 Ibid at 1091. 
401 Ibid at 1092. 
402 Ibid at 1093-1094, citing Roger Ibbotson, “The Importance of Asset Allocation”, (2010) Fin Analysts J, Mar–Apr at 
18, 20. 
403 Steve Lydenberg, “Reason, Rationality and Fiduciary Duty” (2014) 119 J Bus Ethics 365 at 375. 
404 Waitzer and Sarro, supra note 97 at 1096, citing Bennett v British Columbia, 2009 BCSC 1358, 77 CCPB 56 (BCSC); BC 
Nurses’ Union v Mun Pension Board of Trustees, 2006 BCSC 132, 50 CCPB 77 (BCSC). 
405 Ibid at 1097. 
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That includes a natural environment capable of sustaining their operations, an education system 
that prepares the potential labour base for the workforce, and a stable, equitable economy capable 
of sustaining a strong consumer base for the enterprise’s products or services. Otherwise, the 
financial sector will have enormous difficulty finding worthwhile investment opportunities.406 They 
suggest that it implies a normative duty to help preserve this infrastructure by ensuring that 
externalities are properly priced and moral failures are addressed, by taking a more integrative 
approach to investment.407 Fiduciaries should be identifying opportunities to mobilize and allocate 
more of the resources they control for broader social, economic, and environmental goals as part 
of their investment strategy. Waitzer and Sarro argue that it will require a shift from the zero-sum 
culture that has crept into finance, towards a fiduciary culture where service providers place a 
premium on treating clients fairly.408 
 
That fairness norm is reflected in the investment strategy of Alberta Investment Management 
Corporation, (“AIMCo”), one of Canada’s largest institutional investment managers with more than 
$90 billion of assets under management. It is responsible for the investments of 26 pension, 
endowment and government funds in Alberta.409  Its investment strategy explicitly recognizes that 
addressing climate change risk is part of its fiduciary obligations: 
 
AIMCo has a fiduciary duty to satisfy the investment objectives of our pension and 
endowment fund clients. We believe the time horizon, scale, and complexity of climate 
change present challenges which can impact asset values and influence systemic 
economic, environmental and social risk. We recognize the business imperative of 
addressing climate change in our investing strategies, and view both the physical and the 
regulatory risks of climate change as material to our clients’ objectives. 
 
The physical effects of climate change have the potential to significantly impact asset value 
across all asset classes and markets. For example, changes in the frequency of extreme 
weather events alter probability scenarios, asset life assumptions and net present value 
calculations. Investors also seek certainty regarding potential regulatory impacts on asset 
value. The physical and regulatory impacts of climate change create stranded asset 
scenarios for companies, leading to possible solvency issues and shrinking the investible 
universe for investors. Effectively addressing climate change requires concerted action 
from all actors – companies, investors and policymakers.  
     . . . 
Many of the companies we invest in are pledging to support these political commitments. 
Over the coming decades, climate change will present strategic risks and opportunities to 
businesses. In alignment with our responsible investment pillars, AIMCo is committed to: 
                                                          
406 Ibid at 1096. 
407 Ibid at 1098-1099, citing UN Environmental Programme Fin Initiative, “Integrated Governance: A new Model for 
Sustainability, (2014), http://goo.gl/AiZJou. 
408 Ibid at 1098. 
409 Alberta Investment Management Corporation, (“AIMCo”), a Crown corporation of the Province of Alberta, 
https://www.aimco.alberta.ca/Who-We-Are/At-a-Glance. 
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▪ Integrating consideration of an asset’s climate risk and resiliency into our 
investment decision making, including voting by proxy to support reasonable 
proposals to limit carbon emissions (ESG integration). 
▪ Investing to support lower carbon infrastructure, such as alternative energy 
solutions and eco-efficiencies to facilitate the transition to a lower carbon 
economy (Positively-themed ESG investments). 
▪ Actively engaging with companies to promote climate-resilient strategies and best 
environmental practices. AIMCo champions a voice over exit approach- we prefer 
to engage with select companies to promote best practices and effect positive 
changes, where possible, rather than divesting of applicable holdings. 
(Engagement). 
▪ Reporting on climate change related Responsible Investment activities (Reporting 
and Disclosure). 
▪ Participation in collaborative initiatives and support for credible climate change 
policies and regulations based on achievable emissions reduction targets, water 
efficiency targets, alternate energy implementation strategies and industry best 
practices (Advocacy). 
 
AIMCo is committed to addressing climate risk across our portfolios in support of Canada’s 
vision and strategy to achieve a more sustainable, low carbon economy, while continuing 
to focus on our fiduciary duty to our clients.410 
 
In July 2017, the European Commission’s Expert Group on Sustainable Finance reported that failure 
to consider climate-related risks may breach fiduciary duties and potentially lead to claims for 
damages by beneficiaries and clients of financial institutions.411 It states that “The responsibility of 
directors and investors to manage long-term sustainability risks should be enshrined in their 
relevant duties, whether it is through fiduciary duty in common law or its equivalent in other legal 
systems.”412 It recommends establishing a single set of principles describing the content of what a 
fiduciary duty and all its related concepts entail, which can then feed into the respective relevant 
laws according to the specificities of market participants, observing that regulatory authorities 
need to make clear to all parties in the investment and lending chain that managing ESG risks is 
integral to fulfilling fiduciary duty, acting loyally to beneficiaries and acting in a prudent manner.413  
 
The Investment Integration Project (“TIIP”) helps institutional investors understand the feedback 
loops between their investments and the planet’s overarching environmental, financial and other 
                                                          
410 Ibid, “Investment Philosophy”, http://www.aimco.alberta.ca/How-We-Think/Investment-Philosophy.   
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systems that make profitable investment opportunities possible.414 It has created a guide to 
achieving the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals.415 Institutional investors can 
conduct an audit of their climate-related activities, develop a targeted investment program on 
climate change, and tailor support to institutional investors.416  
 
 
iii. The Governance Role of Debt in Climate Change Risk  
 
Lenders also have a governance role in keeping directors and officers accountable for decisions 
regarding climate-related financial risk.417 Triantis and Daniels posited that, in the past, banks 
assisted in correcting governance problems of firms through their monitoring activities, superior 
access to information under loan covenants, and through direct intervention with corporate 
officers or exiting the relationship.418 To the extent that the bank's monitoring deterred directors 
from shirking their obligations, it reduced the risk on the firm's debt, and both equity and debt 
holders benefited from the bank's governance role. A fundamental assumption underlying this 
notion of interactive corporate governance was that all stakeholders shared the goal of firm-value 
maximization.419 For companies relying on public debt markets, while the indenture trustee often 
had limited responsibility to monitor compliance, issuers frequently were required to back their 
commercial paper with lines of credit from banks, with the banks serving a similar governance 
role.420  
 
Hence, the screening and monitoring activities of a lender produced positive externalities that 
benefited numerous stakeholders with an interest in the corporation through the bank’s decision 
to lend, which signalled to potential and existing stakeholders the quality of the borrower; through 
the imposition of fixed obligations under the loan agreement that prevented managerial slack; 
through security rights that constrained the ability of managers to liquidate non-cash assets or 
unilaterally sell more debt; and through loan covenants and monitoring of specified prohibited 
types of behaviour. Triantis and Daniels called this feature “interdependent screening” to describe 
externalities that flow not only among creditors, but also from lenders to shareholders, employees 
and other stakeholders.421 Therefore, there is a governance role for banks in ensuring that 
directors and officers are addressing climate change risk in an effective and timely manner.422  It 
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also links to the discussion above, in respect of what investors should expect of the financial 
institutions in which they invest. 
 
However, a shift in the nature of debt markets in recent years also acts as a barrier to addressing 
climate change. The continual introduction of new structured financial products and the shift to 
non-bank debt financing, including syndication, securitization and collateralization, have 
profoundly altered the nature of debt.423 The result has been a fundamental shift in credit 
relationships. For many years lending was “relational”, the bank as operating lender had an 
ongoing relationship with the business and often the community in which the business was 
located.  That relationship meant that lender and borrower shared goals of sustaining economic 
activity in the community.  However, lending has radically altered. Domestic and foreign creditors 
often now have little interest or direct connection with Canadian companies, their stakeholders 
and the communities in which they operate.424  Their focus is on short-term returns on their 
investment. In turn, there has been a loss in governance oversight of the debt by senior lenders, 
as they have fully hedged their risk.425  While there are early indications that Canadian banks are 
beginning to think about climate change risk in terms of their lending portfolio priorities, many of 
these new types of debt have only a short-term time horizon and place pressure on corporate 
officers to deliver short-term returns or repayments as a condition of financing.426 
 
Products currently being developed, such as catastrophe bonds and climate derivatives, have 
potential to advance or to hinder climate adaptation. For example, credit default swaps can help 
companies manage transition risks by hedging against failed strategies to move to lower carbon 
technologies.  However, speculative credit default swaps can also hedge against development of 
green technologies, creating incentives to cause the failure of an alternative energy initiative or 
company, as the payout is higher if the business fails.427 Unlike insurance, which requires the 
purchaser to have an insurable interest in the asset or business, the incentives in respect of 
numerous derivatives are skewed towards immediate profit, not long-term investment. The 
opaqueness, speed and sophistication of these markets makes them problematic for addressing 
climate change. There is need for new principles that link transactions in the climate finance 
market with sustainability goals. 
 
Beyond the scope of this study, but ripe for research is consideration of the rapid growth in green 
bond markets. Green bonds are ostensibly aimed at financing environmental projects. Examples 
would be solar and other forms of clean or renewable energy; pollution reduction and prevention; 
environmentally sustainable management of living natural resources; environmentally sustainable 
fishery and aquaculture; terrestrial and aquatic biodiversity conservation and climate change 
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adaptation.428  There are subspecies of such bonds, such as “landscape green bonds”, aimed at 
environmental investment in entire landscapes, including reducing deforestation and creating 
sustainable livelihoods on a scaled up and much longer term timeline.429  While green bonds are 
experiencing exponential growth, there is concern that some financial products are cashing in on 
a growing interest by investors in investing in sustainable businesses, while not directing the funds 
as promised.  “Greenwashing”, as it is called, is where businesses and financial firms offering green 
bonds benefit from the growing interest, but do not necessarily invest in economic activities that 
protect or enhance the environment or move us towards a lower carbon footprint.430  The financial 
services firms or investment banks that sell green bonds often do not verify their sustainability. 
There is an opaqueness concern - once the funds have been raised, there is often no tracking of 
their use to verify whether the activities financed are carbon reducing or environmentally sound. 
Any standards that exist are purely voluntary and unenforceable, and are largely financial industry 
created.431 Hence, an extremely important public policy question is how to encourage sustainable 
or green investing, but not have these developments set back by greenwashing actors in the 
market.   
 
The European Commission has commenced developing standards to create some oversight and 
accountability regarding how to label green bonds and other green investment products.432 It is in 
the process of developing EU labels for green financial products.433 The only accountability check 
now is that investors decide, with imperfect information, whether a bond is sufficiently green to 
meet their own investment priorities.  Why mention this issue in a study on fiduciary obligation?  
Because, as institutional investors consider how to shift their investment management practices 
to address climate-related financial risk, part of their fiduciary obligations arguably include 
ensuring that the green financial products they are investing in truly are bonds and other products 
that meet their climate-related obligations.  
 
 
V. Legislators Could Clarify the Scope of the Obligations 
 
One means by which fiduciaries may be encouraged to address climate risk would be through 
legislation that clarifies the need for fiduciaries to address the issue and embeds the cost of carbon 
in capital market decisions.  
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Canadian provincial and federal governments have commenced addressing climate change risk.434 
British Columbia imposed the first carbon tax in North America.435 The Government of Canada 
announced a pan-Canadian framework that includes a national floor price on carbon.436 The 
framework agrees to phase out the use of coal to produce electricity by 2030; reduce methane 
and hydrofluorocarbons emissions from the extraction of oil and gas by 40-45% by 2025; create 
more rigorous vehicle emissions standards; and develop models for net-zero energy building codes 
by 2030.437  The federal government invested more than $31 billon in the clean technology sector 
from 2010 to 2014,438 ranking sixth in the world for investment in new domestic clean energy 
generation projects in 2014.  Cleantech companies generated over $11 billion of revenues and 
employed over 50,000 people in 2014.439  
 
However, provincial and federal governments appear to have largely avoided any mention of 
fiduciary obligation in their public references to climate change.  A canvass of the public disclosures 
in August 2017 found that the federal government website, including news releases, briefings and 
public information, makes only brief mention of fiduciary duties in relation to climate change 
risks.440 Global Affairs Canada briefly mentions climate change risks in relation to corporate social 
responsibility, observing that effective management of social and environmental risks can improve 
business performance, and has led to increased oversight by boards over how the company is 
managing its environmental performance as part of its fiduciary responsibility.441 A 2010 study 
briefly refers to climate-related risks as fiduciary obligations regarding environmental 
performance.442 The federal government website also includes a 2011 document by the Network 
for Business Sustainability, which observes that legal liability could arise for firms stemming from 
                                                          
434 Government of Canada, Federal actions for a clean growth economy, 2017, 
https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/themes/environment/documents/weather1/20170119-en.pdf.  
435 British Columbia Government, “Revenue-neutral Carbon Tax Program”, 
http://www.fin.gov.bc.ca/tbs/tp/climate/carbon_tax.htm.  
436 Canadian provinces will be given until 2018 to implement a carbon pricing policy, starting with a minimum price of 
$10 per tonne in 2018, increasing $10 per year to $50 per tonne by 2022. Ibid. 
437 Ibid, at 15. 
438 Energy Factbook 2016-2017, supra note 53 at 11-12. However, the report notes that there is no generally accepted 
definition of the “energy and clean technology” (“cleantech”) sector. 
439 The Toronto Stock Exchange Venture (TSXV) defines Cleantech companies as companies whose operations fall 
under one of five environmental categories: Energy Efficiency; Low-Impact Material and Products; Renewable Energy 
Equipment Manufacturing and Technology; Renewable Energy Production and Distribution; and Waste Reduction and 
Water Management, ibid. 
440 See for example, Government of Canada, “Federal Adaptation Policy Framework for climate change” (2011), 
https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/climate-change/federal-adaptation-policy-
framework.html [“Federal Adaptation Policy”]. Government of Canada, “Governance for Sustainability” (2010),  
https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/csr-rse.nsf/eng/h_rs00577.html. Global Affairs Canada observes that there is pressure on 
companies by investors to report on climate change risks. Global Affairs Canada, Canada’s Enhanced Corporate Social 
Responsibility Strategy to Strengthen Canada’s Extractive Sector, Global Affairs Canada, 
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/other-autre/csr-strat-
rse.aspx?lang=eng. 
441 Global Affairs Canada reports that a number of pension funds have formed coalitions around issues such as climate 
change in order to pressure companies, including those in the extractive sector, to report on related risks to their 
operations and performance; Andrea Baldwin & Coro Stranderg, CSR Governance Guidelines (2010) Canadian Business 
for Corporate Responsibility at 2, 21: Government of Canada, https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/csr-
rse.nsf/eng/h_rs00577.html. 
442 Ibid. 
  
 
76 
a breach of fiduciary duties should they fail to take impacts from climate-related risks into 
account.443 The federal government’s website discusses its fiduciary duties related to First Nations, 
Inuit and other areas of sole federal responsibility in the context of climate change, but does not 
discuss the obligations of corporations, pensions and other fiduciaries regarding climate change 
risk.444 
 
Under the Alberta Government Climate Leadership Plan, all pollution from coal-fired electricity will 
be phased out by 2030, and 30% of electricity used by Albertans will come from renewable sources 
such as solar, wind and hydro by 2030.445  The Alberta Government website does not discuss 
fiduciary obligations in relation to climate change risk in any direct way.446  Alberta’s Climate 
Change Advisory Panel, in its reports and consultation process, does not mention fiduciary 
obligations. Its final report focuses on a carbon tax as a means of effectively responding to climate 
change.447 Alberta’s Climate Leadership Action Plan also does not discuss fiduciary obligation.448  
That is not to suggest that the Alberta Government is not active in trying to reduce GHG emissions. 
In 2007, Alberta became the first jurisdiction in North America to have mandatory GHG emission 
reduction targets for large emitters across all sectors.449  In June 2015, the reduction targets were 
strengthened so that facilities that emit more than 100,000 tonnes of GHG emissions per year will 
have to reduce their emissions intensity by 20% per barrel by 2017.450 Companies unable to comply 
with the target through direct emissions reductions can use recognized offsets or pay a CAD 
30/tonne fee by 2017 into its Climate Change and Emissions Management Fund. The fund is 
investing in technologies and projects that will further reduce GHG emissions.451 The fund has 
collected more than CAD 577 million as of April 2015.452  In November 2015 the Government of 
Alberta released a climate change policy that moves towards phasing out coal-generated 
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electricity, implementing a new carbon price on GHG pollution, placing a hard-cap on oil sands 
GHG emissions and reducing methane gas emissions from oil and gas operations by 45%.453 
 
Ontario has a five-year plan to fight climate change, reduce greenhouse gas pollution and 
transition to a low-carbon economy.454  The Ontario five-year climate action plan and climate 
change strategy do not mention fiduciary duties, focusing on carbon pricing as the means to reduce 
GHG emissions in businesses.455  The closest it comes is in a discussion of carbon pricing, which 
mentions that carbon pricing “reduces greenhouse gas emissions as businesses and households 
incorporate the cost of emitting carbon into their decisions, encouraging companies and 
consumers to move away from fossil fuels and towards cleaner and more efficient ways of doing 
business.”456 Ontario’s five-year plan actively seeks to reduce GHG emissions and transition the 
province to a low-carbon economy.457 
 
Some provincial governments have legislatively addressed treatment of stranded assets, an issue 
increasingly important. Yet fossil fuel companies are spending significant resources to challenge 
these efforts.458 In upholding the validity of the legislation, the courts have observed that the 
treatment of stranded assets is, at its foundation, a policy issue informed by public interest 
considerations. At the same time, provincial legislation is being “trumped” by federal insolvency 
law as companies fail,459 such that the costs of many stranded assets are likely to fall on taxpayers 
through the tax base as we transition our economy.460  
 
The Government of Newfoundland and Labrador’s website, Turn Back the Tide, offers tools for 
businesses and others in the province to address climate change.  It mentions the Gold and 
Scotchmer report, discussed above, highlighting the report’s conclusions that pension fund 
managers and trustees owe a legal duty to their clients to assess all potential risks and 
opportunities, including those posed by climate change.461   
 
In May 2017, the Nova Scotia Public Service Superannuation Plan (“PPSP”) issued a statement on 
climate change, stating that:  
The Trustee has a fiduciary obligation to present and future beneficiaries of the 
PSSP to maximize investment returns without incurring undue risk. To manage 
risk, the Trustee maintains a well-diversified portfolio. But the Trustee is also 
keenly aware of climate change as an investment risk, potentially jeopardizing 
returns over the long term. The Trustee further believes that a gradual global shift 
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away from carbon-based energy, as well as other effects of climate change, will 
present opportunities to the Plan.”462  
 
It notes that climate change has affected the trustee’s mandate to enhance assets in a risk-prudent 
matter, and that it will monitor and manage the risks associated with climate change.463  
 
Significantly, the Office of the Auditor General of Canada in March 2018 reported that, on the basis 
of current government policies and actions, Canada is not expected to meet its 2020 target for 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and that substantially more effort is needed.464 A 
collaboration among 11 Auditors General across Canada, the report concludes that no government 
in Canada has met all its climate change commitments; many that have set GHG reduction targets 
are not on track to meet them, and none of them are fully prepared to adapt to the impacts of a 
changing climate.465 Most provinces have developed high-level mitigation strategies that include 
actions to reduce emissions, but they lack detailed timelines, implementation plans, and cost 
estimates. The Auditor Generals conclude that meeting the 2030 target will require a joint and 
significant effort by all levels of government.466 
 
The Fiduciary Duty in the 21st Century report identifies some challenges to ensuring that fiduciaries 
carry out their prudential duties, recommending government action to modernize definitions and 
interpretations of fiduciary duty in a way that ensures these duties are relevant to 21st century 
investors.467 It makes a number of recommendations for legislators and regulators that are 
relevant to climate change risk: 
 
• Clarify that fiduciaries must analyse and take account of ESG issues in their investment 
processes, in their active ownership activities, and in their public policy engagement. 
• Clarify that fiduciary duty requires that investors pay attention to long-term 
investment value drivers, including ESG issues.  
• Encourage or require institutional investors to support public policy efforts promoting 
responsible investment.  
• Require investor transparency on all aspects of ESG integration and investment 
practice. 
• Require better corporate reporting on ESG issues and on how these issues affect 
business performance over the short and long term.  
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• Heighten expectations of trustee competence and skill.  
• Better implement existing responsible investment legislation and policy instruments, 
such as stewardship codes and asset owner disclosure requirements, and clarify that 
these laws and instruments refer to environmental, social and governance issues, and 
analyse and report on how these affect investor and company performance. 
• Support efforts to harmonize national and regional responsible investment legislation 
and policy instruments, eg stewardship codes and disclosure requirements.  
• Develop an international statement or agreement on the duties that fiduciaries owe 
to their beneficiaries, reinforcing the core duties of loyalty, prudence and competence 
and stressing that investors must pay attention to long-term investment value drivers, 
including ESG issues, in their investment processes, in their active ownership activities 
and in their public policy engagement. This statement should reinforce the core duties 
of loyalty and prudence; and should stress that investors must pay attention to long-
term investment value drivers, including ESG issues, in their investment processes, in 
their active ownership activities, and in their public policy engagement.468 
• Support the development of guidance on implementation processes: investment 
beliefs, long-term mandates, integrated reporting and performance.469 
 
The report had recommendations specific to Canada that were drafted by consulting investor and 
other groups that have already been engaged in investor action in Canada.470  Recommendations 
include that the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada and the relevant 
pension regulators in each province should clarify that asset owners are expected to pay attention 
to long-term factors, including ESG factors, in their decision-making, and in the decision-making of 
their agents; and that the federal government and the governments of the provinces should follow 
the example set by Ontario and introduce ESG disclosure legislation.471 
 
For each of the recommendations for legislators and regulators, the requirements proposed above 
could be tailored to expressly require fiduciaries to identify and address climate-related financial 
risk in the exercise of their obligations. It would go some measure towards directing fiduciaries’ 
attention to the risks and the need for mitigation and adaptation strategies. 
 
Companies respond positively to legislative standards, as they create a level playing field across all 
businesses and because they serve as a counter-balance to investor pressure for short-term 
returns. Absent regulatory requirements to reduce emissions and shift to green technologies, 
companies are unlikely to redirect their resources. Mark Carney has observed that by the time 
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climate change becomes a clear danger to financial stability, it may already be too late to stabilize 
the atmosphere.472   
 
Another area for government action is through mandatory disclosure requirements under 
Canadian securities law, a requirement being advocated by institutional investors in Canada. One 
2017 study by the Chartered Professional Accountants of Canada of more than 75 publicly-traded 
companies in Canada found that while 79% were making some climate-related disclosure, 
disclosure was generally inadequate.473 The vast majority failed to provide specific disclosure about 
oversight of climate-related risks, financial metrics for GHG emissions reductions or targets to 
move towards a lower carbon economy.474 
 
Canadian securities regulators lag international developments in disclosure on climate change risk. 
On 5 April 2018, the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) published its long-awaited study of 
climate-change in Staff Notice 51-354 Report on Climate change-related Disclosure 
Project.475  Over one year in the making, with extensive consultations with issuers and investors, 
securities regulators acknowledged the importance of climate-change financial risk, but they did 
not announce any new requirements. The CSA observed that although securities laws in Canada 
do not specifically address climate change, the general requirement to disclose material 
information requires disclosure of the material climate change-related risks and impacts.476 At the 
same time, it reported that substantially all users consulted are dissatisfied with the current state 
of disclosure. The CSA announced that it intends to consider new disclosure requirements 
regarding non-venture issuers’ corporate governance practices in relation to climate change risk, 
and how issuers oversee the identification, assessment and management of material risks, but 
wrote that “there is no assurance that any new rules or amendments will ultimately be adopted in 
any of the CSA jurisdictions.”477 While it is understandable that any potential new rules will need 
to follow the CSA’s standard policy-making process, the CSA missed an important opportunity to 
state the principles that will drive the reform or to announce that it will require companies to 
disclose their governance and oversight of climate change-related risks and how they are 
contributing (or not) to Canada’s climate targets.   
 
Models exist that the CSA could have endorsed. For example, since October 2013, UK quoted 
companies (publicly-traded companies) have been required to report on their GHG emissions as 
part of their annual directors’ report and account publicly for their contributions to climate change 
on an annual basis.478  The requirement affects all UK incorporated companies listed on the main 
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market of the London Stock Exchange, a European Economic Area market or whose shares are 
dealing on the New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ.479  Directors and officers must make every 
reasonable effort to acquire all material data to comply with the regulations.480 They are also 
required to report on environmental matters to the extent it is necessary for an understanding of 
the company’s business in their annual report, including where appropriate, the use of key 
performance indicators.481 In circumstances where directors and officers find it difficult to compile 
all necessary data in a timely manner to comply with reporting requirements, they are to state 
what is omitted and explain why in the directors’ report.482  
 
The CSA review did offer some new data. While over half of the issuers it examined provide some 
specific climate change-related disclosure in their MD&A and/or Annual Information Form, the 
other half use boilerplate disclosure or no disclosure at all.483 Almost no companies disclose their 
governance and risk management practices respecting climate change. The majority of issuers that 
mention climate change-related risks in their regulatory filings do not quantify the potential 
financial impact of those risks. The CSA noted an incomplete understanding by some issuers of the 
implications of climate change-related risks and financial impacts that may affect issuers’ 
businesses irrespective of the carbon intensity of their own operations.484  
 
Importantly, the CSA did acknowledge the fiduciary obligations associated with the assessment of 
materiality: 
 
In fulfilling their oversight functions, audit committees, boards and certifying officers 
should consider, among other things, the assessment management has made regarding 
the materiality of climate change related matters, and whether the disclosure made in 
securities regulatory filings is consistent with this assessment.485 
 
Canadian securities regulators are caught up in the “materiality” issue under Canadian securities 
disclosure legislation. Yet insights from reports internationally and from investors surveyed by the 
CSA make clear that the current materiality standard does not work for climate-related financial 
risks, given both the timelines and the existence of risk across the entire economy. As noted earlier, 
                                                          
  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/environmental-reporting-guidelines-including-mandatory-greenhouse-
gas-emissions-reporting-guidance.  
479 Ibid, Strategic Report and Directors’ Report Regulations 2013. 
480 Guidance, supra note 477 at 28. 
481 Environmental key performance indicators are quantifiable measures that reflect the environmental performance 
of an organization in the context of achieving its wider goals and objectives, focusing on relevance, transparency, 
accurateness and comparability. The focus is on ‘key’ measures i.e. those most important to an understanding of an 
organization. the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales have published guidance for company 
directors and officers preparing and auditing annual financial statements to help them in understanding what is 
required to be reported and how this relates to the latest statutory financial accounting and reporting standards. 
482 ibid. 
483 CSA Staff Notice 51-354 Report on Climate change-related Disclosure Project, supra note 475. More companies 
undertake some disclosure in their voluntary reports, but most disclose it as a regulatory risk, rather than looking to 
their own emissions and other activities contributing to climate change. 
484 Ibid at 27. 
485 Ibid at 7. 
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climate-change disclosure could be treated similarly to corporate governance disclosure, which is 
not subject to a materiality standard in Canada. 
 
Canadian securities regulators should adopt the recommendations of the TCFD, which provide a 
framework for disclosure of climate-related financial risks by corporations, financial enterprises, 
investors and asset managers.486 SHARE has been facilitating a group of large Canadian pension 
plans and other institutional investors to ask Canadian securities regulators to adopt new 
requirements for large issuers, to advocate for an update to company disclosure obligations and 
guidance to address climate change-related concerns.487 An enhanced framework for disclosure is 
critically important, but it is not a sufficient measure by itself to address the challenges regarding 
climate finance.  There needs to be a deeper discussion about the role of financial markets in 
addressing climate risk, and the allocation of responsibility as between public and private interests.   
 
Other jurisdictions are considering regulatory change to reflect developing notions of fiduciary 
obligation.  The European Commission, as part of its Capital Markets Union initiative, is considering 
new regulation specifying that fiduciary duties of asset owners and asset managers include 
integrating ESG considerations into decision-making, which includes climate change risk; ensuring 
that sustainability is more central to corporate governance; and promoting better integration of 
ESG performance in issuer ratings and key market benchmarks.488 The Commission’s High-Level 
Expert Group on Sustainable Finance has recommended that the fiduciary duties of institutional 
investors and asset managers explicitly integrate long-term sustainability, including climate-related 
factors.489 It has recommended that in the drafting of new legislative provisions on fiduciary duty, 
a “think sustainability first” principle should be applied to all key investor and financial 
legislation.490  
 
SHARE has been meeting with federal government officials and Members of Parliament to 
advocate for similar ESG disclosure regulations for federally registered pension plans.491  
 
Also, there needs to be fairness measures for smaller retail investors. With the diminution of 
pension funds, individuals forced to turn to capital markets to generate some return in preparation 
for retirement are not being given investment options appropriate to their risk bearing capacity.492 
There needs to be regulatory oversight of the financial products for the transitioning economy, to 
ensure that retail investors do not unnecessarily suffer losses. A very important step is for Canada 
to follow the rest of the world and impose a fiduciary obligation on investment advisors to consider 
the best interests of their clients when giving investment advice.493 That advice should pay 
attention to climate risk as well as other financial risks to the retail investor.  
 
                                                          
486 TCFD Final Report, supra note 73. 
487 SHARE Annual Report 2016, supra note 382. 
488 Report on the Capital Markets Union Initiative, 8 June 2017, 
 https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/mid-term-review-capital-markets-union-action-plan_en.  
489 European Commission, Final Report by the High-Level Expert Group on Sustainable Finance, January 2018. 
490 Ibid at 2. 
491 SHARE Annual Report 2016, supra note 382 at 14. 
492 Sarra, Anthropocene, supra note 69. 
493 On all matters, including climate financial risk. 
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Mutual funds in Canada should be required to make their proxy voting records public in an 
accessible form. Given that such disclosures are currently available only to unitholders, prospective 
purchasers are unable to evaluate the degree to which such funds are aligning their voting in 
support of climate change mitigation and adaptation. As in France, all institutional investors could 
be required to disclose their climate change risk management strategies and actions, and ensure 
that the decision-making board or advisory board designates someone with climate change 
competency to sit on the board. 
 
Very important to note, but beyond the scope of this study, is that GHG emissions are a global 
challenge, requiring a shared global solution. While the Canadian oil sands contributed about 9.3% 
of Canada’s total GHG emissions in 2014, that amount is equal to approximately 0.1% of global 
emissions.494 The Canadian Government observes that all countries, governments, Indigenous 
peoples, as well as civil society, business and individuals will have to be mobilized in order to 
achieve significant reductions in global GHG emissions.495 
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
Climate-related financial risk exists, and it will continue to grow as Canada transitions to a low 
carbon economy.  Directors and officers, pension trustees and other fiduciaries have a fiduciary 
obligation to identify the risks, and where they exist, to develop strategies in the best interests of 
the company, pension fund or investment fund to reduce the risk.  Duly diligent efforts by these 
fiduciaries will not be second-guessed by the courts, and thus the best strategy is to avoid liability 
risk by acting now. 
 
There are also significant opportunities for Canadian business in the transition to a low carbon 
economy. Efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change will produce new opportunities for 
organizations through resource efficiency and cost savings,496 investing in technological 
innovation, the adoption of low-emission energy sources,497 the development of new low-emission 
products and services, and access to new markets as sectors shift to a lower-carbon economy and 
                                                          
494 Environment Canada National Inventory Report (2014),  
https://www.ec.gc.ca/ges-ghg/default.asp?lang=En&n=662F9C56-1.  
495 Government of Canada, “GHG Emissions”, 2017, 
http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/sites/www.nrcan.gc.ca/files/energy/pdf/oilsands-sablesbitumineux/15-
0513%20Oil%20Sands%20-%20GHG%20Emissions_us_e.pdf.  
496 UNEP and Copenhagen Centre for Energy Efficiency, Best Practices and Case Studies for Industrial Energy Efficiency 
Improvement, February 2016; Environmental Protection Agency Victoria (EPA Victoria), “Resource Efficiency Case 
Studies: Lower your Impact”, 2013, http://www.epa.vic.gov.au/business-and-industry/lower-your-impact/resource-
efficiency/case-studies.    
497 International Energy Agency, “Global energy investment down 8% in 2015 with flows signalling move towards cleaner 
energy”, 14 September 2016.  The International Energy Agency reports that to meet global emission-reduction goals, 
countries will need to transition a major percentage of their energy generation to low emission alternatives such as wind, 
solar, wave, tidal, hydro, geothermal, nuclear, biofuels, and carbon capture and storage. See also Frankfurt School-
United Nations Environmental Programme Centre and Bloomberg New Energy Finance, “Global Trends in Renewable 
Energy Investment 2017”, 2017; Ceres, “Power Forward 3.0: How the largest U.S. companies are capturing business 
value while addressing climate change”, 2017, https://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/power-forward-3.  
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build resilience along the supply chain.498  Good governance suggests that directors and other 
fiduciaries address these upside potential opportunities to offset transition risks and costs.   
Climate-related opportunities will vary depending on the region, market, and industry in which an 
organization operates.499  
 
It may take time for an appellate court judgment to alert directors and officers of the extent of 
their fiduciary and other obligations in respect of climate change related financial risk.  Canada’s 
governments could help clarify the scope of obligations by either expressly legislating that 
companies address climate change financial risk or expressly requiring directors and officers to 
identify material climate-related risks and develop strategies to manage them. At a minimum, they 
should legislate the relevant disclosure requirements recommended by the TCFD. While directors, 
officers, pension trustees and other fiduciaries have an obligation to identify and address climate 
change risk under their existing duties, the federal government could offer clear guidance on the 
scope of their obligations.  
 
                                                          
498 G20 Green Finance Study Group. G20 Green Finance Synthesis Report. 5 September 2016, 
http://unepinquiry.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Synthesis_Report_Full_EN.pdf. TCFD Final Report, supra note 73 
at 6-7. The TCFD reports that “The concept of climate resilience involves organizations developing adaptive capacity to 
respond to climate change to better manage the associated risks and seize opportunities, including the ability to 
respond to transition risks and physical risks. Opportunities include improving efficiency, designing new production 
processes, and developing new products. Opportunities related to resilience may be especially relevant for 
organizations with long-lived fixed assets or extensive supply or distribution networks; those that depend critically on 
utility and infrastructure networks or natural resources in their value chain; and those that may require longer-term 
financing and investment.”  
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